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Abstract 
This thesis explores the importance of political conservatism in shaping the ideological and 
political foundations of British imperialism in India between 1857 and 1914. From the Indian 
Revolt to the rise of Indian nationalism, it examines how British and Indian conservatives 
attempted to define a conceptual and institutional framework of empire which politically 
opposed liberal imperialism to the First World War. It relies upon a biographical analysis to 
examine how intellectual configurations defined distinct political positions on Indian empire. 
This study reveals the extent that local conservative inclination and action, through political 
actors such as Lord Ellenborough, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Mayo, Lord Lytton, the Kathiawar 
States, Roper Lethbridge, and M.M. Bhownaggree, shaped public and partisan discourse on 
empire. It argues that British and Indian conservatives evoked shared principles centered in 
locality, prescription, and imagination to challenge, mollify, and supplant the universal and 
centralizing ambitions of liberal imperialists and nationalists with the employment of pre-modern 
ideas and institutions. It is argued that this response to liberalism conditioned their shared 
contribution and collaboration towards an imperial framework predicated principally upon 
respecting and supporting local autonomy and traditional authority in a hierarchical and divided 
India. This formulated political positions and policy on Indian empire which advocated for the 
state’s primacy, paternal local authority and property obligation, and veneration for the 
transcendent qualities of tradition and religion. Moreover, this framework conditioned a 
challenge to a European civilizational definitions of race and identity, with an incorporative and 
vertical identity and subjecthood determined by a state’s, group’s, or individual’s national 
belonging as well as loyalty and obligation to the Crown. 
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Thesis Introduction: Finding the Local Roots of Conservative Empire                                                                                                                                                                      
This thesis explores the importance of political conservatism in shaping the ideological and 
political foundations of British imperialism in India between 1857 and 1914. From the Indian 
Revolt to the rise of Indian nationalism, it examines how British and Indian conservatives 
attempted to define a conceptual and institutional framework of empire which politically 
opposed liberal imperialism to the First World War. It relies upon a biographical analysis to 
examine how intellectual configurations defined distinct political positions on British 
imperialism in India. This study reveals the extent that local conservative inclination and action, 
through political actors such as Lord Ellenborough, Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Mayo, Lord Lytton, 
the Kathiawar States, M.M. Bhownaggree, and Roper Lethbridge, shaped public and partisan 
discourse regarding the objectives of Indian Empire. It argues that British and Indian 
conservatives evoked shared principles centered in locality, prescription, and imagination to 
challenge, mollify, and supplant the universal and centralizing ambitions of liberal imperialists 
and nationalists.  
 This thesis contributes to British imperial historiography on two levels. First, it will show 
that British and Indian conservatives expanded local and pre-modern political and social 
concepts to influence the nature and purpose of Indian Empire in the nineteenth century. Second, 
it demonstrates that British and Indian conservatives collaborated in defining an imperial 
framework which corresponded with their ideas and institutions. While seeing the “modern 
period” as starting in the eighteenth century, this study defines “modernity” conceptually as the 
product of liberal ideology which adhered to the universal applicability of progress, scientific 
rationalism, and individual autonomy. It is shown that British and Indian conservatives viewed 
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liberalism as an alien and intrusive political and social force, and responded with the 
employment of pre-modern ideas and institutions predicated on locality, prescription, and 
imagination. It is argued that British and Indian conservative responses to liberalism conditioned 
their shared contribution and collaboration towards an imperial framework predicated principally 
upon respecting and supporting local autonomy and traditional authority. This formulated 
political positions and policy on Indian Empire that advocated for the state’s primacy, paternal 
local authority and property obligation, and veneration for the transcendent qualities of tradition 
and religion.  
Historiography: Imperializing British and Indian Conservatism 
 A growing scholarship on British conservatism’s philosophical underpinnings illustrates 
that its principles and policies were enforced by a skeptical view of human nature which 
proscribed limits to state and individual reasoning. Using the term “conservative” to label 
adherents of tory and conservative political philosophies, this thesis demonstrates that eighteenth 
century toryism informed the intellectual development of British conservatism in the nineteenth 
century. On state primacy, Roger Scruton argues that “the conservative believes in the power of 
the state as necessary to the state’s authority, and will seek to establish and enforce that power in 
the face of every influence that opposes it.” He argues that in contrast to a Lockean individualist 
perspective, conservatives believe that people exist in a ‘non-contractual’ pre-existing social 
order defined through a natural bond of locality. This contextualizes conservatism’s commitment 
to property. He explains that conservatives maintain a romantic perspective of property which 
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seeks to fuse capitalism with a feudal obligation of duty.1 Nigel Ashford and Stephen Davies 
argue that conservatives conceive that an individual’s duties and responsibilities are determined 
within a particular social context. Just like the individual, the conservative sees political and 
social institutional legitimacy deriving from their endurance over time in a specific 
environment.2 Noël O’Sullivan contends that conservatives believe in an unmalleable and 
unintelligible world, and, therefore, accept the limits that the latter places on an individual’s or 
state’s reason and will. Moreover, conservatives comprehend that these limits and the variety of 
individual and group wants make compromise necessary for a functioning society.3  
 This recognition of human nature’s rational limit informs a conservative’s cautious 
approach to reform. Greatly influenced by Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the French 
Revolution (1790), Ted Honderich relates an individual’s self-identity and self-interest to 
historically familiar political and social institutions. This leads to an aversion to complete 
change, but acceptance of gradual reform through existing institutions.4 Levente Nagy sees 
conservatives’ propensity for measured and reflective change from their acknowledgement of the 
national growth of society through organic interaction, extra-human religious, psychological, and 
natural influences, and traditional ideas of the good life.5 Arthur Aughey combines concepts of 
an organic society and limited human reason to propose that conservatives envision societal 
                                                 
1 Roger Scruton, The meaning of conservatism, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan, 1984), 21-31, 115. 
2 Nigel Ashford and Stephen Davies ed., A dictionary of conservative and libertarian thought (London: Routledge, 
1991), 46-47. 
3 Noël O’Sullivan, Conservatism (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1976), 11, 22. 
4 Ted Honderich, Conservatism (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990), 45, 56. 
5 Levente Nagy, “The Meaning of a Concept: Conservatism,” in Reflections on Conservatism, edited by Doğancan 
Özsel (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 23-29. 
 4 
 
harmony as the outcome of individual and mass conformity to locality and custom.6 This 
literature illustrates that British conservatives had a natural inclination towards acknowledging 
and conciliating societal difference in imagining and constructing political and social institutions. 
This thesis demonstrates that this inclination informed conservative political positions on the 
function of the state, property obligation, and religion and custom in the context of British 
imperialism in India. 
In the historiography on British imperialism in India there have been attempts to 
demonstrate a conservative perspective and influence on empire. This scholarship mostly views 
conservative influence as a late eighteenth and early nineteenth century relic, or a reactionary 
impulse tied to ideologies of national and racial superiority. Anna Gambles reveals that British 
conservatives applied a coherent and intellectual “conservative political economy,” which 
prioritized state and property interests, to Britain and India early in the nineteenth century. In 
opposing the liberal abstract principles of free trade and laissez faire economics, she illustrates 
that Tories, and later Conservatives, glorified a nationally and historically defined “Propertied 
Constitution.” Gambles argues that in defending the Corn Laws and instituting the income tax, 
conservatives sought to maintain the State’s relationship with the economy to ensure mutual 
consumption and social stability.7 In regards to empire, she reveals that conservatives respected 
England’s and India’s specific national experiences. As the East India Company was seen to 
                                                 
6 Arthur Aughey, “The Moderate Right: The Conservative Tradition in America and Britain,” in The Nature of the 
Right: European and American Politics and Political Thought since 1789, edited by Roger Eatwell and Noël 
O’Sullivan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1989), 101-103. 
7 Anna Gambles, Protection and politics: conservative economic discourse, 1815-1852 (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The 
Boydell Press, 1999), 19. 
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represent a local and evolved Indian institution, it also secured India’s distance from influencing 
England’s constitution.8 Moreover, she demonstrates that metropolitan conservatives criticized 
the 1793 Permanent Settlement as a destructive foreign intervention to Indian revenue and 
property organization.9  
Christopher A. Bayly reveals disparate conservative reactions to an emergent liberal 
imperialism early in the nineteenth century. In Imperial Meridian (1989), Bayly contends that 
British imperialism from 1780 to 1830 was informed by a “constructive conservatism,” which 
conditioned a patriotic, militaristic, agriculturalist, and evangelical nationalist policy on empire. 
He argues that it was an evangelical nationalization that sharpened racial attitudes and character 
stereotypes.10 In Recovering Liberties (2012), Bayly argues that separate British and Indian 
“neoconservative” entities emerged in opposition to a bourgeoning liberal imperialism early in 
the nineteenth century. As British conservatives supported the East India Company’s mercantile 
and cultural non-intervention policies, he sees Indian “neoconservatism” as a Hindu bourgeois 
defense of “their rights” to protect religious knowledge, purity, and livelihood from 
colonialism.11 Although limiting his analysis to the early nineteenth century, Bayly’s recognition 
that British and Indian conservatives were modern and national reactions to the universal 
ambitions of liberal empire provides an interesting conceptual basis to examine whether these 
similar responses led to imperial conservative collaborations later in the century. 
                                                 
8 Gambles, Protection and politics, 158-160. 
9 Ibid, 164. 
10 Christopher A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (New York: Longman, 
1989), 11, 136-149. 
11 C.A. Bayly, Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 89-94. 
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Eric Stokes, George Bearce, and Thomas Metcalf argue that British conservatism had an 
impact on imperial governance in India. Eric Stokes reveals a conservative response to utilitarian 
reform in India early in the nineteenth century. He argues that although this metropolitan 
philosophy had a substantial effect to initiating educational, economic, and social reform in 
India, there existed an alternative conservative style of imperial governance in western and 
southern India. Stokes demonstrates that Governors Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
Charles Metcalfe, and John Malcolm were driven by a Burkean attachment to history, as they 
pursued collaborative relationships with local paternal rulers and opposed radical schemes of 
reform.12 Bearce argues that Burke, along with Sir William Jones and William Robertson, 
embodied a conservative sentiment on India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
In showing that Burke believed in India’s position as a civilized polity defined through a 
prescribed hierarchy and system of social obligation, Bearce contends that he advocated that 
British rule of the Subcontinent should be through the country’s institutions which reflected the 
history and experiences of the people. Although Bearce sees Munro and Mountstuart Elphinstone 
as proponents of this conservative perspective in resisting the rapid westernization of local 
Indian culture, he submits that British conservatism failed amid the rise of utilitarianism and 
liberalism in India. This, he argues, reflected its inability to resolve the contraction of wanting to 
maintain India’s institutions while establishing imperial power.13 
                                                 
12 Eric, Stokes. The English utilitarians and India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 13. 
13 George D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India, 1784-1858 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 15-18, 
27-28, 124-154. 
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Metcalf maintains that British imperialism became more informed by conservative 
principles following the Indian Revolt. In Aftermath of Revolt (1964), Metcalf reveals that 
‘liberal conservatism’ informed a governing policy which supported the aristocratic classes and 
social non-interference.14 Preceding the Revolt, he traces an outline of a conservative political 
tradition in the East India Company among Governors Malcolm, Munro, and Mountstuart 
Elphinstone, who argued that a respect for tradition and the recognition of local character should 
caution against transformative liberal reform.15 From Viceroy’s Lord Canning’s policy to secure 
the favour of princes and property to Lord Cranborne’s opposition of Mysore annexation and 
support for the re-installation of its prince in the 1860s, he demonstrates that this tradition was 
maintained in combination with liberal attitudes of laissez faire in the Indian Civil Service.16  
In Ideologies of the Raj (1994), Metcalf perceives the advent of British conservatism in 
India as a reactionary force sustained by an ideology of racial difference late in the nineteenth 
century. He argues that there existed an ideological tension between race similarity and 
difference which defined the contradictory nature of British imperialism in the nineteenth 
century. He demonstrates that although a liberal conception of human universality underpinned 
British policies towards improving the Indian people through English education and culture in 
the first half of the century, after the 1857 Mutiny this was challenged by a British conception of 
                                                 
14 Thomas R. Metcalf, The aftermath of revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), viii. 
15 Metcalf, The aftermath of revolt, 6, 15-17. On John Malcom, Monuntstuart Elphinstone and Thomas Munro’s 
particularly Scottish intellectual influence see also Martha McLaren, British India & British Scotland, 1780-1830: 
career building, empire building, and a Scottish school of thought on Indian governance (Akron, Ohio: The 
University of Akron Press, 2001). 
16 Metcalf, Aftermath of the Revolt, 169-173. 
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racial difference which sustained the protection of a traditional, yet inferior and divided Indian 
society.17 He contends that Britons in India applied “scientific” methods of categorization to 
historicize ethnic, religious, and linguistic racial difference, allied with Benjamin Disraeli’s 
“neo-Tory” re-fashioning of the British Empire as a global military power in an increasingly 
nationalistic world. According to Metcalf, this alignment led to a political preference for 
identified “natural leaders,” such as princes, large landowners, and religious heads.18 Metcalf is 
influenced by Bernard Cohn’s study on the foundations of colonial knowledge, and a 
postcolonial scholarship examining the cultural foundations for a European ideology of race 
superiority.19 For Metcalf,  Henry Maine’s concept of the “Village Community,” where India is 
incorporated yet segregated as “ancient” compared to Europe within a liberal civilizational scale, 
became the excuse for the British to curtail liberal reform towards individual liberty and self-
government.20 
This scholarship demonstrates the prevalence of alternative conservative perspectives and 
political positions on British imperialism which opposed and modified a liberal civilizational 
ideology in nineteenth century India. It shows that rather than being a hegemonic and 
homogenous force, Britain’s Indian Empire was continually redefined by various intellectual and 
individual influences. Its limitation, however, is an inability to locate the intellectual lineage, 
                                                 
17 Thomas R. Metcalf, New Cambridge History of India, vol. 3, 4, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 28. 
18 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 113-159. 
19 Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
20 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, 68-72. 
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diversity, and applicability of British conservatism in India. Although Bayly appropriately 
expands metropolitan conservatism to encompass a “neo-conservative” perspective on Indian 
Empire, for him conservatives were not an ideologically or socially cohesive political force 
beyond the early nineteenth century. Metcalf’s “liberal conservatism” and “neo-Toryism’ 
emphasize an alternative conservative imperial perspective, yet, unlike Bayly, he does not fully 
contextualize this perspective within a British political and intellectual linage. Despite 
demonstrating that Disraeli’s efforts to turn the British Empire into a national enterprise reflected 
a Tory ideology, he does not explore how Toryism’s intellectual relationship with nationality 
could lead British conservatives to hold a more sympathetic understanding of India and its 
people. This thesis demonstrates that conservatives challenged a liberal civilizing perspective of 
racial difference and European superiority by prioritizing locality and prescription to identify, 
differentiate, and incorporate individuals and groups within empire. 
Ian Copland begins to draw important connections between the Conservative Party and a 
pro-aristocratic policy in India. He demonstrates that Lord Stanley’s authored 1858 Queen’s 
Proclamation and Canning’s imperial reconciliation of Indian princes, which protected their 
status and authority in exchange for better government, anticipating Mayo and Lytton’s later 
positions. In emphasizing Mayo, Lytton, and Bombay Governors Sir Seymour Fitzgerald (1867-
1872) and James Fergusson (1880-1885) as Conservative government appointments, he argues 
that they shared a feudatory policy of improving princely governance in partnership with 
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Britain’s Indian Empire.21  Moreover, Copland relates metropolitan partisan politics with British 
policy in India. He demonstrates that the appointments of Bombay Governors Richard Temple 
(1877-1880) and Fergusson, both Conservative MPs, were attempts by Disraeli’s Conservative 
government to aid Lytton’s Indian policy.22 Although establishing these partisan relationships, 
which are often neglected by historians, Copland does not consider how policy and appointment 
were shaped by deeper ideological considerations. Beyond showing that Liberal government 
appointments, such as Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India (1859-1866), and Viceroys 
Lord Elgin (1862-1863) and John Lawrence (1864-1869), were skeptical of reforming princely 
rule, and showing that Lytton’s feudal Imperial Assemblage reflected an aristocratic mentality, 
there is little effort to connect these ideas to political philosophies in Britain.  
Next, this study explores the intellectual and political outlines of an Indian conservative 
constituency late in the nineteenth century. Like its British variant, it is argued that Indian 
conservatism was a modern configuration which employed and espoused pre-modern institutions 
and concepts to critique liberal political and social reform. Moreover, it is contended that like 
Indian liberals, moderates, and extremists of the period, conservatives and conservatism existed 
as a local intellectual and political response to the particular features of empire and imperial 
politics in India. It represented a coherent response from princely states, as well as Parsi and 
Muslim minority communities who feared that liberal democratization and centralization harmed 
                                                 
21 Ian Copland, The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857-1930 (Bombay: Orient 
Longman, 1982), 126, 128-159. 
22 Copland, The British Raj and the Indian Princes, 153-154. 
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their local autonomy and authority. This political conglomeration shared an intellectual 
adherence to locality and prescription, and contributed to an imaginative imperial discourse 
centered upon loyalism and obligation. It is argued that Indian conservatives advocated for local 
and imperial collaboration, and promoted the Empire’s assistance in enabling graduated social 
and economic development. 
 In demonstrating the imperial intersection of British and Indian politics, it is shown that 
Britain’s and India’s conservatives collaborated to oppose similar liberal partisan associations on 
questions regarding empire and nationalism in the nineteenth century. Just as liberals and 
moderates looked to the British Liberal Party as proponents of constitutional reform in India, 
Indian conservatives aligned with the British Conservative Party to oppose Indian nationalism 
and promulgate a conception of a politically divided, socially hierarchical, and culturally diverse 
empire.23 Beyond representing an imperial “anti-Congress party,” conservative political 
opposition to British and Indian liberalism represented a deeper intellectual divide concerning 
the nature and purpose of British imperialism in India. As Indian liberals saw the Empire as a 
means to spread the civilizational blessings of progress, scientific rationalism, and individual 
liberty that enabled democracy, self-government, and a capitalist economy, Indian conservatives 
viewed the Empire as strictly defined through imperial collaborations between local and 
prescriptive institutions. Therefore, they rejected Indian nationalism’s political and bureaucratic 
                                                 
23 Sankar Ghose, Modern Indian Political Thought (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984), 51-82. On Indian 
nationalism late in the nineteenth century see John McLane, Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 1977); S.R. Mehrotra, The Emergence of the Indian National Congress (Delhi: 
Vikas Publications, 1971); Harish P. Kauskik, Indian National Movement: The Role of British Liberals (New Delhi: 
Criterion Publications, 1986); Iqbal Singh, The Indian National Congress: A Reconstruction Volume One: 1885-
1918, New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987). 
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centralization as unrepresentative of a divided, hierarchical, and diverse India.  Instead, Indian 
conservatives imagined India as a diversely populated and geographical space held in aggregate 
by a paramount empire. Therefore, each individual and community held a vertical upward 
loyalty and obligation to the imperial state which was reciprocated downwards to the people of 
India.  
This imperial framework collaborated with indigenous political traditions in India. 
Bhikhu Parekh and V.R. Mehta demonstrate that Hindu and Muslim political theories imagined 
an organically layered and ordered society in which the ruler facilitated each group’s particular 
obligation.24 Jesse Palsetia shows that Parsis maintained a traditionally non-hierarchical society 
and a distinctive cultural and social identity by adapting to indigenous and colonial surroundings. 
In regards to the latter, he argues that a Parsi minority developed a narrative which related their 
financial and social success to British imperial power.25 Beyond peace and security, these 
political traditions informed an imperial framework sustained by reciprocal loyalty and 
obligation. This enabled cooperation towards administrative reform as well as social and 
economic development. This allowed the princely states, Muslim, and Parsi communities to 
strengthen traditional authority and institutions through participating in imperial power and 
public initiatives. In response to the historiography above, this thesis demonstrates that British 
and Indian conservatives employed locally developed institutions and ideas to define an 
                                                 
24 On a Hindu political theory see Bhikhu Parekh, “Some Reflections on the Hindu Tradition of Political Thought,” 
in Political Thought in Modern India, edited by Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1986), 17-19. For Muslim and Mughal feudal practice see V.R. Mehta, Foundations of Indian Political 
Thought-An Interpretation-(From Manu to the Present Day) (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1992),142-148. 
25 Jesse Palsetia, The Parsis of India: Preservation of Identity in Bombay City (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 20-28. 
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alternative imperial framework which challenged, mollified, and supplanted a predominant 
liberal imperialism in India.   
 
Historiography: Debating Liberalism’s Imperial Dominance in the British Empire.  
Historians have recognized liberal ideology’s predominance in defining the modern 
ideological and institutional foundations of British imperialism and colonial nationalism in the 
nineteenth century. Scholars have established how liberalism informed an ‘imperial civilizing 
mission’ which determined not only colonial authoritarianism, racism, and violence, but also the 
global spread of western education, market capitalism, democracy, and nationalism. They argue 
that Europeans and western educated indigenous groups employed a universal conception of 
human nature predicated on the precepts of reasoned progress and individualism to westernize 
and control the colonial periphery. 
 John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson, Andrew Porter, and Andrew Thompson argue that the 
British state, politicians, and the middle class were active participants in applying liberal 
ideologies of free trade, humanitarianism, and self-governance to British imperialism in the 
nineteenth century. Gallagher and Robinson’s seminal article “The Imperialism of Free Trade” 
(1953) reveals how a metropolitan liberal free trade ideology became the motivating force for 
British global expansion from the early nineteenth century. They contend that the British State’s 
enforcement of “informal empire” through “treaties of free trade” in South America led to 
“formal empire,” as the State increased territorial control to secure trade routes late in the 
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nineteenth century.26 Porter argues that a liberal humanitarian impulse encouraged British 
imperialism early in the nineteenth century. Specifically, he focuses on the Abolitionist 
Movement, a collection of public associations involved in trying to stop Britain’s participation in 
slavery and the slave trade, and the Aborigines’ Protection Society, an association that advocated 
for the humane treatment of non-European populations. He explains that they obtained popular 
and parliamentary support by capitalizing on a humanitarian ideology that promoted native 
trusteeship through encouraging free enterprise, labour, and self-governance.27 In regards to 
political reform and empire, Thompson demonstrates how the colonial implementation of liberal 
representative self-governance influenced the development of similar institutions in Britain. He 
contends that just as 1860s colonial constitutional developments encouraged the British Second 
Reform Act (1867), support for the Indian National Congress and the Indian parliamentary group 
influenced metropolitan politics late in the nineteenth century. 28 
 Catherine Hall and Jennifer Pitts illustrate that liberal motivations of empire shaped an 
“imperial civilizing mission” which sought to promulgate a western world view and knowledge 
to transform and control the colonial world. They argue that this sustained an ideological 
discourse which enforced European race superiority and difference over the non-European 
world. Catherine Hall contends that the failure of West Indian emancipated Blacks to subscribe 
to liberal ideals of political economy and individualism accentuated metropolitan prejudicial 
                                                 
26 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade,” The Economic History Review vol. 6, 1 
(1953), 8-11. 
27 Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, anti-slavery and Humanitarianism” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: 
The Nineteenth century. ed. by Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 201-209. 
28 Andrew Thompson, The Empire Strikes Back?: The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century (Harrow: Pearson, 2005), 139. 
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perceptions of cultural and racial difference.29 Jennifer Pitts demonstrates how the failure of 
liberals to understand and transform the colonial world resulted in liberalism becoming 
intellectually tolerant of imperialism defined by racial difference and political authoritarianism. 
Pitt argues that this toleration was absent in an earlier liberal skeptical tradition, endorsed by 
Edmund Burke, David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, which questioned European superiority and 
promoted sympathy for cultural difference.30 Although providing much insight into British 
imperial thought, this scholarship is often deterministic in emphasizing liberalism’s role in 
enforcing a homogeneous and hegemonic experience of empire. In an approach that largely 
monitors liberal European voices, this historical work discounts the prevalence of variance and 
resistance from metropolitan and colonial interests. Specifically, it overlooks the capacity of 
local, pre-modern, and non-liberal ideas and institutions to shape the global British Empire.  
Uday Singh Mehta, David Cannadine, and Indian subalternists provide alternative 
conceptual frameworks for examining British Indian Empire. Mehta’s study on Edmund Burke 
provides significant insight into a main progenitor of modern conservative thought. He argues 
that contrary to a liberal world view predicated on the universal application of European 
reasoned progress through individual consent, Burke recognized the plurality of local experience 
and difference in conceptualizing Britain’s imperial relationship in India. Mehta demonstrates 
how, from Locke to James and John Stuart Mill, a liberal epistemology and ontology tied to 
                                                 
29 Catherine Hall, Civilizing subjects: metropole and colony in the English imagination 1830-1867 (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press), 124, 245. 
30 Jennifer Pitts, A turn to empire: the rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 59-160. 
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individual reason about political consent and democracy became a civilizational measure by 
which Europe compared itself to India. He proposes that British liberals’ failure to find or 
educate similar characteristics in India represented their inability to understand and sympathize 
with societal difference defined by territory.31 In contrast, Mehta demonstrates that Burke 
recognized the importance of locality to informing individual identity and community 
institutions through the production of shared experience and habits.  Moreover, Burke believed 
that beyond reason, individual and social prejudices were informed by an inheritance of location 
and history which eventually manifested itself as nationalism.32 In recognizing these foundations 
of difference, Mehta determines that Burke employed a “conversational” approach to India 
which allowed the communication of difference without a hindrance of “presupposed 
knowledge.”33 This thesis shows that Burke’s recognition and acceptance of difference 
influenced conservative imperial ideology throughout the nineteenth century.  
David Cannadine’s research on British upper class anxiety towards liberal modernity in 
Britain and the Empire provides an additional imperial theoretical framework which credits the 
challenge of pre-modern concepts to liberal notions of race and civilizational superiority. In 
Ornamentalism (2001), he argues that an aristocratic hierarchical mentality informed British 
                                                 
31 Uday Singh Mehta, Liberalism and empire: A study in nineteenth-century British liberal thought (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 20-22, 119. 
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imperialism from the 1790s to 1820s and the 1870s to 1950s, with the interim period 
representing reform and rejection based on egalitarian principles.   He demonstrates that British 
upper class governing and administrative dominance allowed social prejudices in Britain to 
shape imperial practice. He shows that this class’s pre-Enlightenment mentality shaped its view 
of empire as a functional social entity defined by individual status over collective racial 
attributes.34 In India, and later in Africa, he argues that their mentality informed a perception of 
unchanging and socially hierarchical colonial environments. He proposes that this informed a 
collaborative imperial policy of strengthening indigenous rulers through a system of honours, 
and a genuine admiration for individual princes and social caste systems which maintained 
tradition against urban industrial capital and democracy.35  
Despite providing a useful framework to understand social class significance in defining 
British imperialism, it is questionable to what extent aristocratic sentiment on British 
imperialism was homogenous during these periods. Beyond a consideration that imperial 
perspective could evolve over the study’s 160 year focus, there is also a notable absence of 
analysis on the political and ideological divisions within the British upper class itself. The 
personality and governing differences of Whig Lord Bentinck and Tory Ellenborough, or 
Conservative Lytton and Liberal Lord Ripon later in the century, reveals a deeper political 
partisan relationship between Indian empire and British politics. It is interesting to note that 
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unlike Cannadine’s earlier work The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy (1990), in 
Ornamentalism he does not associate the British upper class in the imperial setting with 
Conservative politics in Britain.36 This thesis demonstrates that Cannadine’s elucidation of 
aristocratic paternalism, skepticism of modernity in favour of tradition, prescription and 
hierarchy in empire resembled popular components of British and Indian imperial politics late in 
the nineteenth century.  
Recently, Indian Subaltern scholarship has problematized the shared attempts of British 
imperialists and colonial nationalists to control India through the destruction of pre-modern 
indigenous institutions. A growing segment of this scholarship has convincingly argued that the 
British and Indian Nationalists were unable to establish western themed hegemony, and that 
princely, caste, and religious practices were able to sustain themselves through the colonial 
period. From a critique of Indian nationalists’ reliance on colonial progress and modernity over 
indigenous epistemology and ontology, Ranajit Guha argues that pre-modern concepts, such as 
dharma, informed imperial perspectives on the state’s relationship with society and the 
individual.37 Hira Singh contends that India’s princes resisted political economy and influenced 
imperial practice, especially the British adoption of durbars, through their active employment of 
traditional values relating to kinship.38 This thesis proposes to demonstrate that British and 
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a Derivative Discourse?, Third World Books (London, U.K: Zed Books for the United Nations University, 1986). 
 19 
 
Indian conservatives utilized pre-modern ideas and institutions to challenge liberal imperial 
reasoning and objectives in Indian Empire.  
This thesis reveals that liberal imperialist’s universal and centralizing ambition motivated 
local conservative political reactions in Britain and in India from the nineteenth century. It 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of partisan political ideology and politics in determining local 
responses to empire. As liberal modernity increasingly defined the motives of British imperialists 
and a western educated Indian elites, British and India conservatives collaborated in conceiving, 
constructing, and communicating an imperial ideology predicated on protecting local and 
prescriptive institutions. To that end, this thesis utilizes scholarship that has conceptualized the 
British Empire as a global, collaborative, and structured entity defined by local political, social, 
and cultural ideas.  
Bayly's The Rise of the Modern World 1780-1914 (2004) argues that from the late 
eighteenth century, western colonialism reinforced locally instigated processes which eventually 
produced global uniformity in bodily habits, ideas, and governing practices amidst nationalistic 
particularities. By combining the local, regional, and national into a global historical narrative, 
he demonstrates how a global commercial middle class, nationalist upheaval, and the spread of 
liberal ideologies were products of local responses to western colonialism.39 Frederick Cooper's 
Colonial in Question (2005), and later co-publication Empires in World History (2009) with Jane 
Burbank, argue that empires had a substantial influence on world history, as they represented 
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multi-ethnic collaborative political entities. Cooper and Burbank contend that the modern French 
and British empires were global entities which relied on mutually beneficial collaborative 
relationships with non-European local elites to maintain political and economic paramountcy.40 
This argument critiques postcolonial scholarship which emphasizes European imperialism’s 
political, social and cultural hegemony over colonial societies. In Colonialism in Question, 
Cooper argues that postcolonialists and postmodernists are incorrect in depicting Europe as the 
single transformational ideological force in the colonial world. Therefore, a framework that 
places empire as the central analytical unit is needed to incorporate the reality of non-Western 
influences in shaping historical definitions of identity, globalization, and modernity. Cooper 
contends that as “identity” is a restrictive term which places people in static groups and 
“globalization” represents the unchallenged reality of western dominance, “modernity” is an 
abstract term utilized increasingly by different groups.41 In emphasising that the British and 
French empires’ diverse nature and size placed limitations on central administrative control, he 
contends that power was delegated and negotiated with indigenous elites and cultural interests 
that sought to define their own status and identity in a mutually beneficial imperial relationship.42 
This scholarship demonstrates that western imperialists had to conciliate local non-Europeans 
elites, ideas, and institutions to maintain political and economic paramountcy in the colonial 
world. While Bayly demonstrates local influence in structuring global convergence, Cooper and 
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Burbank show that local collaboration informed the political and governing aspects of European 
imperialism. 
Thesis Outline: Conservative Imperialism in Indian Empire  
         The process of British and Indian conservative collaboration is explored through an 
analysis of three periods, represented by three sections in this thesis. The first section examines 
British conservative inclination and action on the 1857 Indian Revolt, as well as the Government 
of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation in 1858. It focuses on the political philosophy and 
relationship with British imperialism of Robert Law, Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board 
of Control (1829-30, 1834-35, 1841, and 1858) and Governor General (1842-1844), and 
Benjamin Disraeli, Conservative MP, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-1859, 1866-
1868), and Prime Minister (1868, 1874-1880). It argues that their critical and imaginative 
response to British imperial policy before and during the Revolt, and legislative participation in 
the 1858 Act and Queen’s Proclamation reflected a coherent metropolitan conservative ideology 
applied to the Indian Empire.  
 This section demonstrates that London partisan politics was the forum in which the 
British public interpreted and responded to the Indian Revolt. In literature on the metropolitan 
reaction to the Revolt, Gautam Chakravarty’s contention that British victory over Indian 
mutineers reinforced British racial superiority is challenged by Christopher Herbert’s view that 
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this event produced an existential challenge to Victorian cultural idealism on empire.43 In 
contrast, this thesis supports Salahuddin Malik’s argument that the participation of multiple 
political and institutional interests created varying perspectives on the causes, nature, and 
consequences of the Revolt. Moreover, Malik describes how this formed a rudimentary political 
division between a Whig and military school, and a coalition representing the Conservative 
Party, missionaries stationed in India, Chartists, and ‘moralists’ who reacted “sympathetically 
towards Indians and the outbreak as a socio-political rebellion or revolution.”44 This thesis 
demonstrates that British conservatives employed the ideas of Burke and a Tory political 
tradition, each predicated on social prejudice and imaginative adherence to locality and 
prescription, to interpret the sepoy and popular uprising in India. It is shown that just as 
conservatives defended local authority, property, and the Church of England against liberal 
political and economic reforms in Britain, they saw liberal civilizing reform as leading to 
national discontent through the destruction of India’s native states, property tenure, and religious 
custom. It is argued that British conservatism’s inclination towards locality and prescription 
allowed them to be sympathetic to this destruction instigated by western feelings of civilizational 
superiority.  
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 The first chapter explores how Ellenborough’s official experience with the Indian Empire 
informed a critical response to liberal policy during the Revolt. It argues that as a British and 
Indian statesman, he maintained a particular Tory inclination that India must be ruled in 
accordance with the country’s local political, social, and religious customs. In the only 
comprehensive biography of Ellenborough, one which was written in 1939, Albert H. Imlah 
argues that his perceived failure in India, being recalled after two years in 1844, reflected a 
sustained criticism from liberal political opponents in England. He proposes that this opposition 
reflected Ellenborough’s Tory mentality which disdained the value of popular opinion, and 
believed that good government was predicated on conciliating the people to aristocratic rule.45 
Lastly, Imlah demonstrates that Ellenborough respected India’s political and cultural institutions. 
This included a wish to conciliate native princes to British paramountcy, and to protect native 
custom from the intrusive but necessary interventions of modern science.46 This thesis argues 
that Ellenborough’s aristocratic and conciliatory mentality reflected a conservative inclination 
towards locality and prescription which respected societal difference in India. It demonstrates his 
coherent legacy towards Crown rule, the necessity of reconciling princely and propertied 
interests to Britain, and non-interference with religious custom. It is also proposed that 
Ellenborough’s imaginative attempt to conciliate local custom and sentiment with the Somnauth 
Proclamation (1842) represented a lasting conservative inclination to use the imperial state to 
engage with the multiple facets of Indian society. During the Revolt, his criticisms of state 
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supported Christian proselytism, and public denouncement of Canning’s Oude “confiscation” 
Proclamation reflected a wider conservative sympathetic response to a socially intrusive Indian 
government.  
 The second chapter demonstrates that Disraeli’s adherence to a Burkean and Tory 
political tradition skeptical of liberal modernity informed an imperial perspective on India. It is 
shown that Disraeli expanded a Young England critique of Whig political centralization and 
social destruction in England to Ireland, Ceylon, and India. A prominent voice in an extensive 
historiography on Disraeli’s personal life and career, Robert Blake argues that Disraeli had no 
firm political or philosophical convictions. For example, he contends that his 1840s associational 
contributions to the Young England group was politically motivated and did not inform policy as 
Conservative Party leader in the 1860s.47 In a study of Disraeli’s literary career, Michael Flavin, 
in contrast, contends that although he saw political opportunity in Young England, it offered a 
forum to express an anti-Whig political philosophy which critiqued progress and industrial 
capitalism through an espousal of aristocratic rule and social responsibility.48 Peter Jupp and Paul 
Smith contend that Disraeli promoted prescription and questioned abstract reason as the guiding 
historical force for state and society.49 In regards to Disraeli’s Young England literary voyage to 
the East in Tancred, Patrick Brantlinger argues that he exhibited a “positive orientalism” which 
was contrary to contemporary interpretations of the “orient.” In challenging Edward Said’s 
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contention that Disraeli saw the orient through a British imperialist perspective, Brantlinger 
argues that his promotion of the racial “genius” of Hebrews and the Arabs represented an attempt 
to contest personal prejudice, and the racial and cultural stereotyping exhibited in James Mill’s 
History of British India.50  
 In expanding upon Flavin’s, Jupp’s and Brantlinger’s analyses, this thesis establishes 
how Disraeli’s attachment to a Tory political tradition informed an original perspective on 
British imperialism in India. Through a literary analysis of Disraeli’s Young England novels and 
other earlier political tracts, it argues that his principles of noblesse oblige, individual and 
property obligation, and religious reverence informed a historical argument that Britain was 
obligated to protect India’s ancient institutions. This conditioned Disraeli’s 1857 contention that 
a “national revolt” in India was instigated by a Whig political ascendency in Britain that 
supported Governor General Lord Dalhousie’s (1848-1856) policy of state annexation, property 
confiscation, and religious interference. The third chapter reveals that Ellenborough and 
Disraeli’s conservative political response to the Revolt informed a new imperial policy embodied 
in Lord Stanley’s 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation. These documents, 
which substituted Company for Crown rule, protected prince and property rights, and pledged 
religious and non-interference and enshrined a conservative vertical imperial framework 
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predicated upon a discourse of reciprocal loyalty and obligation. 
          The second section explores British and Indian conservative collaborative endeavors to 
challenge liberal imperialism through protecting and enhancing local and prescriptive institutions 
in India. In demonstrates how the viceregal policies of Richard Bourke, hereafter Lord Mayo, 
and Robert Bulwer, hereafter Lord Lytton, effecting princely collaboration and paternal 
obligation were embraced by Indian rulers in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Chapter 
four examines how Mayo’s viceroyship (1869-1872) centered upon socially-based, aristocratic 
principles of state paternalism, political decentralization, and propertied obligation. It is shown 
that Mayo’s youthful travels in Russia, and experience as a Protestant landowner and 
Conservative Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-1859, 1866-1868) in a religiously divided 
Ireland influenced his time in India. It is argued that this background conditioned Mayo’s 
inclination and policy that the British paramount power should protect and enhance India’s 
unrepresented national interests through ryot, rural peasant population, and Muslim education, 
and instructing India’s princes and property interests on good governance. Mayo’s biographers 
demonstrate his governing and intellectual contribution to British imperialism in India. William 
Wilson Hunter relates Mayo’s Indian viceregal tenure to his experiences in Ireland. He argues 
that in India Mayo implemented novel schemes of financial de-centralization, as well as princely 
education and collaboration that were similar to his earlier progressive initiatives for Ireland.51 
S.R. Bakshi illustrates that Mayo’s guiding focus was decentralization. This meant not only 
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downloading authority and resources to provincial and local governments to undertake expansive 
programs of public works, but also meant a non-intervention policy with the personal authority 
and affairs of Indian chiefs.52 George Pottinger sees Mayo’s Indian legacy as an effort to 
improve agriculture and the condition of the masses. He argues that Mayo’s charitable efforts 
during the Irish Potato Famine led him to propose an Indian agriculture department, promote 
vernacular education for India’s mass and Muslim population, and engage India’s princes and 
chiefs.53 This chapter demonstrates that Mayo’s decentralization policy as well as engagement 
with India’s princes and mass population reflected a conservative imperial tradition informed by 
an aristocratic inclination forged amidst the sectarian strife in Ireland. In focusing on his Irish 
minority background as a Protestant landowner, it is argued that Mayo believed that the Empire 
should encourage state and landed paternal obligation to defend and mediate the various national 
interests of a socially and religiously divided Indian Subcontinent.  
 Chapter five examines Lytton’s viceregal (1876-1880) political program of princely 
engagement and collaboration through the attempted establishment of an Indian Privy Council at 
the 1877 Imperial Assemblage. It shows that Lytton’s political and literary critique of British 
aristocratic decline in modern society informed the color and purpose of the Delhi Assemblage, 
which proclaimed Queen Victoria’s elevation to Empress of India following the Royal Titles Act 
(1876). It is argued that the Assemblage and the Council was an imagined conservative 
endeavor, supported by Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for India (1866-1867 and 1874-1878), 
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and opposed by British Liberals, to strengthen aristocratic leadership in empire through a closer 
individual association between the Viceroy and Indian princes.  Lytton’s biographers prioritize 
his diplomatic over literary career, non-political association, and non-racist attitude to 
understanding his tenure in India. Lady Betty Balfour’s early twentieth century publications of 
Lytton’s personal and official correspondence remain the most comprehensive published 
collection available. It is interesting to note, however, that this collection reveals little regarding 
the mutual hostility between Lytton and official Anglo-Indians, or his failure to create an Indian 
Privy Council.54 E. Niell Raymond argues that Lytton shunned party association and a career in 
the House of Lords. He demonstrates that the influence of his conservative father, Edward 
Bulwer Lytton, cabinet minister and close friend to Disraeli, was moderated by a close friendship 
with Liberal reform MP John Foster. Raymond praises Lytton’s genuine conviction to helping 
the Indian people by reducing the salt duty and the fiscal deficit despite opposition from the 
Indian Civil Service and the Viceroy Council.55 For Mary Lutyens, the mutual animosity 
between Lytton and his Anglo-Indian administration represented the former’s aversion and 
challenge to color prejudice, and efforts to reconcile India’s population with British rule. She 
briefly explains that this hostility was the product of Lytton’s dissatisfaction with English 
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culture, social convention, including a dislike for sport and hunting, and his disdain for attending 
church service.56   
 An outsider status and non-partisan affiliation are themes supported in Aurelia Brooks 
Harlan’s biography of Lytton as a poet writing under the pen name “Owen Meredith.” Harlan 
depicts Lytton as an outsider to English society, including his life-long criticism of time spent at 
Harrow School and ridicule of the narrow and static nature of English culture. Harlan states that 
although Lytton professed a belief that poetry and politics were incompatible, his work did 
express a brand of “utopian liberalism” influenced by John Foster. She argues that “Utopian 
liberalism” informed Lytton’s social and political criticism of the upper and middle classes in 
Britain.57 In addressing this scholarship, this chapter explores how Lytton’s literary expressions 
were crucial to defining his perspective and policy as Viceroy of India. In contrast to Harlan’s 
contention, it demonstrates that Lytton’s association with his father and Disraeli informed a 
conservative- themed literary critique of a weakening British aristocracy and decadent middle 
class which was a significant political influence in India. Moreover, it is argued that Lytton’s 
failure to enact an Indian Privy Council because of Anglo-Indian and Liberal opposition 
strengthened a partisan association with Disraeli, Salisbury, and the Conservative Party.    
 Scholarship on Lytton’s 1877 Imperial Assemblage, or Delhi Durbar, has focused on its 
significant representation of British imperial perception and policy in the late nineteenth century. 
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L.A. Knight viewed the Assemblage’s pronouncement of the Royal Titles Act as an attempt to 
increase British executive power over the House of Commons through Indian prince 
collaboration.58 David Washbrook sees Lytton’s spectacle as part of a conservative counter-
reaction to liberal imperialism.59 Metcalf argues that the atmosphere of Lytton’s Assemblage was 
heavily influenced by Henry Maine and Alfred Lyall’s inclinations to view India through 
Europe’s feudal and medieval past.60 In extending Bernard Cohn’s argument that the British 
attempted to construct a “ritual idiom” to present their authority to India early in the nineteenth 
century, Alan Trevithick argues that the 1877, 1902, and 1911 Imperial Durbars were 
manipulative constructions to use ritual ceremony to gain support among the princes and 
masses.61 Chapter five stresses that Lytton’s Assemblage and Indian Privy Council represented 
an extension of his imagined literary response to British aristocratic decline in the modern 
period.   
Chapter six examines how the Kathiawar States in Western India, responded to Mayo’s 
and Lytton’s sentiments and policies towards imperial princely collaboration. In addressing 
scholarship which considers Indian state agency in the British Empire, it is shown that the States 
were active in fashioning a coherent and self-motivated response to European imperialism in the 
late nineteenth century. It is contended that Kathiawar’s indigenous rulers utilized British 
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initiatives of political decentralization, education, and public works to strengthen their local 
autonomy and authority against external intervention. This chapter demonstrates that their 
participation through the Karbharis (first ministers) States’ Meeting (1869) and the Rajkumar 
College (1870) allowed them to secure political position by enabling managerial and financial 
contribution towards the region’s social and economic development. 
Recent historiography on Britain’s relationship with the Indian states demonstrates that 
indigenous polities embraced western-themed administrative, social, and economic reforms to 
enhance local autonomy and authority. It challenges an earlier literature which argued that 
British indirect rule meant princely state subordination.62 Copland argues that Indian heads of 
state in western India, with powers mostly devolved to officials, maintained their traditional 
guardianship of dharma (social unity) despite engagement with Mayo and Lytton’s pro-princely 
sentiments on education and public works.63 Manu Bhagavan and Aya Ikegame illustrate that 
larger princely states, including Mysore and Hyderabad, were eager to adopt and adapt western 
modern administration and education to strengthen local power and culture.64 Ikegame pinpoints 
Mayo’s policy influence for the opening of the Mysore Royal School, an institution which 
mirrored the English Public School structure and upper class value dissemination.65 Barbara N. 
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Ramusack contends that indigenous states remained autonomous entities which continued a 
process of state formation from the pre-British period. She demonstrates that Mayo’s efforts 
towards princely education represented a period of enhanced British intervention in Indian states 
beginning in the 1870s. She argues, however, that the princely states increased their revenue and 
secured themselves from internal and external challengers through British desires to create a 
strong traditional and collaborative ruling class.66 Waltraud Ernst and Biswamoy Pati contend 
that India’s dominant landed interests resisted British attempts to subvert traditional rights until 
the 1880s.67  
Howard Spodek’s and Harald Tambs-Lyche’s studies on Kathiawar society present 
contrasting viewpoints on the impact of British paramountcy to the region’s rulers. Spodek 
argues that after the 1808 Walker Settlement, which established fixed state borders under British 
paramountcy, and increasingly from the 1860s, the British controlled local chiefs by elevating 
and changing their big landowner status to a new ruling class estranged from the population.68 In 
contrast, Harald Tambs-Lyche contends that the British influence was minimal, as the Settlement 
merely renewed indigenous state and social formation underway since the eighteenth century.69 
Spodek’s thesis that British paramountcy changed the Kathiawar chiefs’ political and social 
dynamic with their people has resonated in the region’s historiography. John McLeod contends 
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that the Settlement precipitated the Kathiawar rulers’ disassociation with the bhayats (nobles) 
and mass population. He argues that this represented the former’s reduction of state expenditure 
on the military which traditionally maintained social cohesion and defined the political 
distribution of power.70 Focusing on the poor economic condition of Kathiawar’s smaller states 
in the first half of the twentieth century, Uchhrangai Kesharai Oza maintains that mass poverty 
and economic stagnation were the result of maladministration, extortion, and crippling taxes 
from the chiefs, bhayats, and zamindars (large landowners).71 While not directly addressing the 
cultural and economic consequences of Britain’s relationship with Kathiawar’s rulers, this 
chapter confronts the contention that the latter were increasingly controlled by the British 
paramount power. It shows that in the post-Revolt period, the Kathiawar States, despite 
allegations of misrule and corruption, collectively engaged in defending and enhancing local 
autonomy and authority through participating in imperial initiatives towards social and economic 
development. 
          The last section explores British and Indian conservative collaborative responses to liberal 
imperialism and nationalism from the 1880s to 1914. In contrast to the previous sections which 
focused on senior British and Indian statesman, these last chapters focus on Sir Roper 
Lethbridge’s and Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhowanggree’s contribution to a conservative 
imperial tradition and framework in India. As British conservative MPs and Indian reform 
advocates, it is argued that they challenged liberal imperial and national orthodoxy through 
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expounding conservative alternatives which promoted the imperial state’s benevolent recognition 
of India’s internal differences and national separation from Britain. In contrast to a national 
political identity espoused by Indian nationalists, Lethbridge and Bhownaggree saw the nation of 
India as an aggregately populated geographical space held together through a vertical political 
association with the Crown and Empire. Responding to Indian nationalism, this represented an 
evolution of conservative thinking from seeing India’s as a land of many nations to a 
consolidated nation of nations supported through imperial cooperation, security, and 
benevolence.   
Chapter seven examines Lethbridge’s encouragement of British imperial collaboration 
with India’s national political and economic interests into the twentieth century. It is shown that 
through official experience in the Bengal Education Service (1866-1876) and as Lytton’s Press 
Commissioner (1878-1881), he argued that the British arrogation of princely authority and 
English-educated Indian requests for political participation harmed imperial strength and unity. 
Correcting an absence of biographical analysis on Lethbridge, this chapter illustrates his role in 
incorporating India within a larger British conservative debate concerning replacing liberal free 
trade and laissez-faire economy with state enforced tariff reform and imperial protection.72 
Specifically, this chapter argues that Lethbridge endeavoured to conciliate British and Indian 
national interests within a strengthened imperial subjecthood. This included an endorsement of 
                                                 
72 On the Tariff Reform Movement see Alan Sykes, Tariff Reform in British Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979); Andrew Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics C. 1880-1932 (Harrow: Pearson, 2000). 
On imperial federation see Duncan Bell The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future World Order, 1860-
1900 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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Lytton’s program of constituted princely collaboration, and legitimizing Indian economic 
swadeshi (self-sufficiency) within a protective scheme of imperial preference.  
Chapter eight examines Bhownaggree’s representation of Indian and imperial 
conservative collaboration in the late nineteenth century. His opposition to the Indian National 
Congress (1885) and tenure as Conservative Party MP for London’s Bethnal Green North-East 
(1895-1905) has led to scant, yet critical historiographical attention. Jonathan Schneer and R.P. 
Masani argue that Bhownaggree was compliant to British power, subversive to Indian 
nationalism, and lacked any interest in or popular credibility on Indian reform.73  Omar Ralph 
and John Hinells' 1995 short biography challenges this reputation by detailing Bhownaggree’s 
objection to increased taxation in India, the treatment of Indians in South Africa, and advocacy 
for British investment in scientific, technical, and vocational education in India.74 McLeod 
demonstrates that Bhownaggree’s philanthropy in Bombay and England conditioned his entry 
into British politics.75 This chapter shows that his experience in the Kathiawar State of 
Bhavnagar as Judicial Councilor and Agent in Bombay, and association with Western India’s 
Parsi community informed an adherence to a conservative imperial tradition and framework. It is 
argued that Bhownaggree’s self-claimed representation for “conservative India” and an “anti-
congress party,” joined by Parsi and Muslim minority groups, reflected an acknowledgement of 
India’s internal differences and separation from Britain. This informed his contribution to a 
                                                 
73 Jonathan Schneer. London 1900: An Imperial Metropolis. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1999), 243-
245; R.P. Masani, Dadabhai Naoroji: The Grand Old Man of India. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1939), 370.  
74 John R. Hinnels and Omar Ralph, Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggreee K.C.I.E. Order of the Lion and the 
Sun of Persia, 1851-1933 (London: Hansib Publishing, 1995), 12-13. 
75 John McLeod, “Mourning, Philanthropy, and M.M. Bhownaggree's Road to Parliament’ in Parsis in India and the 
Diaspora,” edited by John R. Hinnells and Alan Williams. (London: Routledge, 2008), 136-147. 
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conservative imperial discourse of good government predicated on reciprocal loyalty and 
obligation. It is contended that this sustained Bhownaggree’s promotion of a Kathiawar and 
Bombay model of development for India, in which a benevolent imperial state was obligated to 
support local autonomy and agency in effecting education and industrial reform for India’s mass 
population.  This thesis argues that Bhownaggree’s and Lethbridge’s response to Indian 
nationalism represented an ideologically coherent conservative tradition constituted following 
the Indian Revolt. In 1857 and in the late nineteenth century, conservatives endeavored to define 
an imperial framework based on a vertical and reciprocal loyalty and obligation to a Crown and 
Empire which conciliated and prioritized India’s particular institutions. 
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Section I: A Tory Response to the Indian Revolt 
 
Section Introduction 
This section examines how British conservatives responded to the 1857 Indian Revolt, the 
Government of India Act of 1858, and the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. It explores how 
prominent Conservative statesman Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough and Benjamin Disraeli 
interpreted the sepoy and popular uprising through Tory political philosophy and British partisan 
politics. While Ellenborough’s political career was defined through experience with India 
compared to Disraeli’s literary and parliamentary view of empire, they shared a conservative 
imperial inclination predicated upon tory themes of locality, prescription, and imagination. In 
valuing place, hierarchy, and the moral virtues of loyalty and obligation, they argued that the 
Revolt represented the legitimate expression of popular and national discontent against British 
liberal destruction of traditional political, social, and religious institutions. 
 The first chapter examines how Ellenborough’s political experience as President of the 
Board of the Control, Governor General, and in parliamentary opposition informed a critical 
response to British and Governor General’s Lord Canning’s escalation of the Revolt. In 
confronting contemporary and historical criticism regarding his mental soundness, it is shown 
that Ellenborough maintained a continuity of thought and action which advocated for Britain’s 
imperial obligation to sympathize and conciliate with India’s national interests. It is argued that 
this principle informed political support for crown rule, social respect, and state non-interference, 
and fiscal economy and material development which were integral components of the Indian 
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Empire after 1858. The second chapter contextualizes Disraeli’s parliamentary condemnation of 
British liberal culpability for the Indian Revolt. It is shown that his literary endeavors and 
political association with a Tory political tradition and Young England Movement in the 1830s-
1840s defined an imperial perspective on Britain’s relationship with Ireland, Ceylon, and India. 
This informed a contention that whiggism’s oligarchic, capitalist, and sectarian ambitions, which 
besieged England’s ancient institutions, were being replicated under the guise of progress and 
reason across empire. It is argued that this contention encouraged Disraeli’s partisan response to 
the Revolt, where he blamed Whig Indian governance, personified by Governor General Lord 
Dalhousie’s (1848-1856) policies of state annexation, property confiscation, and religious 
interference, for causing a “national revolt” against the British. The third chapter demonstrates 
how Ellenborough and Disraeli’s Indian Revolt response, and influence within Lord Derby’s 
Conservative government (1858-1859), shaped Lord Stanley’s authored 1858 Government of 
India Act and Queen’s Proclamation. It is shown that these documents redefined British 
governance in India along conservative principles which endorsed a view of India’s differences 
and the necessity of collaboration with its varied national interests. It argues that they enshrined a 
non-civilizational conception of race and racial difference, which defined local belonging and 
imperial identity within a framework of vertical obligation and loyalty reciprocated between the 
Crown, princely and property interests, and ethnic and religious communities. 
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Chapter 1: Lord Ellenborough and Tory Imperialism 
I said incidentally to-day, 'I will not sit here to sacrifice India to England,' a 
sentiment which escaped me, but which I feel to be correct, not only socially but 
politically.1 (Political Diary, 13 April, 1829) 
I now look forward with apprehension to the danger likely to arise from the insolence 
of office—which even in my time led to one insurrection—from disregard of military 
duties, from the absence of due consideration for the native officers and troops, 
and…from the forgetfulness of that great principle by which our Indian empire was 
acquired, respect for the religious prejudices and for the social habits of the people.2 
(Ellenborough to the House of Lords, 2 April, 1852) 
 
Introduction  
Throughout his long political career, Ellenborough maintained that British imperialism in India, 
legitimated by conquest, relied upon respecting the country’s national political, propertied, and 
religious interests. This chapter contextualizes Ellenborough’s contention that the Indian Revolt 
was caused and sustained by British intervention into India’s religious and property custom. His 
advocacy and respect for India’s difference informed a contention that Canning’s Oudh 
Proclamation (1858), which prescribed mass property confiscation in the recently annexed 
province, instigated a “national revolt” and “legitimate war” against the British. It is shown that 
Ellenborough maintained a political conception of Indian Empire and “imperial subjecthood” 
which prescribed Britain and India’s mutual acceptance of each other’s legitimacy and 
                                                 
1 Edward Law Ellenborough and Reginald Charles Edward Abbot Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830 
(London : R. Bentley, 1881), 13.  
2 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd Ser., vol. 120, 02 Apr., 1852, col. 555. 
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obligations. This conditioned his continued advocacy for incorporating India’s princes into a 
feudal relationship with the Crown, opposition to unsolicited British legislative interference with 
local custom, and a “Mughal styled” program of economic and social development. Lastly, it is 
argued that Ellenborough divisive reputation in Britain, which led to his official recall as 
Governor General in 1844 and resignation from the Board of Control in 1858, arose from his 
imagined and earnest endeavors to disregard metropolitan convention and social prejudice to 
conciliate India’s history and institutions within an imperial polity.  
Responding to the Indian Revolt 
 In political opposition and as the President of the Board of Control amidst the Indian 
Revolt in 1857-58, Ellenborough maintained that the uprisings were a direct result of British 
interference with the religious and property settlement in India. He criticized Canning’s 
governorship for instigating and sustaining a revolt motivated by popular national feeling. Early 
in the conflict, Ellenborough proposed that “discontent and mutiny” was caused by a popular 
apprehension that the Government wished to interfere with religion. He pointed to Canning’s 
subscription to missionary societies, and argued that the continuance of this practice would lead 
to the collapse of British power in India: “you will see the most bloody revolution which has at 
any time occurred in India. The English will be expelled from India; and, expelled from that 
country, they will not leave behind them a dozen sincere converts to Christianity.”3 In July 1857, 
Ellenborough contended that the overwhelming evidence that the sepoy revolt was sparked by 
                                                 
3 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 145, 09 Jun. 1857, cols. 1394-1396. 
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animal greased cartridges proved this event’s religious nature. Looking to the future, he 
remarked that this offered an opportunity to convince the population that government policy had 
always advocated religious non-interference.4  
 Returning to the Board of Control as part of Derby’s Conservative government in 
February 1858, Ellenborough maintained criticism of Canning’s response to an increasingly 
popular revolt. Focusing on Canning’s 1858 Oudh Proclamation, a province recently annexed to 
British India by Dalhousie in 1856, he argued that its proposed confiscation of the country’s 
propertied and religious foundations prolonged the conflict. Delivered when British troops 
regained control of Lucknow, Canning’s proclamation stated that all property in the territory, 
excluding land from the five largest landowners who remained loyal to the Government, would 
be forfeited unless landed proprietors claimed their loyalty to the State.5 For Ellenborough, this 
policy introduced national motivations for revolt in Awadh, as it entailed an assault on the 
country’s social and religious foundations. His response to the sepoy mutiny and popular 
uprising reflected a Tory societal inclination that the British paramount power must respect and 
conciliate India’s particular institutions and custom. 
Respect and Justice to Traditional Authority  
 From 1828 at the Board of Control, Ellenborough insisted that Britain’s governance 
and role as paramount power rested upon a moral obligation to abide and enhance India’s 
                                                 
4 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 147, 30 Jul. 1857, col. 694. 
5 09 May, 1858, Pro 30/12/09, fols. 2482-2485, 3067, Edward Law, 1st Earl of Ellenborough:Papers (hereafter EP), 
National Archives (hereafter NA).   
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local and prescriptive institutions.  To India’s princes and land owners, he defined a 
conception of “imperial subjecthood” based on British and Indian mutual loyalty, obligation, 
and privilege. This entailed that each side accepted the other’s ruling legitimacy along 
prescribed guidelines of good governance. He argued that India’s princes had to loyally accept 
British paramountcy which was legitimated by conquest and the maintenance of security. In 
return, Britain must recognize the princes’ privilege, as loyal “imperial subjects” and 
traditional rulers, to claim grievance against any unfair treatment. As Governor General, 
Ellenborough used this framework to defend native authority, property, and religious custom, 
but also to justify state annexation.   
 This respect for princely rule allowed Ellenborough to support Canning’s press 
censorship during Indian Revolt. He argued that if newspapers questioned native princes’ 
fidelity or supposed that the re-establishment of power meant a continued annexation policy, 
the whole of central India, chiefs and subjects, would turn against Britain.6 In 1858, this fear 
was confirmed, as he was convinced that Awadh annexation and confiscation had intensified 
an uprising into a “national revolt” against the British. Although not opposed to intervention 
to ensure good government or thwart aggression against Britain’s territory and allies, he 
maintained that the Paramount Power’s responsibility was to respect and treat fairly India’s 
traditional leadership.    
                                                 
6 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 148, 07 Dec, 1858, col. 242. 
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 More than twenty years earlier, Ellenborough had warned the British and Indian 
governments against Awadh annexation and property confiscation. In 1834, he challenged the 
Whig administration’s tacit approval of Governor General Lord Bentinck’s (1833-1835) plan 
to annex the Awadh Kingdom for the settlement of outstanding debts to Company creditors.7 
In a letter to an official in India, Ellenborough argued that it was unprecedented for the Board 
of Control to sanction state annexation. Moreover, it was contrary to a past moderate and non-
interventionist governing policy which allowed Awadh’s King to reform his country.8 In 
parliament, Ellenborough maintained that, contrary to Bentinck’s argument that Awadh 
suffered from misgovernment, the real motive for annexation was to redress the King’s 
longstanding debt to Company officials. He argued that this debt was illegal and should be 
forfeited, as it was legally established that no European should make or purchase loans or 
enter into bonds with a “native” prince. This lack of sympathy for Company officials’ private 
financial engagements was evident a couple years earlier. In 1832, he opposed a 
                                                 
7 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 23, 05 May, 1834, cols. 476-487. Building upon parliament’s 
removal of the East India Company’s Indian trading monopoly in 1817, the 1833 Government of India Act 
effectively made them a purely administrative entity in India. Although the Court of Directors, the Company’s 
executive body in London, maintained the power of political appointment, parliament’s late eighteenth century 
creation of the Board of Control, headed by a British cabinet minister mandated to monitor India’s government, 
curtailed their independence. On a history of the East India Company and their nineteenth century status see 
Anthony Webster, The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian Commerce and Politics, 
1790-1860 (Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2009); Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the 
Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
8 29 Apr. 1834, Pro 30/12/8, fol. 29, EP, NA. 
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parliamentary motion which asked the British government to reimburse loans made to a 
Zamindar of Nozeed.9  
 In the previous debate, Ellenborough contended that government endorsement of 
unjust interference with a friendly power for debt repayment risked onto England and 
Englishmen in India “…the stain of cupidity and extortion.” He submitted that these actions 
would return Britain to a shameful policy in India which  
…had not prevailed for the last fifty years in India; and they would imitate 
transactions, the recollection of which were regarded with shame, and which had 
been stigmatized by the law as criminal. Such principles of government in 
India…were, on the impeachment of Mr. Hastings, condemned by the noble Earl 
opposite, by Mr. Burke, Mr. Fox and other great men of the day.10 
 
To maintain a just and moderate character towards the princes, he urged upon the British and 
Indian government “the essential importance of not interfering in the internal affairs of allied 
or friendly States.”  If, however, they had to intervene “for the protection of the public 
interest…[and] for the purpose of relieving the people from oppression,” they must avoid 
“sordid and selfish motives.”11  
 Prophetically in 1834, Ellenborough argued that any annexation of Awadh for the 
purpose of extracting revenue would present difficulties due to the people’s warlike nature, 
and challenge the moral basis of British rule. Just as in 1858, he continued that British forces 
                                                 
9 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 11, 20 Mar. 1832, col. 488. 
10 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 23, 05 May, 1834, cols. 482-483. 
11 Ibid, 484. 
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“would find it a matter of the greatest difficulty to retain possession of the country without the 
authority of the Sovereign; the feelings of all the men of influence and power, as well as the 
mass of the people, would render any such attempt extremely dangerous.” Moreover, he 
contended that the consequences of resorting “…to the ancient system of extorting every 
farthing from the resources of an unfortunate people” would be so morally reprehensible that 
“…he should not desire the maintenance of our Indian possessions for one day.”12 Throughout 
his career, Ellenborough maintained that just as India’s princes had a loyal obligation to 
promote and practice good governance in their respective territories, Britain was reciprocally 
obligated to respect and treat fairly India’s people. 
 In 1852, Ellenborough condemned the Indian government’s confiscation of Ameer Ali 
Morad’s northern Sind territories after he was found guilty of forging documents to increase 
his land. He argued that not only was the Ameer denied the basic advantages of an impartial 
tribunal and taintless evidence, but that the punishment should be commensurate with the 
offense.13 He proposed that the root of the injustice was treating the Ameer as a subject and a 
state. As an independent Prince and British ally, he argued that the Government was dealing 
with a state and, therefore, should not impose upon a Sovereign and his people absolute 
territorial forfeit. To act in such a matter “…would shake the confidence of all the native 
                                                 
12 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd series, vol. 23, 05 May 1834, col. 486. 
13 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3th series, vol. 120, 29 Mar. 1852, cols. 238-240. 
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princes of India in the fidelity of this country to its engagements, and in its kind feeling to 
those who had served it.”14 
  In 1856, Ellenborough presented a parliamentary petition regarding the legal 
proceeding against Punjab’s Pertaub Singh and Bisheu Singh. This saw the Government 
remove one-fourth of their land title instantly, and two-fourths from inheritors once they died. 
He submitted that his purpose in presenting the petition was to make it known that all imperial 
subjects had parliamentary recourse, and that the native gentry’s destruction had deeper 
consequences for Indian society and British paramountcy. He argued that although the British, 
as the victor over a country conquered in 1849 had the right to punish those who aided enemy 
forces, Pertaub and Bisheu were respectable gentlemen and deserved equitable treatment as 
government allies.15 In emphasizing the Kingdom of Awadh, Ameer Ali Morad, and the 
Singhs’ loyalty in defending their claims against the Indian government, Ellenborough 
maintained that this behavior necessitated Britain’s reciprocal obligation to accept their 
legitimacy as local political and social leaders.  
 For Ellenborough, these examples of annexation and destruction of traditional 
authority represented the Indian government’s financial motivation to extract revenue from 
the land. In 1856, he argued that this motivation was destroying the foundations of India’s 
ancient society. He stated that unlike his 1843 Sind conquest as Governor General, where 
                                                 
14 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3th series, vol. 120, 29 Mar. 1852, col. 246. 
15 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3th series, vol. 143, 11 Jul. 1856, cols. 619-621. 
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property and rank were respected, the British in the Punjab introduced a system “…which was 
to annihilate the ancient possessors of the soil, to substitute none for them, and to have none 
whatever between the Government and the field labourer.” For India altogether, he stated that 
this approach had a dramatic effect on the Subcontinent’s natural social hierarchy: 
For there could be no doubt that our severe fiscal administration had, against our 
desire, had the effect of so changing the distribution of property there, as to produce 
a state of society of which there were few instances in the history of the world—he 
meant a state of society without any or very rare gradations of rank—a nation 
without a gentry.16  
 
Amid a parliamentary debate regarding India’s future government in 1853, Ellenborough 
submitted that although the last thirty years of British rule bought real improvement to 
India, it had also produced substantial change and great wrong. Specifically, he argued that 
a lack of “…sufficient knowledge of the tenure of the land and the rights of individuals” 
had “…gone far to destroy the higher classes of that country.”17 To Ellenborough, the 
Government of India’s disrespect for the loyal princes and propertied classes represented 
an overarching disregard for the country’s particular political history and social customs. 
Like the Mughals before them, the British paramount power was obligated to enact 
material improvement while protecting and conciliating India’s diverse national interests.    
Social non-interference 
                                                 
16 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3th series, vol. 143, 11 Jul. 1856, cols. 619-622. 
17 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd series, vol. 127, 13 May 1853, col. 1853. 
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  Beyond the political and propertied interests, Ellenborough maintained that the 
British government had a moral obligation to respect and not interfere with the social 
customs of the people. He maintained an opposition to state-sponsored westernization 
instigated by liberal social and legal reformers from the 1830s. Specifically, he opposed 
settler colonization, a unified code of law, and proceeded cautiously on initiatives fighting 
slavery and expanding Indian official employment. On colonization, Ellenborough rebuked 
and censured Bentinck’s efforts in 1830 to ease regulations on European settlement.18 
Responding to Lord Lansdowne’s, the Whig Lord President of the Council, proposal of 
introducing European settlers and capital to expand economic development in India, he 
argued that English capitalists had no interest or history in a country which had been 
developed by the Crown’s civil and military servants.19 With regards to Lansdowne’s 
scheme for a unified code of law for Europeans and the people of India, he believed that 
suiting the law to European tastes would be dangerous to “native” feeling:  
If they were to alter the laws there so as to induce Europeans to live under them, they 
must, in doing so, violate all the prejudices and feelings of the natives; and, instead 
of producing satisfaction, they would excite abhorrence and disgust amongst the 
natives throughout the whole of India.20 
 
                                                 
18 Ellenborough to Bentinck, 27 Jun. 1830, in Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 59; 
Ellenborough to Lansdowne, 19 Apr. 1830, Ibid, 223. 
19 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 19, 05 Jul. 1833, col. 189. 
20 Ibid.  
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Mediating European and local prejudices guided Ellenborough’s thoughts on slavery in 
India. Although in principle in favor of the abolition of the slave trade, he argued that the 
metropolitan government should refrain from criminalizing practices which were tied 
deeply to religion and society. He warned against treating West Indian slavery as similar to 
that in India. He contended that what existed in the latter was caste slavery, and that any 
attempt to abolish this would abolish caste.  The consequence of that action would be 
unthinkable to peace: 
It would be a violent outrage on the feelings and-prejudices of the natives of India 
thus to abolish all castes there, and to say, that slavery should no longer exist in that 
country. The attempt to establish such a state of things would lead most certainly to 
bloodshed in every part of India. In fact, it was insanity to make the attempt.21 
Ellenborough proposed that the best means to combat slavery was to allow the Indian 
government to slowly institute change based on their local knowledge and facility.22 In 1841, he 
cautioned against English sensational judgment on Indian practices in response to Lord 
Brougham’s reading of an official report which described how Indian slave dealers murdered 
parents to sell their children into slavery. He retorted that just as in India, in Scotland, which he 
remarked “was generally admitted to be the most moral part of the United Kingdom,” heinous 
crime also occurred such as people being “…murdered for the sake of obtaining the value of 
their dead bodies.”23 This cautious mentality also defined his sentiments on the abolition of sati, 
                                                 
21 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 19, 05 Jul. 1833, col. 190. 
22 Lord Ellenborough to Lord Brougham, 06 Nov. 1841, Pro 30/12/11, fol. 129, EP, NA.  
23 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 59, 05 Oct. 1841, cols. 1120-1125. 
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the Hindu ritual of widow burning after her husband’s death. Through supportive of 
criminalization, he supported Sir John Malcom’s, Governor of Bombay (1827-1830), quiet law 
repeal and amendment over Bentinck’s promulgation of Regulation XVII, which he called a 
“pompous document.”24 
His stance on colonization, law, and slavery reflected his longstanding contention that the 
British in India should maintain respect and sympathy for the local customs and prejudices of the 
people. During a parliamentary debate on the Company’s charter in 1852, Ellenborough shared 
his growing “apprehension” regarding the consequences of increased state interference with 
India’s religious and social custom. Prophetically, he warned that Britain’s internal security in 
India relied upon not disturbing the good feelings of the “Native” army and population: 
I now look forward with apprehension to the danger likely to arise from the insolence 
of office—which even in my time led to one insurrection—from disregard of military 
duties, from the absence of due consideration for the native officers and troops, 
and…from the forgetfulness of that great principle by which our Indian empire was 
acquired, respect for the religious prejudices and for the social habits of the people.25 
A year later, Ellenborough supported Lord Monteagle’s petition from Bengal Hindus 
complaining about new state legislation which changed the inheritance laws. He argued that in 
legalizing the ability of Christian converts from Hinduism to inherit ancestral lands, the 
                                                 
24 Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 363 (20 Sept. 1830). On Lord Bentinck actions on 
Sati and relationship with liberal reform in India, see Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History 
of India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 80-90.  
25 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 120, 02 Apr. 1852, col. 555. 
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petitioners faced a real grievance from a law which severed the social obligations between 
religion and property. Moreover, he proposed that the State’s implicit protection of a Christian 
convert, against the customary punishments of his former community, signified its partiality. 
Therefore, it invalidated Hindu trust and consent towards British governance which was based on 
religious non-interference.26 This aversion to legislative interference with India’s social custom 
and religious practice reflected a Tory mentality which aligned imperial governance with 
respecting and engaging the country’s local circumstances.  Whether in opposition or state 
office, Ellenborough refused to countenance metropolitan prejudice and practice when 
considering India’s national interests within the Empire. 
Conservative Economy and the Employment of “Responsible Natives”  
 From his earliest days at the Board of Control, Ellenborough maintained that Britain had 
a moral obligation to promote fiscal economy and material development in India. He pursued 
reduced taxes through lower public expenditure, and state assistance for expanding agricultural 
cultivation and an imperial export trade. For both objectives, Ellenborough, in opposition and in 
the Government, chastised the Company for lack of financial restraint and policies futhering 
economic development. In 1829, he communicated to Cabinet why the Company was to blame 
for financial deterioration in India:   
I mentioned that the character of the local Government was 'disrespect and 
disobedience.' That nothing but a long continuance of strict rule could bring India 
                                                 
26 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 127, 26 May 1853, cols. 561-564. 
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into real subjection. It was this disobedience which was the chief source of increased 
expenditure.27 
 
Debating the provisions for the Company’s new charter in 1833, Ellenborough argued that India 
would greatly benefit from more public money towards water tank and canal construction. 
Despite this, the British Indian government failed to meet the standard of public benevolence set 
by “previous sovereigns” and was “…much inferior to the government of the Moguls.”28 In 
1835, he rejected the Court of Director’s request to cover rising pension expenses by raising 
taxes. He argued that the pension system should be reformed based on the realization that too 
often “…we indulge our feelings for individuals at the expense of the people of India,” and that 
the diminishing profits on the country’s resources made it necessary as public trustees “…to 
place restraint upon ourselves.”29  
 Ellenborough maintained that the Company needed to adopt measures for lowering 
public expenditure. Guided by class prejudice, this included replacing Europeans with 
“responsible natives” in official administrative positions to reduce cost and promote greater trust 
between the State and the people. In 1829, he admonished the Company for not employing more 
Indians, stating that “the more we could avail ourselves of the services of the natives in the fiscal 
and judicial administration the better… as there was no doubt that there were capable natives to 
                                                 
27 Ellenborough, 13 Nov. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 129-135. 
28 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 20, 05 Aug. 1833, cols. 310. 
29 Ellenborough to Court of Directors, 17 Feb. 1835, Pro 30/12/08, fols. 65-71, EP, NA. 
 53 
 
be found.”30 A year later in parliament, he contended that reducing expenditure necessitated that 
“… the most deserving amongst the natives” should be employed “…in situations of higher 
authority and trust than they had hitherto been accustomed to fill.”31 He maintained that this 
employment should be achieved cautiously and gradually, and with respect to India’s social 
hierarchy. In response to Lord Lansdowne’s argument that the ultimate goal of Britain’s 
“providential” position was to incorporate Indians into every state office, Ellenborough 
contended that he shared this sentiment with the obvious exceptions of political and military 
offices.32  
 His social prejudice also conditioned this employment. This informed an opposition to 
Eurasians and ‘lower status’ Indians receiving western education or taking positions of 
administrative responsibility. To Ellenborough, a “responsible native” represented an 
individual’s status and belonging to the Subcontinent’s particular social and cultural 
environment. To Lord Auckland, President of the Board of Trade (1830-1834), he argued in 
1830 that, along with increasing revenue through fiscal economy and tea production, the focus 
should be on “the employment of responsible natives instead of Europeans whose work is now 
done by irresponsible Natives.”33 The term “irresponsible natives” applied to the employment of 
“half-castes,” people with mixed European and Indian ethnicity, due to their outsider status in 
                                                 
30 Ellenborough, 16 Dec. 1829, in Ellenborough and Colchester, A Political Diary, 1828-1830, 149 
31 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 3rd ser., vol. 22, 09 Feb. 1830, col. 251. 
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India. In 1830, Ellenborough opposed Lord Carlisle’s petition regretting the lack of status and 
employment for this group.34 In 1833, he explained that this objection was based on avoiding 
“native” ill will over the latter’s supposed social privilege and connection. Also, he argued that 
their anomalous position made them “not as trustworthy as the natives.”35  
  In an 1853 statement critical of English education expansion and its connection with 
public employment, he regretted that it allowed lower caste children to gain an expectation of 
public employment despite their unrespectable status.36 Generally, he contended that English 
education’s general application would harm Britain’s position in India. He argued that its 
dissemination among the higher and upper classes would make British rule just as impossible for 
India’s people as if “the people of England…[had]to bear the constant immigration of Brahmin 
and Mussulman young gentlemen, if they should be sent over every year to occupy the great 
offices in this country.37 His bias against the English educated and Eurasian individuals 
represented a Tory inclination towards social belonging. Unlike the titled, propertied, and 
indigenous “responsible native,” these groups lacked public accountability as they were 
unrepresentative of the current social order. This informed a typical conservative response to 
British liberal interventions in India’s society and culture, and a latent prejudice against English 
educated Indians that appropriated European values.  
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          Despite being wary of English educational propagation, Ellenborough maintained that 
Britain must rely upon consultation and conciliation with the country’s disparate interests. 
Specifically, he argued that this was extremely important over issues of religion and taxation.  In 
1853, he proposed that further public consultation would have restrained the Indian 
government’s legislative changes to civil laws on religion and inheritance which upset Bengal’s 
Hindu community.38 In 1860, he suggested a consultative council on taxation be established with 
equal Indian and European representation. He contended that this would produce better policy, as 
the Government should not solely rely on Europeans’ views to decide appropriate taxation for 
the unique circumstances of India. Moreover, he believed that the British solely deciding the 
country’s taxation without consulting “…a single Native out of 120,000,000…was a monstrous 
inconsistency and contrary to all views that we ought to entertain upon the subject of just and 
beneficial legislation for India.”39  Amidst the Revolt in 1858, he stated to John Lafevre, civil 
service commissioner in charge of official examinations, that candidates for India, preferably 
“well-educated gentlemen,” should know Muslim, Hindu, and English law principles. He argued 
that they should also be given a book which explains how the two major Indian communities 
raise their revenue.40 Ellenborough’s views on fiscal economy, suitable Indian employment, and 
public consultation represented his core principle that the British paramount power must act 
solely for the imperial and national interests of India. This prescribed limits on British 
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interference in the country’s political, social, and cultural institutions, while at same time 
acknowledging that their imperial rule was only legitimated and sustained through promoting the 
population’s general physical and material good. 
Imperial Development and Trade 
           For Ellenborough, the British had a moral obligation to promote India’s economic 
development and trade with the Empire. This included a conservative argument at the beginning 
and end of the nineteenth century that India’s resources and trade strengthened Britain against 
foreign competitors. In 1835, Ellenborough questioned the Company’s inaction over the 
abolition of internal transit duties, which, he stated, hampered India’s economic development 
and trade with England. To the Directors, he argued that this inaction, plus a duty preference for 
English cotton importers expressed through duties, had risked the people’s moral and material 
improvement. Concluding, he challenged British fiscal superiority in Asia: 
…before we can proceed to advice other nations to reform their systems of internal 
taxation, we must at least reform our own, and make that perfect which appears at 
present to be inferior to the system of every state in Asia, with the simple exception 
of Lahore.41 
For Ellenborough, India’s cotton cultivation and trade facilitated local and imperial prosperity. 
Promoting a protective imperial free trade system, he suggested that Indian cotton would 
enhance the local economy and allow Britain to become less reliant upon the United States. In 
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1831, he opposed a new duty on Indian raw material which abolished imperial preference 
towards India by equaling its cotton duty to that paid by the United States.42 In 1851, he 
maintained that the prohibitive cost of transporting raw produce to the coast frustrated the 
fulfilment of England’s and India’s greatest commercial objective of being independent from the 
United States for the supply of cotton.43  
Crown Rule and Feudatory India 
During his time at the Board of Control, Ellenborough argued that Crown rule would 
promote efficient government and reconcile local interests to the Empire. He maintained a career 
advocacy that this change would introduce strict economy and remedy the high costs of duplicate 
government. In 1829, he proposed to Cabinet that the present governing system was one of great 
delay and expense. To his diary following the meeting, he expressed the benefits of Crown rule: 
“…the substitute the King's government for that of the Company. I am sure that in doing so I 
shall confer a great benefit upon India and effect the measure which is most likely to retain for 
England the possession of India.”44 Leading up to the Company’s 1833 charter renewal, 
Ellenborough found that the Company’s Chairs, including Lord Elphinstone and the Duke of 
Wellington, were opposed to his proposition that the King’s name be the title for India’s 
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government. 45 Despite this opposition, he maintained that Crown rule would transmit historical 
and cultural legitimacy to the princes and people of India. In 1843 as Governor General, he 
communicated to Queen Victoria the necessity of the Indian government instilling a sense of 
historical continuity for the princes. Without this, he imagined the great difficulty faced by 
Britain in maintaining an empire where the native chiefs have “no natural place” and “must be 
continually in apprehension of some design to invade their rights and to appropriate their 
territories.” He proposed that this difficulty could be removed “…were your Majesty to become 
the nominal head of the empire.” After depicting to Victoria the colorful scene of the Governor 
General leading a seven thousand man procession of chiefs and their retainers to the old Mughal 
imperial capital of Delhi, he argued that the princes’ positive acceptance of her as “Empress” 
would create a perception that the British government was a partner and benefactor in India: 
The princes and chiefs of India would be proud of their position as the feudatories of 
an empress; and some judicious measures calculated to gratify the feelings of a 
sensitive race..[and] inspire just confidence in the intentions of their sovereign, 
would make the hereditary leaders of this great people cordially co-operate with the 
British Government in measures for the improvement of their subjects and their 
dominions.”46 
By 1853, Ellenborough concluded that the Government of India should be separated 
completely from the East India Company. He contended that with a president and a council 
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under the Crown’s full authority, the Government could “bestow greater happiness upon 
the Indian people.”47 As we shall see, Ellenborough’s respect for nationality, Crown rule, 
and non-intervention informed his governorship of India, as well as his and the 
Conservative Party’s response to the Indian Revolt with the 1858 Government of India Act 
and Queen’s Proclamation.  
Governor General  
 As Governor General of India from 1842 to 1844, Ellenborough’s expressed goal was to 
promote India’s economic development while maintaining a strict respect for local social and 
religious custom. Despite this aspiration, his tenure was dominated by an inherited war in 
Afghanistan, and subsequent military interventions against princely authority in Sind and 
Gwalior. His reaction to these events reflected a Tory inclination to govern based on the 
particular political, social and, religious customs and prejudices of the Subcontinent. It is argued 
that this inclination, which conditioned his unwillingness to compromise India’s particular 
interests for British prejudices and interests, produced metropolitan criticism and his eventual 
official recall.   
For Ellenborough, his governing perspective and policy was guided by the sense of 
India’s physical separation and historical uniqueness from England. At the Board of Control in 
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1829, he responded to a potential Russian invasion into Afghanistan and India with the view that 
the Indian government should act unrestrained of metropolitan and European concerns as an 
“Asiatic Power.”48 In an 1842 statement to the Directors upon accepting the governorship, he 
stated that his primary objective was to pursue India’s economic development in a spirit which 
attempted “…to emulate the magnificent beneficence of the mahomendan emperors in their great 
works of public utility.” He argued that canal and irrigation expansion as well as the 
“accouterments of European civilization” would be accomplished with “…regard for the feelings 
and even the prejudices of the Natives of India.”  Although his first duty was to the people of 
India, he would strive to unite the interests of his “native and…adopted country.”49  
 It was Ellenborough’s Tory inclination to govern as an “Asiatic power” and in the 
interests of his “adopted country” which defined his engagement with India’s population. This is 
clearly represented in Ellenborough’s 1842 Somnauth Proclamation to the Hindu community 
during the British war with Muslim Afghanistan. It represented an imaginative effort to reconcile 
British paramountcy to the supposed prejudices of India’s majority population. Proclaimed a 
national trophy of victory for India, it announced the British Indian Army’s return of the 
Somnauth Temple sandalwood gates after centuries of possession by a remnant of an earlier 
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Muslim invading power. It reveals that Ellenborough viewed the Hindu population, over the 
Muslim and other inhabitants, as India’s indigenous population. Although admiring Mughal 
imperial power, the Proclamation was an attempt to inspire Hindus to support Britain’s efforts 
against a Muslim Afghan enemy.   
To Queen Victoria in October 1842, he proposed that “The progress of the gates from 
Ferozepore to Somnauth will be one great national triumph, and their restoration to India will 
endear the Government to the whole people.”50 The Proclamation’s language extoled to Hindu 
princes and people that the returned gates were a “national triumph,” and an example of India’s 
strength under British guardianship:  
My Brothers and my Friends.-Our victorious army bears the gates of the temple of 
Somnauth in triumph from Affganhistan [sic], and the despoiled tomb of Sultan 
Mahmoud looks upon the ruins of Ghaznee...The insult of 800 years is at last 
avenged. The gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your 
humiliation, are [to] become the proudest record of your national glory-the proof of 
your superiority in arms over the nations beyond the Indus. 
To the princes, he argued that their allegiance and affection to the British paramount power 
strengthened their authority and brought glory to their people: 
...My Brothers and my Friends.-I have ever relied with confidence upon your 
attachment to the British Government. You see how worthy it proves itself of your 
love, when, regarding your honour as its own, it exerts the power of  its arms to 
restore to you the gates of the temple of Somnauth, so long the memorial of your 
subjection to the Affghans[sic]. 
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To you, Princes and Chiefs of Sirhind, of Rajwarrs, of Malwa, and Guzerate, I shall 
commit this glorious trophy of successful war. You will, yourselves, with all honour, 
transmit the gates of sandal-wood through your respective territories, to the restored 
temple of Somnauth. 
He contended that the Gates’ return reflected a British and Indian shared national triumph:  
For myself, identified with you in interest and in feeling, I regard with all your 
enthusiasm the high achievements of that heroic army, reflecting alike immortal 
honour upon my native and upon my adopted country.  
…May that good providence, which has hitherto so manifestly protected me, still 
extend to me its favour, that I may so use the power no intrusted to my hands, as to 
advance your prosperity and secure your happiness, by placing the union of our two 
countries upon foundation which may render it eternal.51 
Ellenborough’s Somnauth Proclamation was an imaginative endeavour to engage the history, 
custom, and sentiments of India’s people for the purpose of reconciling the country’s national 
interests with British imperial ambition. 
In Britain, the Somnauth Gates’ restoration and proclamation raised questions regarding 
Ellenborough’s political and moral judgement. In parliament, critics argued that his action and 
language excited Muslim and Hindu religious tension, and demonstrated a partiality towards the 
latter at the expense of Christianity. E. Vernon Smith, Whig MP and future President of the 
Board of Control (1855-1858), argued that Ellenborough’s Christian reason had to be questioned 
over his idolization of “Hindoo rites, or at least those of juggernaut.” He proposed that “…as 
they [Hindus] seem opposed even to the plain injunctions of a natural religion…deeply founded 
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in error, and to be productive…of a serious evil,” the Indian government is not “…obliged or at 
liberty to show them any degree of positive sanction or encouragement.”52 Prime Minister Robert 
Peel and the Conservative government responded with the assertion that the Governor General 
merely endeavoured to conciliate India’s national feeling with a war prize. However, they were 
forced to reply to the allegations that he sacrificed Christian for Eastern values. Peel tried to 
reassure the House of Ellenborough’s Christianity, by reading the latter’s letter to the Chaplains 
of the Upper Provinces of India which communicated his prayer and “humble thanksgiving to 
Almighty God” for their recent escape from drought. Peel submitted that “…is it possible that he 
can be charged with a desire to represent himself as a favourer of Hindooism? What sentiments 
could be more worthy of a Christian Governor?”53 The Times proposed that Ellenborough’s 
pompous actions and proclamation illustrated to them an adoption of a Napoleonic demeanour, 
and that his references to the Temple made them “…unaffectedly tremble for the Governor-
General’s Christianity.” They implored him “to temper his enthusiastic temperament…for his 
adopted country,” quipping 
let him be on guard against the seduction-let him steel his mind by the thought of his 
family-his English estates-his seat in the House of Peers, to which a worshipper of 
Jughernaut [sic] or Vishnu has never yet been admitted-let him think of the 
associations of his childhood, and the friends of his more mature years-let him think 
of the dishes he would be obliged to forgo if he were a Brahmin-of the religious 
luxuries of Exeter-hail-the temporal ones of a Cabinet dinner-let him think of 
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anything, do anything, desire anything, rather than yield to the temptations which 
will solicit him.54  
Lord John Russell, Whig opposition leader in the Commons, was skeptical of Ellenborough’s 
judgement. He elucidated that this proclamation was not the sole objection to his conduct, but 
rather his information from India informed “…an opinion that it would be dangerous to trust 
Lord Ellenborough with the sole, undivided command of our immense empire in India.”55  
In response to criticism, Ellenborough argued that the Somnauth Gates’ restoration and 
proclamation were necessary appeals to India’s history, custom, and prejudices for the 
maintenance of British power. In responding to the Duke of Wellington’s communication of 
metropolitan disapproval, he responded bluntly that “The measure was a politic measure for 
India-and I ought only to look to India. If I were to abstain from doing anything here which 
could be disapproved by gentlemen over their firesides in England I should lose India.” 
Moreover, it was an action which attempted to remove the people of India’s serious indifference 
to the Government. To that end, he argued that “…I must throw over English Prejudices and act 
in the spirit of a native, not of a foreign governor.”56  
 In 1843, Ellenborough attracted significant criticism from the Court of Directors for his 
unconventional response to popular uprisings in Saugar, in the Central Provinces. He argued that 
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the uprisings were the result of the civil administration’s lack of social courtesy towards the local 
population. In response, he removed the district’s entire European administration and replaced 
them with military personnel. In receiving a report from Col. William Sleeman on the causes of 
the instability, he physically underlined the author’s conclusion that the root of ill feeling was an 
insolence of office: “The Europeans officers no longer show that courtesy towards the middle 
and high chaps, and that kindness towards the humble which characterized the officers of our 
day; and the native officers either imitate or take advantage of this.” 57 To the Directors, he 
argued that this lack of courtesy towards local social status “…deprived us of the sympathies and 
cooperation of the great body of the people.”58 Laying out his rationale for installing military 
administration, he submitted that their shared combat experience with Indians allowed them to 
treat the population with more respect as they knew “the best part of the native character.” 
Unlike the civil servant who “…only see the worst part of the Native character,” Military officers  
have served the best part of the native character; they have seen the soldiers on 
service, and have shared his hardships and his dangers-they...have acquired a kindly 
disposition towards the natives, and it was this disposition which I was, above all 
things, desirous of substituting the administration of the Saugar territory for that 
which appeared to me to have prevailed there.59 
 
This action, which acknowledged and countered prevalent British racial and social prejudice, 
reflected an attempt to enforce a sympathetic understanding of India’s particular habits and 
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institutions. For Ellenborough, the military’s closeness with the population, through shared 
experience, represented a good model which determined that the British paramount power 
needed to remain attuned and adaptive to India’s unique political and social environment. 
 Ellenborough’s 1843 Sind intervention and dethronement of its traditional authority drew 
additional metropolitan criticism. For his detractors, this action reflected a direct contradiction to 
earlier pronouncements against British expansion beyond the Indus and Ganges rivers. In 
Parliament, Lord Ashley, Conservative MP and Tory radical, introduced a motion condemning 
Ellenborough’s imprisonment of Sind’s Amirs and territorial motivations in the area. He argued 
that despite the Amirs being faithful British allies during the Afghan War, Ellenborough forced 
them to cede territory which he gave to a neighbouring state as a reward for fidelity.60 In a 
lengthy, anonymous, and well-researched pamphlet titled Lord Ellenborough and India (1844), 
the writer illustrates that Ellenborough warned the Amirs of the consequences of infidelity, and 
instructed Sir Charles Napier to find any infraction to legitimate annexation or intrigue into local 
succession.61   
Ellenborough’s Sind campaign, and subsequent Gwalior intervention of the same year, 
reflected a belief that the British paramount power must maintain a dominant military presence 
in a country which was historically accustomed to intrigue and conflict. For Ellenborough, India 
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was a diverse and inherently unstable country which needed a strong external hand to maintain 
peace and prosperity. With regards to Sind, he submitted to Wellington that the military 
intervention was justified by the Amirs’ treachery, and to refute an opinion that the British had 
retreated from Afghanistan. Believing that British power was constantly threatened from 
neighbouring powers, he contended that the invasion, which secured territory in the lower Indus, 
provided a launching pad for future campaigns against Afghanistan.62 In regards to British 
intervention in Gwalior, he explained to Victoria that social instability and violence in that 
territory, and threats against bordering possessions necessitated government intervention. He 
argued that in India, unlike the balance of power which existed in Europe, British power 
destroyed all others. Therefore, any hesitation to restore security would make the princes and 
Britain’s own subjects doubt British power.63  
 In July 1844, the Court of Directors recalled Ellenborough from office. This was affected 
by the Company’s and metropolitan political opponents’ routine criticism of the nature and tone 
of his policy in India. In a supportive yet straightforward communication to Ellenborough, 
Wellington summarized this criticism. In regards to the Company, he expressed that they were 
upset with Ellenborough over his absence from the seat of government in Calcutta, and for not 
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seeking approval for the large expenses incurred by military installation expansion.64 Following 
the controversy over Somnauth and Sind, Wellington captured the mood against Ellenborough’s 
Indian administration: 
The opposition in Parliament had, at a very early period of the session, endeavoured 
by sarcasm, and observations upon passages and words in your general orders and 
letter upon the gates of Somnauth, to ridicule your pacific professions, to place them 
in contrast with your conduct in Scinde[sic], and to draw the conclusion that, 
notwithstanding your blame of the conduct of your predecessor in office, you were 
acting with views of conquest inconsistent with the declarations and principle of the 
law.”65 
In response, Ellenborough contended that prioritizing India’s interests over metropolitan opinion 
and the Company’s monetary pursuits was the reason for his unpopularity. Resigned to his 
eventual recall a month earlier, he argued that the Company, both individually and collectively, 
were hostile to his different mode of governing India which put the public interests over their  
…scrupulous regard for individual interests, and none at all for those of the public, 
which has, indeed, here no representative but the Governor-General, are necessarily 
most hostile to an Administration conducted, like mine, upon totally different 
principles, and they give to their account of actions and sayings and events the colour 
of their own disappointed minds.66 
 
 Contemporary and historiographical reflections upon Ellenborough mental soundness 
overlook the fact that he maintained a consistent thread of opinion on Britain’s imperial 
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relationship with India. His official rebuke amidst metropolitan criticism reflected his 
uncompromising inclination that British interests, whether they be financial or cultural 
propagation, must be checked by a sympathetic acknowledgement of India’s particular political 
and social environment. Beyond maintaining order, the state needed to be attuned and adaptive to 
local material needs, habits, and feelings of the people.     
 
Ellenborough and the “national revolt in Awadh 
 Ellenborough’s response to the Indian Revolt in opposition and as President of the Board 
of Control reflected a continuity of thought and tone regarding British imperialism in India. Just 
like in 1844, in 1858 this perspective and manner led to his forced resignation from Cabinet 
following his public and publicized rebuke of Canning’s Oudh Proclamation. As noted, 
Ellenborough maintained, public and privately, that this document’s sanction of mass property 
confiscation fueled a nationally oriented revolt and hostility against the British. In arguing that 
this revolt was not equated to a military mutiny, he resisted growing race antagonism against 
India’s population by expressing sympathy for the rationale and plight of Awadh resistance. 
 In 1858 at the Board of Control, Ellenborough was concerned about the British forces’ 
violent retribution on Indian civilians. He received communication from British officials familiar 
with Northern India that condemned the Proclamation and British brutality in Awadh. Writing to 
Ellenborough, Frederick Currie, former judge in Allahabad, Lahore Resident, and Company 
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director, argued that the Proclamation was universally condemned among officials in India.67 He 
stated that along with the Proclamation, the British and Indian papers’ exaggerations on rebel 
atrocities and calls for vengeance had “…excited the vindictive feelings of officers.”68 Moreover, 
he contended that a British reputation for justice and moderation was being questioned by the 
local populous: 
We hear of stories of arbitrary and unwarrantable proceedings even by civil officers, 
and the number of innocent lives that have been sacrificed by the undiscriminating 
ferocity of the soldiers, especially of the newly arrived...is perfectly frightful.”69  
 
Mr. Edwards, from Calcutta, asked Ellenborough to stop the practice of special courts, stating 
that “The people are becoming terrified by our operations, and in a terror stricken multitude there 
is fearful danger.”70 Colonel Henry Marion Durand, Ellenborough’s former aide-de-camp and 
private secretary, now Agent in Indore, suggested that Sir. C. Campbell and Sir James Outram 
“…were all opposed to this confiscation proclamation, one of them saving ‘it was good for a ten 
years war.”71  
 This criticism informed Ellenborough’s condemnatory Secret Dispatch to Canning dated 
18 April 1858. He argued to Canning that his Proclamation exacerbated a popular and legitimate 
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uprising which was largely conditioned by the recent 1856 British annexation.72 He detailed a 
hostile environment in which the British had publicly dethroned and substituted a native 
sovereign with foreign rule, and changed the revenue settlement that deprived landowners of the 
means to provide wealth and power to their families. He contended that amidst these 
deprivations the revolt had a  
…rather the character of a legitimate war, than that of Rebellion, and that the people 
of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration, than made the 
objects of a penalty, exceeding in extent, and in severity almost any which has been 
recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation.73 
 
In a Lords debate condemning the Dispatch’s subsequent publication in the Times, 
Ellenborough maintained that he acted in the local population’s best interests and their future 
conciliation to the Empire. He contended that the Proclamation’s confiscation decree was 
contrary to the spirit of clemency and amnesty which resembled the current Conservative 
government’s policy on India.74 In sum, he illustrated that the British government had two 
contrary options in confronting the Indian Revolt: “It is practically this:—Shall the 
Government of India be conducted on the principles of justice and clemency, or shall it be 
conducted on the principles of severity which appear in the Proclamation of Lord Canning?” 
In proposing that his fellow Lords understood “…the expression of ‘the proprietary right,” he 
submitted that for the people of India it had stronger resonance as confiscation was unknown 
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in the country’s history. Beyond reminding their lordships of the negative consequences of 
property confiscation in Ireland, he stated that even the former Muslim conquerors of India 
respected proprietorship in India: 
Whatever have been the changes of dynasty, the storm of war has swept over village 
communities, and the property of individuals from the lowest to the highest has 
always been respected. The wise conquerors of India changed little but the Ruler—
they left everything standing—and on that account it is that they were enabled to 
establish a permanent Government.75 
 
For Awadh’s soldiers, Ellenborough proposed that property confiscation amounted to the final 
straw in Britain’s brutal repression of the revolt. He tried to invoke British public sympathy 
for the rebels’ situation and feeling. He argued that amidst threats and acts of brutal violence, 
they had now no material means to maintain their society’s religious foundations:  
They have been threatened with hanging, with being blown from guns, with 
transportation; and they are now under a panic, hardly knowing what they are to do. 
What must be their feelings when, while disarmed and incapable of committing any 
act against the Government, however indignant they might be at the dishonour they 
had sustained—what must be their feelings, I say, when they find that all their 
property is at once confiscated, and that they have not a home to go to? More than 
this—the Mahomedan mosques, the Hindoo temples, all are supported by the land of 
the country…The whole of this, however, is confiscated; the whole means of 
maintaining both religions are unwisely, rashly taken away. All the provision for 
objects of charity, for orphans and widows, is swept away.76 
 
In conclusion, he reiterated that his letter’s aim was to stem violence by offering Oudh’s 
people hope under British rule: “They were men who had been fighting without hope. I 
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wished to give them hope. I gave them the hope of returning to their homes, to their villages, 
to all the comforts of their families”.77  
 For Ellenborough, the opposition to his dispatch and pressure to leave the Government 
represented a partisan divide over India between a sympathetic Conservative administration 
and a Whig policy of repression and confiscation. In a letter to Disraeli following his 
resignation, Ellenborough argued that his dispatch “afforded the only hope of tranquilizing the 
natives and controlling our maddened people who seem to have lost all regard for human life 
and human suffering.”78 He maintained that India’s only hope for imperial reconciliation 
rested with himself and the Conservative government. In correspondence with John 
Parkington, Wellington, and Disraeli, he contended that the Proclamation had to be sanctioned 
by the former Whig government, and that the fall of Derby’s administration would lead to 
India’s despair.79   
Conclusion 
       This chapter challenges a contemporary and historical perception that Ellenborough’s 
political career was coloured by eccentricity and insubordination. It argued that in state 
office and political opposition, he maintained a consistent Tory national perspective and 
policy on British imperialism in India. This represented a challenge and attempted 
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mollification of ascended liberal civilizing currents which informed westernization and 
racial superiority from the 1830s to the Indian Revolt. As President of the Board of Control 
and Governor General, he maintained that Britain had a moral obligation to govern through 
India’s particular political and social environment by respecting the institutions, habits, and 
feelings of the people. This represented the core principle of a wider imperial polity and 
“subjecthood” predicated on reciprocal obligation and loyalty. It informed Ellenborough’s 
state intervention against instability and disloyalty in the Sind and Gwailor, and his 
punishment of Company officials who disrespected local social hierarchy and custom. 
Outside India, this defined his condemnation of loyal prince and gentry displacement, and 
his rebuke of state interference in India’s religious and inheritance customs. It conditioned 
his sympathetic response and calls for British moderation to Awadh’s “legitimate” uprising 
during the Revolt. His official condemnation of Canning’s Awadh’s “confiscation” 
Proclamation reflected a Tory inclination that Britain’s moral obligation as an imperial 
power was to protect the country’s entangled political, propertied, and, religious 
institutions. Ellenborough’s perspective and political positions informed a wider 
conservative response to the Indian Revolt. Moreover, it informed a Conservative 
ministry’s imaginative reformulation of an imperial framework in India by the 1858 
Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation.  
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Chapter 2: Disraeli’s Challenge to Whig Ascendency in India 
 
“…a party has arisen in the State who demand that the principle of political 
liberalism shall consequently be carried to its extent; which it appears to them is 
impossible without getting rid of the fragments of the old constitution that remain. 
This is the destructive party.”80 (Disraeli, 1844) 
 
“There is not a race so proud, so willful, so rash, and so obstinate. They live in a 
misty clime, on raw meats, and wines of fire. They laugh at their fathers, and never 
say a prayer. They pass their days in the chase, gaming, and all violent caurses. They 
have all the power of the State, and all its wealth; and when they can wring no more 
from their peasants, they plunder the kings of India”81 (Disraeli, 1847) 
 
Introduction 
Unlike Ellenborough, Disraeli had little experience with Indian issues and had never been to 
India. Although involved in parliamentary commissions on Ceylon and India, it is argued that his 
inclination and action towards the Subcontinent was informed by political conditions in Britain 
and Ireland as well as literary engagements with the Middle East. Moreover, this chapter 
demonstrates that it was a Tory and Young England critique of Whig-espoused liberal modernity 
and reasoned progress which defined Disraeli’s perspective on British Indian Empire. This 
conditioned Disraeli’s skepticism of European modern civilization’s superiority over Asia, and 
defined a conception of civilizational difference based upon locality and prescription. It is argued 
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that this skepticism of modernity and partisan critique of the Whigs defined his sympathetic 
response to the national characteristics of the Indian Revolt. 
The Indian Revolt      
 On 27 July 1857, Disraeli made a lengthy, comprehensive, and partisan parliamentary 
assault on recent British Company governance in India. In confronting what he argued was the 
lethargic and unsophisticated response of Lord Palmerston’s Whig Government (1855-1858) to 
the Revolt, he challenged parliament to consider Britain’s responsibility for the escalating crisis 
in India. Disraeli’s contention reflected a Tory political philosophy uniquely expressed through 
the imaginations of the Young England Movement which revered the national and social values 
of noblesse oblige, expansive privilege, and religious reverence. With similar arguments used to 
denounce Whiggism’s oligarchic and liberal destruction of England ancient institutions, Disraeli 
critiqued a Whig policy of similar national destruction in India which reversed a traditional 
imperial policy to protect and engage political, propertied, and religious interests in India.82   
 For Disraeli, this reversal in policy matched the Whigs re-ascendancy to government and 
Dalhousie’s appointment to Governor General in 1848. He ascribed three reasons for the Indian 
and British governments’ responsibility for the Revolt: “first, our forcible destruction of native 
authority; next, our disturbance of the settlement of property and thirdly, our tampering with the 
religion of the people.”83 Focusing on Dalhousie’s annexation of Awadh in 1856, he contended 
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that the sepoy mutiny and popular uprisings were not predicated on military service or 
superstitious grievances, but represented a “national war of revolt.”84 In November 1857, he 
stated to Lord Derby that the “paramount and proximate cause was to be found in the annexation 
of Oudh.”85 Disraeli’s contention that Britain’s destruction of India’s ancient and national 
institutions led to the Revolt was informed by his vehement Tory defense against Whiggism and 
liberal reform in Britain and Ireland before 1857. 
A Tory defense against Whig Ascendency 
           From his early days as a political outsider and parliamentary backbencher to his ascension 
to Prime Minister, Disraeli adhered to a tory political tradition and philosophy from the 
eighteenth century. This adherence that prefaced an involvement with the Young England 
Movement in the 1840s made Disraeli a distinctive and rogue figure within the post-1832 
Reform Act Conservative Party early in his career. In 1835, in a letter to Viscount Howick on the 
Tory’s previous political support for shortened parliaments, he argued that “I'm willing to admit 
that primitive toryism...may be a very different faith from the one at present by its votaries: 
nevertheless I am a primitive tory.”86 In his novel Coningsby, published in 1844, he contended 
that the post-reform Conservative Party was controlled by “Pseudo-Tories,” who perpetuated a 
“…mantra of political exclusion and economic restriction” that was contrary to a tory reverence 
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for the universal principals of nationality.87 For Disraeli, the proponents of true Tory principals 
were in the lineage of eighteenth century statesmen culminating in William Pitt’s defense against 
the Whig oligarchy’s centralizing and exclusionary motivations devised from the 1688 Glorious 
Revolution.88  
           From this political narrative, Disraeli maintained throughout his career that the Tory Party 
and Toryism were inherent defenders of national political, social, and religious institutions 
against the abstract, universal, and transformative nature of liberalism.  In a letter to Edward 
Beadan in 1835, Disraeli stated that “I hold one of the first principles of Toryism to be that 
government is instituted for the welfare of the many...This is why the Tories maintain national 
institutions.”89 In 1837, he proposed to Maidstone’s electors that it was the Conservative Party’s 
“...object to resist liberalism in politics...[which] is only another phrase for an attack upon the 
protestant religion and the English poor.” To Buckinghamshire’s electors in 1847, he hoped 
“…that [in the] great struggle between popular principles and liberal opinion, which is the 
characteristics of our age, I hope ever to be found on the side of the people, and of the 
institutions of England.”90 In his famous 1872 London Crystal Palace speech, he inaugurated a 
popular conservative platform that would dominate late Victorian politics. He argued that: “the 
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Tory party, unless it is a national party, is nothing. It is not a confederacy of nobles, it is not a 
democratic multitude; it is a party formed from all the numerous classes in the realm-classes 
alike and equal before the law, but whose different conditions and different aims give vigorous 
variety to our national life.”91 In advocating a clear contrast between the Conservative and 
Liberal parties, he used the political stage to challenge the precepts of nineteenth-century 
Victorian liberalism. Specifically, he critiqued liberalism’s abstract and cosmopolitan disregard 
for national interests: “Influenced…by the philosophy and politics of the continent…[liberalism] 
substitute[d] cosmopolitan for national principles; and they baptized the new scheme of politics 
with the plausible name of ‘liberalism.” Moreover, he condemned a liberal civilizing world view 
which “…attack[s] the institutions of the country under the name of Reform, and to make war on 
the manners and customs of the people of this country under the pretext of Progress.”92 It is 
important not to underestimate the extent that Disraeli’s partisan rhetoric was informed by a 
substantive and consistent intellectual inclination towards the national and social consequences 
of liberalism. This defined his conservative world view which saw liberal modern reform 
predicated on societal precepts of reasoned progress as a transformative and destructive force in 
England, Ireland, and India. 
           Disraeli’s critique of western liberalism resonates through his early political and creative 
writings. In “Spirit of Whiggism” (1836), Disraeli proposed that the England’s institutions and 
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population needed to be defended from a factious Whig interest. He argued that the tory defense 
of the Church of England and the dual houses of parliament represented their organic 
embodiment of the nation: 
Now, a nation is a work of art and a work of time. A nation is gradually created by a 
variety of influences-the influence of original organization, of climate, soil, religion, 
laws, customs, manners, extraordinary accidents and incidents in their history, and 
the individual character of their illustrious citizens. These influences create the 
nation-these form the national mind, and produce in the course of centuries a high 
degree of civilization. If you destroy the political institutions which these influences 
have called into force…you destroy the nation.93 
 
Resembling Burke’s argument on the importance of locality for instilling local and national 
identity, Disraeli submitted that England’s political institutions represented the English people’s 
particular history and character. In contrast, Disraeli contended that Whigs pursued a destructive 
reform program predicated on the rallying cry of enlightenment principles such as the “equality 
of man.” He submitted that its end result was the submission of the local and hierarchical to the 
liberal centralization of a progressive metropole:  
Let us suppose our ancient monarchy abolished, our independent hierarchy reduced 
to a stipendiary sect, the gentlemen of England deprived of their magisterial 
functions, and metropolitan prefects and sub-prefect established in the counties and 
principal towns, commanding a vigorous and vigilant police, and backed by an army 
under the immediate orders of a single House of Parliament. But where then will be 
the liberties of England? Who would dare disobey London? the enlightened and 
reformed metropolis!94 
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Young England 
          In the 1840s, Disraeli espoused and contributed to the Young England Movement’s 
negation of a Whig ideology of progress with a Tory historical narrative and political philosophy 
based upon feudal inspired values and a romantic reverence for the nation. It centered around 
four individual Conservative MPs, Disraeli, George Smythe, Lord John Manners, and Alexander 
Baillie Cochrane, with auxiliary support from around a dozen other MPs. It promoted the use of 
imagination to pursue a platform of noble obligation, the expansive privileges and rights of 
propertied and labor, and religious reverence to correct the ills of modern society.95 In the 
preface for Lothiar (1870), Disraeli recalled the imagination, philosophy, and objectives of 
Young England: 
They recognised imagination in the government of nations as a quality not less 
important than reason. They trusted much to popular sentiment, which rested on an 
heroic tradition and was sustained by the high spirit of a free aristocracy…they 
looked upon the health and knowledge of the multitude as not the least precious part 
of the wealth of nations. In asserting the doctrine of race, they were entirely opposed 
to the equality of man, and similar abstract dogmas, which have destroyed ancient 
society without creating a satisfactory substitute. Resting on popular privileges, they 
held that no society could be durable unless it was built upon principles of loyalty 
and religious reverence…96 
 
The role of imagination as a device to critique and espouse a positive alternative to the reasoned 
foundations of modern society would inform Disraeli’s political engagement with England and empire.   
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Disraeli and Young England engaged with the prominent “Condition of England” question in the 
1840s. They proposed to elevate the poor in utilitarian England with education on the feudal virtues of 
duty, obligation, and community.  For Manners, the future 7th Duke of Portland and a leading voice of 
Young England inside and outside parliament, the poor’s degradation reflected the loss of feudal 
principles of community and mutual obligation due to the rise of industrial capital. This represented a 
nostalgia for Britain’s pre-industrial feudal past reflected in his poem titled “England’s Trust” (1841): 
Each knew his place-King, peasant, peer, or priest- 
The Greatest owned connexion with the lease; 
From rank to rank the generous feeling ran, 
And linked society as man to man 
 
Gone are those days, and gone the ties that then 
Bound peers and gentry to their fellow men. 
Now, in their place, behold the modern slave, 
Doomed, from the very cradle to the grave, 
To tread his lonely path of care and toil.97 
 
In an 1844 North-West speaking tour to the industrial towns of Birmingham, Manchester, and Bingley, 
Manners and Disraeli promoted recreation for working laborer to re-inspire the moral spirit of noble 
obligation, duty, and community. Speaking to the Birmingham Athenic Institute on the importance of 
recreational activity, Manners praised the institution for their efforts in “…bringing back [the] manly 
games of traditional England,” which once united the classes and bought a spirit of peace such as in the 
“Palmiest days of feudalism [where] the barons of England were accustomed to sit at the same table and 
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partake of the same fare with those beneath them.”98 In a speech supporting initiatives promoting field 
garden allotments for laborers in Bingley, Disraeli expressed Young England’s lamentation and solution 
for social disunity. He argued that instruction in duty and sympathy were urgently needed to move away 
from a mantra of exclusiveness, and influence national manners towards ameliorating the social 
condition and stability of England.99 For Disraeli, the decline of mutual sympathy across England’s 
various interests and classes was the product of a Whig ideological assault on nationality since the 
seventeenth century.  
 In his Young England inspired novels, Coningsby, Sybil, and Tancred, Disraeli imagined 
an English political and economic social landscape divided by exclusion and mass degradation. 
Through these works, Disraeli employs a Tory historical narrative to explain Whiggism’s role in 
dissolving noble obligation, expropriating the people’s rights, and banning religious toleration. 
He contended that a Whig exclusionary promulgation of sectarian religion and market capitalism 
led to a lower moral condition of the rich and the poor.  These texts also challenged the political, 
economic, and cultural foundations of European civilization and its claimed superiority around 
the world.  
For Disraeli, the plunder of the church, the Crown’s submission, capitalism, and 
sectarianism were the prevalent themes degrading and disuniting England. In Coningsby: or The 
New Generation (1844), Disraeli explains that it is from the sixteenth-century plunder of church 
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lands during the Reformation that the local and imperial roots of a Whig mantra of political 
exclusion are traced: 
They have in that time pulled down thrones and churches, changed dynasties, 
abrogated and remodeled parliaments; they have disfranchised Scotland and 
confiscated Ireland. One may admire the vigour and consistency of the Whig Party, 
and recognize in their careers that unity of purpose that can only spring from a great 
principle; but the Whigs introduced sectarian religion, sectarian religion led to 
political exclusion, and political exclusion was accompanied by commercial 
restraint.”100 
 
In Sybil, or The Two Nations (1845), a book which focuses on England’s industrial North-West, 
Disraeli’s character Lord Marney represents the Whig oligarch. His elevation from commissioner 
to knighthood through the confiscation of church property and the plundering of monasteries 
during the Reformation, and to a peerage for rejecting James II’s restitution of religious tolerance 
and Church property in the 1688 Glorious Revolution, Marney symbolized the ambitious and 
exclusive Whig aristocratic governing mentality during the period.101 For Disraeli, the 
introduction of “Dutch Finance,” or finance capitalism, accentuated the aristocratic governing 
class’s dissociation from the peasant classes: 
pursued more or less for nearly a century and a half, has ended in the degradation of 
a fettered and burdened multitude, made national debt a habit, it has made credit a 
ruling power…it has introduced a loose, inexact haphazard, and dishonest spirit in 
the conduct of both public and private life; a spirit dazzling and yet dastardly; 
reckless of consequences and yet shrinking from responsibility...these are the evils, 
but ought perhaps cheerfully to be encountered for the greater blessings of civil and 
religious liberty”102 
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In Sybil, Disraeli’s portrayal of the stagnant and impoverished town of Marney is 
represented as the consequence of a Whig exclusion in England. In the monastic ruins above the 
town, the main character Egremont, younger brother to Lord Marney, learns from two strangers 
that the historical relationship between the church and the people had been destroyed by an 
ascendant capitalist aristocracy. We learn that unlike the present day when the small proprietor is 
forced from his country cottage to the town by the landowner to find wage work, the old 
monastery was a point of refuge, council, and defense for the poor. In the present, however, the 
poor stand apart from a State and Church controlled by an aristocracy. This creates an England 
of two separate classes: “between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are… 
ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings.”103 For Disraeli, the symbol of a ruined 
monastery, ruined by an aristocratic family power that disassociates from rather than fulfills its 
obligations to the poor, signifies how the doctrines of religious liberty and material advancement 
have degraded the moral bonds of the nation.  
In Tancred: Or the New Crusade (1847), the last novel in the Young England trilogy, 
Disraeli is most introspective on the condition of European morality and spirituality, and its 
comparisons with the East. In Tancred’s, the main character, discussion with his father, the Duke 
of Bellamount, on England’s progressive material development, Disraeli lays out a Young 
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England critique of modern society. Tancred argues that in the progression of material industry 
there is a moral deterioration of aristocratic virtue:  
I see nothing but fresh causes of moral deterioration. You have announced to the 
millions that their welfare is to be tested by the amount of their wages…You 
propose for their conduct the least ennobling of all impulses. If you have seen an 
aristocracy invariably becomes degraded under such influence, if all the vices of a 
middle class may be traced to such an absorbing motive; why are we to believe 
that the people should be more pure, or that they should escape the catastrophe of 
the policy that confounds the happiness with the wealth of nations.104 
Through the young noblemen Tancred and a variety of stereotypical Eastern characters, Disraeli 
travels to the East to critique a materially obsessed and morally degraded British society. This is 
done through Tancred’s interaction with the strengths of Eastern morality and spirituality. In 
confronting the presupposed superiority of European civilization, Disraeli introduces to the 
reader the extensive civilizing influences of the East. In explaining British prejudices against 
Judaism, he contends that Europeans are “…touched by a presumptuous jealousy of the long 
predominance of that oriental intellect to which they owed their civilization.”105 With regards to 
the Church and the English nation, Disraeli writes that “the deficiency of oriental knowledge” in 
a State controlled and monitored church limits its doctrinal and spiritual influence over the 
government and the market place.106  With regards to English Christian proselytism in the East, 
the character Fakredden questions their motivations and suitability as the “English have no 
religious principles.”107 Disraeli also questions the credibility and legitimacy of England’s 
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interference and modification to Eastern political constitutions. In recounting the recent political 
upheaval and religious violence in Lebanon in 1842, Disraeli argues that English attempts to 
introduce sectarian government into a region accustomed to a feudal system, although 
satisfactory to “Exeter Hall,” had the contrary result of unifying the entire country against 
Europe.108 In Tancred, Disraeli expanded a criticism of Whiggism’s forced moral and material 
deprivation in England to argue that western civilization had little to complement the institutions 
and customs of the East. In suggesting that the East could morally improve the West in terms of 
respecting history and religious reverence, he challenged liberalism’s credibility as superior 
civilizing force in England and throughout the Empire. This allowed Disraeli to remain skeptical 
of liberal imperialism’s propagation of reasoned progress, and stay sympathetic to national and 
social difference. 
Whiggism and Ireland 
 For Disraeli, Ireland’s material plight and social turmoil represented the consequences of 
the Whigs’ unmitigated destruction and overthrow of an ancient constitution with sectarian state 
and religious principles. To Disraeli and Young England, what was needed for Ireland was 
English sympathy for the laws, customs, and feelings of the Irish people. Manners argued that 
the Government should desist from altering the 
…old manners and ancient feelings of a generous hearted people; I implore them to 
desist from striving to effect such a revolution…by accepting their traditional habits 
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and ideas, by appealing to and governing by their unhesitating faith, and hereditary 
feudalism…109 
 
In the House, Richard Monckton Milnes contended that the Irish were the most religious and 
faithful people in the world, and that it was the evils of religious ascendancy (State Church 
dominance) which was the root of all disturbances in Ireland.110 Disraeli proposed that the 
removal of Charles I and James II in the name of political and religious liberty unleashed onto 
Ireland hundreds of years of confiscation, humiliation, and discrimination at the hands of an alien 
church and aristocracy.111  
For Disraeli, Irish distress and violence were the result of a Whig exclusionary ideology 
which attempted to impose foreign social elites and institutions onto a historically and religiously 
cognizant Irish people. In an 1844 debate concerning the state of Ireland, Disraeli argued that it 
was not the Tories, but the Whig Party, who made a factitious aristocracy out of the lands of the 
church, introduced the Penal Codes, and infused a puritanical spirit within the Church of Ireland. 
In trying to evoke sympathy for the Irish plight in the House of Commons, he contended that 
these changes had inflicted on “…a starving population, an absentee aristocracy, and an alien 
Church, and in addition, the weakest executive in the world.”112 To Disraeli, a Tory alternative in 
Ireland resembled the reign of Charles I, in which there was political and civil equality for 
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Roman Catholics, an encouragement of their service in judicial and legislative positions, and 
Anglican and Catholic Church equality.113 In responding to the claims that English institutions 
were needed to improve Ireland’s condition, he contended that this concept had produced Irish 
dissatisfaction. Just as earlier he contended against the introduction of English styled municipal 
corporations in Ireland, Disraeli stated:   
Justice in Ireland was then said to mean, an identity of institutions with England. He 
believed that to be the greatest fallacy that could be brought forward. He always 
thought that the greatest cause of misery in Ireland was the identity of institutions 
with England…How could people ask for an identity of institutions when the very 
primary and most important institution of all—the union of Church and State—was 
opposed by the Irish people?114 
 
Disraeli argued that Ireland’s material plight and social violence was due to a Whig attempt to 
destroy nationality and impose foreign institutions on the people. In response, he laid out an 
alternative Tory imperialism in Ireland. Looking back to the Stuart kings, he imagined an 
English monarch which protected and conciliated Irish nationality for the imperial interest. 
Beyond Ireland, Disraeli maintained that sympathy for human difference and distress should 
inform parliamentary consideration for all subjects of the British Empire.  
Ceylon 
In an 1850 Commons debate responding to a recent popular uprising in Ceylon, Disraeli 
challenged the House, and especially its most liberal proponents, to consider sympathetically 
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their political and moral obligation towards Britain’s Eastern subjects. In arguing that little had 
been heard concerning the condition of the local people during the debate, he criticized the 
arguments of liberal reformers John Roebuck and J. Hobb that Ceylon was a prize of conquest 
and should not be accountable to parliament.115 Disraeli highlighted Ceylon’s victims, and 
Britain’s responsibility to maintain good governance, justice, and moderation for all subjects of 
the Empire. Quoting a Ceylon newspaper, he questioned the activities and conduct of the British 
authority: “The soldiers are pillaging the houses, digging up the floors to find money and jewelry 
belonging to the hiding villagers, confiscated under martial law. The scenes at present enacted in 
the neighbourhood of Matelle are a disgrace to a civilized Government.” He concluded that this 
situation merited a parliamentary interference: “…the circumstances must be fresh in the 
recollection of every Member of the House. I look to them as circumstances which are dangerous 
to our tenure of our Colonies. This, I think, of all others is the case in which the Parliament of 
England ought to interfere.”116 For Disraeli, the Imperial parliament was politically and morally 
responsible for the well-being of the Crown’s and the East India Company’s subjects. In 
appropriating a Young England condemnation of social exclusiveness, and the virtue of noble 
obligation, he argued that MPs should protect all imperial subjects against colonial injustice.  
Whig Culpability for the Indian Revolt  
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During the 1857 Indian Revolt, Disraeli again insisted that the Imperial parliament should 
be accountable for the escalating distress and popular uprisings caused by a recent British policy 
of destroying nationality through state annexation, land confiscation, and interference in 
religious custom. His perspective on India reflected his Tory defense of nationality and the moral 
principles of noblesse oblige, expansive social privilege for rich and poor, and religious 
reverence. This informed his opposition to the destructive forces of liberalism in India. Similar in 
consequence to a Whig usurpation of a free monarchy, land proprietorship, and the Anglican 
Church, he saw the Indian government’s new policy of dethroning princes and state annexation, 
as well as interference in Hinduism as direct attacks on the bonds of nationality in India. As with 
Ireland, Disraeli argued that stability and loyalty in India was conditional on Britain’s political 
acknowledgment of the different political institutions, social rights, and customs which 
characterized the various nationalities of India.  
Before the Revolt, Disraeli was a consistent critic of the East India Company’s activities 
in India. In 1843, he supported Lord Ashley’s motion condemning Governor General 
Ellenborough’s conquest of Sind and dethronement of its princes.117 In Tancred, Disraeli 
summarized British tactics and intentions in India through the Fakredden character, who morally 
defended his countless attempts at intrigue to gain possession of Lebanon and Syria by arguing: 
“Why, England won India by intrigue. Do you think they are not intriguing in the Punjaub at this 
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moment?”118 In this novel as well, he communicates England and India’s religious differences 
within the British imperial context. In explaining that Tancred’s pilgrimage to Asia Minor was 
justified as it represented the historical birthplace of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, he sets as a 
contrast the “rational and refined” Indian Brahmin’s visit to England:  “The land which the 
Hindoo visits is not his land, nor his father’s land; the laws which regulate it are not his laws, and 
the faith which fills its temples is not the revelation that floats upon his sacred Ganges.”119 This 
passage should be read as a clever allegorical critique on English colonization in India. It is a 
veiled warning to the self-confident rational and civilized Englishmen against the dangers of not 
considering the laws and religion which define India and its people. In Sybil, he criticized and 
discredited the intentions of liberal proponents for civilized progress in the metropole and across 
the Empire. For example, he noted England and India’s comparable social distress: “Infanticide 
is practiced as extensively and as legally in England as it is on the banks of the Ganges: a 
circumstance which apparently has not yet engaged the attention of the Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts.”120 Amidst the 1853 debate on renewing the East 
India Company’s charter, Lord Stanley’s private journal suggests that Disraeli disliked the 
Company’s Whig westernization policy, and thought the Company should be either abolished or 
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renewed for a limited term.121 For Disraeli, it was the consequences of a Whig ideology tied to 
reasoned progress, capital, and sectarian religion that destroyed the ancient constitutions of 
England and Ireland, and next threatened a similar usurpation in India. 
 From the Revolt’s outset, Disraeli treated Indian policy as tied intrinsically to domestic 
politics. He argued to Lord Henry Lennox that the responsibility for the Indian Revolt was not so 
much the Company’s administrative failings, but Downing Street policy. 122 Before his speech to 
the Commons, Disraeli’s co-owned newspaper The Press criticized the Government’s treatment 
of the sepoys and the landed proprietors of recently-annexed Awadh. Agreeing with 
Ellenborough’s argument that the sepoys had legitimate grievances for being overworked, 
underpaid, and having their Hindu religion slighted by distant officers, they pointed to European 
growing prejudice as the prime motivation for their mutiny: “the subscriptions of the English 
officers to their festivals withdrawn under the pretense that they are idolatrous, and the line more 
and more plainly marked which separates them from the ruling race.”123 In regards to the 
Company’s Awadh annexation, The Press laid down its consequential relationship with the 
growing popular uprising in the country:  
…the annexation to our empire has brought with it only increased extortion and 
oppression…We hear from all sides of landowners dispossessed, of rent free tenures 
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arbitrarily set aside, and of the assessment of whole districts being altered at 
pleasure. 124 
 
At the beginning of January amidst popular British calls for revenge following the reports of 
Indian massacres of English civilians, The Press maintained its argument that the revolt’s causes 
laid directly with India’s administration: 
How much gratifying to attribute our disasters to the treachery of pampered sepoys, 
or to some other cause wholly beyond our control, than to show it to have been the 
natural result of continued misgovernment…added to a system of spoliation so 
grasping as must sooner or later have caused an explosion among the most patient 
people upon the globe.125 
 
In the House of Commons, Disraeli argued that the Whig government’s 1848 appointment 
of Dalhousie and support for his policies made them responsible for the Sepoy and popular 
uprising in India. His account of British error from that date represented an attempt to coalesce 
partisan conservative support and opinion on the Revolt. To that end, he rebuked Dalhousie’s 
actions for destroying native political authority, property settlement, and religious custom which 
consequently led to the Revolt. Stressing the importance of religion to Indian society, he argued 
that the Government’s assault on Hinduism’s relationship with the political and propertied 
institutions of the country struck at the heart of nationality in India. As an example, he focused 
on Dalhousie’s refusal to recognize the significance of adoption to perpetuating native dynasties 
and property tenure. He expounded that adoption was the “very corner stone of Hindoo society,” 
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and in regards to the transference of title and property was “…not only a civil right, but a 
religious privilege; the whole frame-work of Indian society is established upon that principle.”126 
To Disraeli, the Government’s restriction of this right was motivated by a need for additional 
revenue. He submitted that the annexation and confiscation of lands from the Raja of Satara in 
1848, the Rajah of Benares in 1854, the King of Awadh in 1856, and dozens of smaller 
kingdoms was done so as to extract additional revenue from the Indian population.   
In response to the argument that some native states had spurious territorial claims and, 
therefore, could be removed without social disturbance, he warned that this reasoning could be 
easily applied to England. Similar to Lord Marney and the confiscation of the Marney 
Monastery, he argued that although India, suffering from many revolutions and conquests, had 
fictitious landed titles, England had its share as well: “Any person, for instance, in possession of 
church lands or of a Royal manor, who could not prove that the land was rightfully acquired by 
the persons from who he inherited or purchased it, might have his whole property 
confiscated.”127 Drawing a parallel to the political and religious consequences of church land 
confiscations during England’s sixteenth century reformation, he begged MPs to appreciate how 
this new system of confiscation and taxation was producing revolutionary change in Indian 
society. In addition, he noted that beyond extracting two-thirds of a million pounds from landed 
proprietors due to the rental of land, the Government’s new policy of giving individual annuities 
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instead of hereditary pensions to former native chiefs caused considerable social unrest. This, he 
argued, reduced “…once ancient royal families and nobles….to a state of the utmost 
humiliation” and instilled upon their people the scene of “…their ancient sovereigns reduced to 
absolute beggary.”128  
For Disraeli, the relationship between a “native” sovereign and his people had been 
brutally usurped in Awadh’s recent annexation. He contended that under no circumstances 
should the King of Awadh’s misconduct be a pretense for abolishing a whole kingdom, 
especially one which had been Britain’s faithful ally and had not violated any agreed treaty. In 
illustrative language, Disraeli argued that British conduct in Awadh had produced suspicion 
regarding British motivations among the Hindu and Muslim princes: 
The moment the throne of Oude was declared vacant, the English troops poured in; 
the Royal treasury was ransacked, and the furniture and jewels of the King and his 
wives were seized. From that instant the Mahomedan princes were all alienated. For 
the first time the Mahomedan princes felt that they had an identity of interest with the 
Hindoo Rajahs. From that moment they threw aside the sullen pride of former 
conquerors who would not condescend to sympathize with the victims of Sattara.129  
 
With regards to the sentiment of Awadh-raised soldiers in the British Sepoy army, Disraeli 
portrayed their forceful dislocation from a traditional social position of privilege and standing. 
Unlike in the past where joining the British Army gave the sepoy tenure and income security to 
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maintain a small proprietorship which was as “…dear to him as the tenure of a Kentish yeoman,” 
Disraeli argued that now the 
Sepoy returns now to his village, and finds it belong to the Company, and that the 
rigid revenue system of India is applied to his small property…The Oude Sepoy 
finds himself subjected to a hard and novel system of taxation and revenue. He finds 
he has lost political privileges and his territorial position.130  
 
            Lastly, Disraeli challenged the Indian government’s interference with Hindu religious 
customs on inheritance and widow remarriage. In particular, he condemned two Legislative 
Council Acts which stated that no one should be deprived of an inheritance for changing 
religions, and which legalized remarriage for Hindu widowers. These laws, argued Disraeli, 
attacked Hindu society which bonded religion and property together in a sacred trust. More 
dangerously, it insinuated in Indian minds that the Government was intentionally trying to 
remodel society.131 Just as Disraeli and Young England defended Irish nationality from the 
imposition of foreign English institutions, so India’s nationalities needed to be protected from a 
British liberal transformative ideology bent on overthrowing the ancient political, propertied, and 
religious customs of the Subcontinent.     
For Disraeli, the long term solution to India’s grievances was to bring England and India 
closer together under a shared monarch. In Tancred, with the words of Farredenn to Tancred on 
the latter’s hope for a spiritual reconciliation between East and West, we see a gleam of 
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Disraeli’s imperial vision in India: “Let the Queen of the English collect a great fleet, let her 
stow away all her treasure, bullion, gold plate, and precious arms; be accompanied by all her 
court and chief people, and transfer the seat of her empire from London to Delhi.”132 In stating 
that “…you can only act upon the opinion of Eastern nations through their imagination,” 
Disraeli, in 1857, argued that the government should immediately send a royal commission to 
investigate the causes of the revolt, and issue a royal proclamation stating that the “…Queen of 
England is not a Sovereign who will countenance the violation of treaties…disturb the settlement 
of property…[and will] respect their laws, their usages, their customs, and, above all, their 
religion.”133 This argument informed the new 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s 
Proclamation which constituted British Crown rule, and a new conservative imperial framework 
promoting non-interference and conciliation in the latter half of the nineteenth century.   
 Disraeli’s 1857 speech to the House of Commons elicited substantial and partisan press reaction 
across Britain. Critical of the timing and sincerity of Disraeli’s speech, The Times contended that his 
arguments were not supported by evidence and resembled more of an artist’s touch. They further argued 
that not only were his contentions on the annexation of Awadh not supported by facts, but actually the 
various reforms introduced by the Indian Government were beneficial for the native people.134 The 
Morning Post contended that there was no evidence of a “national revolt,” and that Disraeli’s “great 
swelling theories” and “inflated commonplaces” were only a rallying cry to unite a divided Conservative 
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Party.135 More bitingly, The Standard argued that in attempting to gain from this public calamity, “The 
House saw clearly that the ex-CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER was half so anxious for the sepoy 
or the native as he was moved by the recollections of office.”136 Somewhat removed from London 
partisanship, the Leeds Mercury argued that although there might be arguments for Indian 
misgovernment, there was no evidence that the population was dissatisfied, especially as annexations 
had been going on for over a century.137 
The Morning Chronicle thought that Disraeli delivered a good and non-partisan speech which 
condemned Dalhousie’s annexation and reformist policies. In supporting his idea for a royal 
proclamation and royal commission to understand India’s grievances, they acknowledged that 
annexation had produced the current uprisings:  
 
“these vast acquisitions had been made at a great risk-that the patient astonishment of 
the Hindoo was mistaken for submission to the new order of things-and that a 
discontent was produced which smoldered under the surface, and which has at last 
broken in insurrection”138    
 
In a subsequent article, they supported Disraeli’s contention that this was a national insurrection 
rather than a troop mutiny. They linked the latest news of massacres with a sympathetic 
perspective on native feelings: “the intensity of this passion for revenge shows how long and 
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deeply the natives must have pondered on their wrongs.”139 The Lincolnshire Chronicle 
concurred with Disraeli’s arguments that the destruction of native authority, through annexations 
by the Company, was a prime cause of the revolt. In highlighting the conspiracy to dethrone the 
King of Awadh as an example of the Company’s history of tyranny, injustice, and 
misgovernment over India, they bluntly maintained that   
The policy of continual annexations must bring with it a retribution in course of 
time…When we accuse the United States of filibustering, and a desire to extend 
their territory by arms, how can we, with any appearance of consistency, continue to 
depose the native sovereigns of the East, to give the inhabitants of the their 
kingdoms the doubtful advantage of a Government by the East India Company and a 
system of exorbitant taxation, enforced by torture, to provide enormous salaries for 
the servants of the company, and to keep up an army for the purpose of continuing 
our oppressions?140 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that Disraeli contributed to a Tory historical narrative and political 
philosophy in the literary voice of Young England and as a Conservative politician and in such a way as 
to interpret and respond to British imperialism in India. Like with England and Ireland, it is argued that 
Disraeli applied political and social principles tied to noblesse oblige, expansive social privilege, and 
religious reverence to define a conservative opposition and alternative to protect local institutions in 
India from liberalism’s destructive modern application of reasoned progress. As a Whig ascendency in 
England and Ireland overthrew a free monarchy, independent Church, and moral aristocracy to the 
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determent of social unity and sympathy, so a British Whig supported the Indian government’s 
dethronement of princes, state interference with Hindu tradition, and stripping agreed allowance and 
property rights. Disraeli’s use of Young England to expound British capability for instigating a “national 
revolt” reflected a consistency and expansion of an argument concerning conservatism’s inclination to 
use imagination to establish and expound national principals. Moreover, Disraeli employed an imagined 
understanding of India to legitimate Indian grievance and elicit British sympathy for the toppled prince 
or disenfranchised sepoy. It is argued that this represented his skepticism of western civilization’s 
claimed superiority over the Indian people. Moreover, this defined his separation from popular opinion 
which saw the Indian people’s revolt against British governance as an example of their latent racial 
inferiority. As noted with Ireland, this represented a view that British imperial rule should recognize and 
accommodate the racial and social differences which were a natural product of history and tradition. 
Months later in government, Disraeli and fellow Conservatives again used imagination to construct a 
conservative imperial framework which incorporated national interests as integral components to Indian 
Empire.  
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Chapter 3: 1858 Government of India Act and the Queen’s Proclamation 
 
Introduction 
The 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation produced by Derby’s 
Conservative government represented a Tory refashioning of Britain’s Indian Empire following 
the Indian Revolt. In replacing the East India Company with Crown rule, they constituted an 
imperial framework which acknowledged India’s internal differences and separation from Britain 
by stating its determination to protect and engage its national institutions and customs. This 
chapter explores how Disraeli’s and Ellenborough’s legislative engagement and disagreement on 
the Act represented disparate attempts to refashion Indian empire upon tory principles. Next, it is 
shown that their sentiments defined Lord Stanley’s authored Queen’s Proclamation in December 
1858. It is argued that the Proclamation was a distinctly conservative document. It constituted 
British Indian Empire and a wider imperial identity on a vertical relationship between the Crown 
and a socially hierarchical and culturally divided population of India. It challenged liberal 
civilizing ambitions by establishing a collaborative imperial framework based upon Britain’s 
reciprocal loyalty and obligation with disparate princely, propertied, and ethnic and cultural 
groups in India.     
Government of India Act (1858) 
The conservative Government of India Act (1858) was the product of substantial partisan 
amendment and debate concerning the re-establishment of the British Indian Empire following 
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the Revolt.141 It represented a Conservative opportunity to reintroduce and succeed upon the 
Whig’s failed bill earlier that year which was opposed by Radicals and Conservative. Their 
opposition reflected the bill’s proposal to consolidate Indian authority in a Secretary of State and 
a small executive council.  With the Whig government’s collapse due to Common’s non-
confidence, Disraeli, now Chancellor of the Exchequer and leader in the House of Commons, 
introduced the Conservative attempt to refashion Indian empire through a conciliation of tory 
and radical principles. It inscribed Crown rule over India with a Secretary of State for India and 
an executive Indian Council that would be responsible for appointing and supervising a 
Governor General and a newly named Indian Civil Service. In contrast to the earlier bill, 
Disraeli’s defined an expanded and representative Council which attempted to conciliate British 
and “Indian” opinion.   
 In the bill’s first reading in March 1858, Disraeli introduced the Government’s plans for a 
new eighteen member Indian Council composed of nine crown appointments and nine elected 
officials. Beyond an attempt to appeal to the democratic instincts of Radical MPs, this scheme 
was consistent with Disraeli’s views on “Tory democracy” and national engagement with 
empire. With regards to the appointments, it proposed that one member would be an official with 
at least five years of experience with native princes, while eight would be officials from 
government and military service in the local Presidencies.142 The council’s elective element was 
                                                 
141 For a summary of the 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation see Metcalf & Metcalf, A 
Concise History of India, 102-104.  
142 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 149, 26 Mar. 1858, cols. 822-823. 
 104 
 
the bill’s most criticized element in parliament and the press. Questioned for its constitutionality 
and practicality, the proposal called for the election of nine councilors to six year terms. These 
would include four elected from a constituency of men with Indian experience and Indian 
residence of at least fifteen years, and five from Britain’s principal seats of industry: London, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Belfast.143 Following substantial amendment representing 
Conservative and Radical opposition to this scheme, the final Act would construct a titled 
Council of India with fifteen lifetime members who had at least ten years of experience in India.   
 Ellenborough was thoroughly engaged in the composition of the 1858 Act, including 
opposition to Disraeli’s council experiment. As argued in the previous chapter, Ellenborough 
was a career advocate for Crown rule and local representation in Indian governance. He 
maintained that the Crown’s status and authority would promote financial economy over a 
duplicative double government, and secure the trust and affection of India’s princes and people 
towards British paramountcy. In July 1858 to the House of Lords, he proposed that the 
overriding objective of the new Indian government bill was to secure its acceptance of the 
country’s population. Therefore, he could see no better way than through the Queen’s personal 
protection of the people’s religion and property rights.144 With regard to the new Indian council, 
Ellenborough was influential in proposing a responsible advisory institution which represented 
the official experiences of the local Indian presidencies. He argued that the need of 
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representation from across the Subcontinent reflected the differences between the Presidencies, 
which he compared to differing European states. Regarding the proposed council’s electoral 
component, he argued that it was a dangerous proposition which, if enacted, could seriously 
undermine the quality of governance in India. This reflected his consistent opposition to 
metropolitan interference with India’s government, and a latent class favoritism towards men of 
property in the political and administrative positions of Indian governance. Before Disraeli’s 
introduction of the Bill, he argued to Stanley that an elected council member would alert Indians 
to the danger of further state interference with religion.145 To Derby, he communicated that any 
election for the Indian Council could lead to partisan expressions on issues relating to education 
and proselytism which would cause serious unrest in India.146  
 Ellenborough’s second point of contention with the Council’s representative element, 
especially from the chief urban and industrial towns, was the introduction of the non-gentry into 
positions of political and administrative patronage. To Derby, he contended that the lack of a 
“reliable landlord body” in these towns would leave considerable patronage to the “sons of 
tailors and other shopkeepers” who would prove to be “…men…very inferior to the English 
gentlemen who have…led our armies.” This sentiment also informed an opposition to 
competitive examinations for the new Indian Civil Service. Again to Derby, he considered 
competitive examinations a democratic measure which, if enacted, “…must lower the character 
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of the Public Service-in which high feelings of honor are of far more value than high educational 
attainment…”147 In the Lords, Ellenborough lamented that competitive examinations might lead 
to the sons of grocers and tailors taking spots away from the sons of gentry who could not afford 
the costs of education. He considered the proposal an “unasked for act of homage to democracy,” 
which would question British moral superiority in India, and challenge the principle that “the 
higher a man’s position in life the greater his consideration of the people under him.”148 This 
sentiment reflected similar concerns that Britain had subdued India’s native gentry and curtailed 
their political participation as intermediaries. He saw the British gentry as expressly qualified, 
from their paternal positions of local authority, to govern in the national interests of the local 
people. Although disagreeing on the Indian council’s composition, Disraeli and Ellenborough 
shared a basic conviction that Britain had to govern India with an acknowledgement of, respect 
for, and engagement with its diverse local and prescriptive interests.  
Stanley’s 1858 Queen’s Proclamation was an attempt to conciliate India’s political, 
propertied, and religious interests to the British Empire. It gave the Crown’s guarantee that its 
Indian government would refrain from state annexation, undermining property right, confiscating 
titles, and discriminating against or interfering with the people’s religious beliefs. Just like 
Disraeli and Ellenborough, Stanley argued for British culpability for the Indian Revolt. He also 
chastised Canning’s continued instigation of the conflict. The Proclamation represented his 
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acknowledgement that Britain had failed to respect and engage India’s propertied, religious, and 
political interests. Stanley joined Ellenborough’s condemnation of Canning’s Oudh 
Proclamation. In the Commons, he contended against the ‘arbitrary’ and ‘indiscriminate’ nature 
of the proclamation, and affirmed the local taluqdar’s proprietary land rights against the notion 
that confiscation was legal because all land in India belonged to the Government.149 As the first 
Secretary of State for India, he told Canning that the Government could not retract 
Ellenborough’s earlier condemnation as it seemed correct that compulsory land sales in Oudh did 
alienate the people.150 In December 1858, Disraeli praised Stanley’s comments to graduating 
cadets at the Royal Military College on avoiding prejudice and respecting local custom in 
India.151 In this speech, he emphasized past British error and harm for not recognizing the 
necessity of having a knowledge of and empathy for the local population:  
Examine native habits, native ideas, native character; do it in a spirit of fairness, and 
you will gain at least this…that you will avoid that ignorant and unwise contempt for 
all this is Asiatic, which, political and personally, does Englishmen so much harm in 
the East.152 
 
To Canning on the details of the Queen’s Proclamation, Stanley recognized that past Indian 
discontent was largely instigated by Britain not respecting religious neutrality.153 In a speech in 
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early 1859 to the Commons, he repudiated territorial annexation “which…has undoubtedly in a 
great degree been the cause of the present disaster” as a component of future British policy.154 
 The Queen’s Proclamation endeavored to rectify British errors on territorial annexation, 
property settlement, and religious interference.  To India’s princes and landowners, the document 
assured that all the previous treaties made with the Company would be honored and that 
ancestral claims would be respected. Moreover, it pledged that the Government had no further 
ambition towards territorial expansion, and local status, rights, and customs would be 
incorporated within a collaborative system supporting peace and good governance in India: 
We desire no extension of our present territorial processions; and while we will 
permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with 
impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the 
rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as 
well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement 
which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.155 
 
Towards the landowners, the Proclamation ensured that the Government would honestly consider 
the title and right of ancestral proprietorship: 
We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India 
regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors and we desire to protect them 
in all rights connected there with, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and 
we will that generally, in framing and administering the law due regard to be paid to 
the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.156 
 
                                                 
154 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., 14 Feb. 1859, cols. 358, 370. 
155 The Times, 12 Jun. 1858, p. 7. 
156 Ibid.  
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With regards to the State’s relationship with the people’s religion, it stated that the Government, 
despite its preference, would maintain a strict principle of non-interference:  
Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity and acknowledged with 
gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose 
our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be in our royal will and 
pleasure that none to be in anywise favoured, none molested or disquieted by reason 
of their religious faith or observances, but that all should enjoy the equal and 
impartial protection of the law, and we strictly charge and enjoin all those who may 
be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious 
belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.157 
 
Next, the Proclamation reiterated a commitment made in the 1833 Indian Act towards the state’s 
employment of the local people. It asserted that natives, whatever their race or creed, should 
“…be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service the duties of which they may be 
qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.”158 Lastly, it offered 
clemency and peace to the rebels defeated by superior British force in the field, excluding those 
who committed murder or knowingly harbored those who murdered British subjects. To all 
others “in arms against the government, we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and 
oblivion of all offenses against ourselves, our crown, and dignity, on their return to their homes 
and peaceful pursuits.”159 
 
 
                                                 
157 Ibid. 
158 Times, 12 Jun. 1858, p. 7. 
159 Ibid. 
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Section Conclusion 
The 1858 Government of India Act and Queen’s Proclamation represented a British 
conservative intellectual and political reformation of Indian Empire which remained influential 
until later in the nineteenth century. These documents represented a concerted conservative effort 
to challenge and supplant the universal and centralizing principles of liberal imperialism in India. 
Primarily, they represented Ellenborough’s and Disraeli’s coherent Tory argument that British 
culpability for the Indian Revolt was due to liberalism’s intentional destruction of the country’s 
political, propertied, and religious institutions. In response, the Act and Proclamation prescribed 
the Crown’s rule and protection over these national institutions. It also established a framework 
by which these institutions could collaborate with empire through demonstrating a reciprocal 
loyalty and obligation to imperial authority. For Ellenborough, Crown rule eliminated the 
inefficiencies of double government, and provided historical and political continuity to the 
country’s ruling elite and mass population. To Disraeli and the Young England imagination, the 
Whigs promulgation of liberal reasoned progress informed the Indian government’s deliberate 
destruction of princely authority, property confiscation and disenfranchisement, and religious 
custom. In response, the Queen’s Proclamation established a strong monarchy to protect India’s 
distinctive nationalities, and promote the feudal principles of noble obligation, expansive social 
privileges, and religious reverence. Disraeli’s introduction of the Royal Titles Act in 1876, which 
assented to Queen Victoria’s request to become the Empress of India, was a further testament to 
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his imaginative inclination and action towards conciliating India’s unique historical and political 
traditions to the British Empire.  
Lastly, the Queen’s Proclamation established an imperial framework and identity which 
informed future conservative engagement and collaboration in India. It constituted an alternative  
to predominant European standards in assessing political, social, and racial characteristics, by 
prioritizing a polity’s, groups’, and individual’s belonging to India’s particular local and 
historical environment. Later in the nineteenth century, this conception of belonging informed 
British conservative collaboration with accepted political and social elites that were believed to 
represent the natural leaders of India’s diverse society. For the latter, this framework allowed 
them to protect local autonomy and authority against imperialist and nationalist interference by 
espousing a vertical loyalty and obligation to the Crown.     
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Section 2: Forging Conservative Collaborations in the Indian Empire  
Section Introduction 
This section examines the intellectual and political foundations for conservative collaboration in 
India following the Indian Revolt and the Queen’s Proclamation. In demonstrating that the 
Indian Empire was a polity informed by local compromise and resistance, the next three chapters 
explore how imperial practice was shaped by the collaboration of British and Indian concepts 
and institutions. Chapters four and five examine how Viceroys of India, Richard Bourke, Earl of 
Mayo (1869-1872), styled Lord Naas (1842-1867) and then the fifth Earl of Mayo (1868-1872) 
(hereafter referred to as Mayo), and Robert Bulwer, Earl of Lytton (1876-1880), styled as 2nd 
Baron Lytton (1873-1880) and then Earl of Lytton (1880-1892) (hereafter referred to as Lytton), 
implemented a conservative program of engagement with Indian states, the propertied elite, and 
mass population.  
Although Mayo and Lytton accepted of western intellectual and moral superiority over 
the East, they maintained a conservative and aristocratic skepticism concerning political 
liberalism’s reforming ambitions at home and in the Empire. As physical and ideological 
representatives of Britain’s aristocracy, they espoused a concept of paternal good governance 
institutionally centered on social hierarchy and individual leadership and defined by values of 
loyalty and obligation.  Mayo’s Irish identity as a Protestant landowner and Lytton’s literary 
criticism of modern aristocratic decline contributed to a conservative imperial framework which 
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attempted to conciliate India’s traditional interests. It is argued that despite British and Anglo-
Indian opposition, they sought to empower the Indian states’ collaborative engagement with the 
British paramount power. Moreover, they sought to use British power and a collaborative 
relationship with the states to politically influence and materially improve the condition of the 
mass population. Chapter six explores how the Kathiawar States in Western India responded to 
this engagement within the framework established by the Queen’s Proclamation. It is argued that 
their political participation and financial contribution towards imperial initiatives of public 
works, security, and education allowed them to strengthen their local autonomy and authority 
against British and Indian political centralization at the end of the nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 4: Mayo the Irish-Indian Viceroy 
Introduction 
As a Conservative MP (1847-1868) and Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-59, 
1866-68), Richard Bourke’s, Lord Mayo’s political experience mediating class and sectarian 
division in Ireland defined his tenure as India’s Viceroy from 1868 to 1872.1 In both colonial 
peripheries, the self-identified Irish statesman anchored imperial good governance upon the 
state’s paternal recognition of the people’s particular institutions and customs. It is contended 
that Mayo’s privileged position as a minority Irish Protestant landowner defined for him a view 
that the state was the guarantor of social stability, and, therefore, was obligated to protect 
propertied interests and religious difference.  In India, Mayo implemented a governing policy 
centered upon the aristocratic principles of decentralization and reciprocal obligation which was 
often at the expense of an entrenched liberal tradition and a British Anglo-Indian interest. As 
decentralization acknowledged India’s diverse circumstances by downloading political authority 
and financial resources to provincial governments, reciprocal obligation informed the Paramount 
Power’s and feudatory Indian states’ responsibility to govern in the best interests of the people. 
Specifically, it is argued that Mayo’s sentiments on land tenure and taxation, as well as 
initiatives to expand mass vernacular, Muslim, and princely education reflected a conservative 
                                                 
1 The Chief Secretary for Ireland is a member of the British Cabinet responsible for governing Ireland in 
coordination with the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, located in Dublin.  
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imperial tradition predicated on engaging India’s internal national differences through 
collaborating with its aristocracy and materially improving its mass population.   
 
Irish Identity  
Mayo was descended from a Norman noble family which settled in Ireland in the twelfth 
century. This informed his lifelong affinity for Ireland and identity as a Protestant Irishman. 
During his thirty-five year political career, Mayo advocated for the country’s social improvement 
and internal unity while emphasizing its external difference from Great Britain.2 As an Anglican 
landowner, first in the County Meath then at the family’s principal estate in Palmerstown near 
Dublin, he defended the rights of property against tenant interests. Despite this, he denounced 
sectarian extremism on both sides and advocated for a balanced approach on education and 
religion. In British politics, Mayo’s Irish identity and interest were politically compatible with a 
career friendship with Disraeli, Conservative Party membership, and as a cabinet minister in 
successive Conservative governments.  
Mayo’s Irish identification and pride was expressed from his entry to the British House of 
Commons to his last career appointment as Viceroy of India. In 1849, Mayo, MP for Kildare 
(1847-1852), supported the Whig government’s continued suspension of Habeas Corpus, stating 
that “as an Irishman” he gladly supported “any measure which would insure, over for a short 
                                                 
2 Hunter, Comprehensive History of Indian Empire: The Earl of Mayo, 8. 
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time, a continuance of peace.”3 Following his investment of the Knight Grand Commander of the 
Order of the Star of India on the Prince of Wales, Mayo told Disraeli that “you would like to 
have seen the English Prince decorated…by an Irish Viceroy.”4As Viceroy of India, Mayo 
remarked to Derby that posterity would have to admit “that the poor paddy that the Times told 
everyone was not fit to be trusted with the care of a W. India island was without firing a shot or 
moving a solider made British influence paramount in regions which have been for years the 
hard nut of Anglo-Indian politicians.”5 To the Duke of Argyll, Secretary of State for India (1868-
1874), Mayo voiced a desire for peace in Ireland, while also explaining its uniqueness from the 
rest of the United Kingdom. Ascribing blame for recent violence on both the Protestant 
Orangemen and Catholic Fenians, he argued that its cause was the imposition of foreign concepts 
and modes of government to Ireland. He expressed that he had “long thought that though the 
British constitution is the finest thing in the world for Englishmen & Scottishmen, it is a failure 
as a means of govt in Ireland.”6 For Mayo, Ireland required a strong British state which protected 
landlord privilege and obligation while acknowledging the country’s history and religious 
divisions.  
Disraeli and the Conservative Party 
                                                 
3 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 06 Feb. 1849, 3rd ser., vol. 102, col. 353.  
4 Mayo to Disraeli, 11 Jan.1870, B/XX/90/2, fol. 107, HP, OBL. 
5 Mayo to Derby, 30 Jan. 1870, MS 7490/152, fol. 122, Mayo Papers (hereafter MP), Cambridge University Library 
(hereafter CUL). 
6 Mayo to Argyll, 29 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 145, MP, CUL.  
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Mayo’s propensity to emphasize his Irish identity and Ireland’s difference from Britain 
was compatible with a Conservative Party increasingly under Disraeli’s leadership. Mayo and 
Disraeli’s shared perspective on Ireland informed a personal and career friendship. It is evident 
that Mayo viewed Disraeli as a key patron. On leaving England for India, Mayo stated to Disraeli 
that “For 20 years I have followed your fortunes-you have made me what I am-you can do 
nothing more for me-except to keep me in remembrance.”7 This friendship was informed by 
similar inclinations and political positions on Ireland. This included a belief in Ireland’s 
distinctiveness within the United Kingdom, support for economic protection, and agreement 
about Whiggism’s detrimental effect on the country. This shared position on Ireland informed 
Mayo and Disraeli’s early correspondence. In an 1850 letter regarding local sentiment on Irish 
land reform, Mayo held that a recent Whig proposal was responsible for tenant rent agitation, 
and somewhat agreed with fellow Irish Tories that confiscation could soon take place.8 In 1851, 
he expressed a concern that the Whig’s Parliamentary Election (Ireland) Act (1850) endangered 
his own parliamentary seat in Kildare, as it expanded the franchise of Roman Catholics.9 In 
1860, Mayo reminisced with Disraeli on their past achievements and political failures to 
convince parliament on the necessity of reform amidst growing Fenian insurrection and agrarian 
                                                 
7 Mayo to Disraeli, 10 Nov. 1868, B/XX/90/2, fol. 83, HP, OBL. 
8 Mayo to Disraeli, 12 Nov. 1850, B/XX/90/2, fol. 1, HP, OBL. 
9 Mayo to Disraeli, 11 Jan. 1851, B/XX/90/2, fol. 6, HP, OBL. The Parliamentary Elections (Ireland) Act of 1850 
expanded the franchise to catholic tenant proprietors of holdings valued over £12. See R.V. Comerford, “Ireland 
1850-70: Post-Famine and Mid-Victorian,” in A New History of Ireland, 1801-70, Vol. V, no. I, edited by W.E. 
Vaughan (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 382. 
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crime. He argued that the public was aware of their beneficial policy but “no one will give us 
credit for the way we dealt with that country.” Moreover, in believing that their initiatives could 
have benefited all sections of the population, he submitted that  
I think before long when you have a rampant orange voluntary church, the 
Presbyterians, Red republicans, & the Priest educated in Fenian Diocesan 
Seminaries, people will wonder how wise men could, for party objects, or for the 
qualification of bigotry, denounce a policy which would have secured to Ireland 
quiet and peace for ever.10 
 
In terms of state economic protection for Irish agriculture, Mayo attacked a Whig mantra 
of free trade for destroying the rural economy. In July 1851 to the House of Commons, he 
contended that the open import of flour from France and America was devastating Ireland’s once 
prosperous milling industry. He stated that unlike past statesman “from the beginning of the 
century” who cared deeply about developing agriculture, the Whig Party perpetuated “new 
theories” which were hostile to the farmer. In arguing that “it has of late been quite the fashion 
with a certain party in this country to undervalue and run down our own workmen,” Mayo laid 
out the Whig prejudice against farmers: 
The farmer, I well remember, has constantly been described as most deficient in 
intelligence, ignorant of his profession, uneducated and stupid, little better than the 
clod of the soil, and utterly unequal to the management of a farm, that perhaps he and 
his fathers had lives on in honour and comfort for thirty generations; he was opposed 
to all progress, a thing of a past age-brutal, boorish, and superstitious, strongly 
suspected of an inordinate love of beer, and a belief in witchcraft.11 
                                                 
10 Mayo to Disraeli, 05 Feb. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 152, MP, CUL.  
11 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 118, 15 Jul. 1851, cols 796-807.  This is a reference to 
the nearly unbroken period of Tory Party governance from 1783-1830. In 1815, the Lord Liverpool’s Tory 
government re-introduced import protection on cereal for British farmers. This protection was removed by Peel’s 
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Underpinning his association with Disraeli and the Conservative Party was an aristocratic 
inclination towards validating governing principles centered upon social hierarchy and paternal 
obligation.  
Confronting British Prejudice of Autocratic Russia 
Through personal experiences in Russia and Ireland, he approached India with the belief 
that the state as well as property owners were paternally obligated to the larger community. In a 
published account of travels through autocratic Russia titled St. Petersburg and Moscow (1845), 
a young Mayo considered questions relating to state authority and aristocratic obligation. In 
displaying his fondness for practical over philosophical reasoning, he stated that he was “not 
going to give to the world an abstruse political dissertation on Russian Government…but a mere 
account of my own doings, and to tell plainly the little I saw and heard.” While doing so, Mayo 
challenged negative Western European perceptions of Russia by expressing personal 
observations and judgements regarding its social hierarchy and education.12 He confronted the 
period’s most popular Russian travel narrative, Marquis de Custine’s Empire of the Czar 
(1839).13 In remonstrating against its blatant bias towards the country, he argued that “Any 
person reading this book must be impressed with the unaccountable bitterness that pervaded the 
                                                 
government, supported by Whigs, in 1846. See Norman McCord, British History 1815-1906 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 25. On agricultural protection and the Tory Party see Gambles, Protection and Politics 
12 Richard Southwell Bourke, St. Petersburg and Moscow (New York: Arno Press & the New York Times, 1970), 
10. 
13 Marquis de.Custine, Empire of the Czar: a Journey through Eternal Russia (1839). 
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whole work, which discolors every fact mentioned, every impression recorded, and the more 
sincere hater of Russia, her system of government, and her people…”14 In response, he sought to 
explain and contradict the stereotypes concerning the Russian State’s autocratic nature. One 
tactic was comparing Russian institutions and social norms with their equivalent in Britain.  For 
example, Mayo moderated western misconceptions on the social impact of state press 
censorship. This included his approval of its protection against the personal slander of private 
and public officials. Although favorable to the rights of the press, which were “the bulwark of 
British liberty,” he proposed that “at the same time, I should like to see editors milder in their 
attacks, and less partial in their praise.”15 He also criticized popular British attitudes towards 
their monarchy as compared to Russia and other countries in Europe. In stating that “The people, 
in all foreign countries, I think behave much better towards their princes…,” he lamented that 
“the great desire of the people of England to see their sovereign arises…[is] I fear more from a 
mere feeling of curiosity than of respect or regard.”16  
Beyond reacting to British bias, Mayo evaluated and critiqued Russia’s deep social 
divisions. He argued that Russian propensity to behave subordinately towards their social betters 
represented the deep divide between the aristocracy and serf population. He submitted that 
Russian society’s major social flaw, exacerbated by the lack of a middle class, who brought the 
                                                 
14 Bourke, St. Petersburg and Moscow, 69. 
15 Bourke, 110-111. 
16 Bourke, 143. 
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“cramping irons of the constitutional edifice” to England, was the social and emotional distance 
between serf and aristocrat:  
The Serf in his sweepkin may walk in the palace of his lord, or may watch by his 
master’s gate, but no feeling in his breast tells him that he is born of the same race, or 
formed for the same purposes; and the great lord, knowing his superiority of birth, 
education, and descent, looks forth on his horde of slaves, with all benignity, and 
kind attention; but it is the affection of a good herd, for a noble and faithful 
beast…never the least participation in a single right of fellowship or friendship.17  
 
Although lamenting that serfdom perpetrated an inferior class “sunk in deep ignorance, rudeness 
and slavery,” he argued that it would take “some years” for serfs to be educated and allowed civil 
rights. Lastly, Mayo challenged Britons to reconsider their constitutional prejudices against 
Russia’s autocratic rule and ruler. He admired Czar Nicholas’s (1796-1855) “immense burden 
and singular responsibility” in governing over a large and diverse empire. Mayo’s foremost 
praise centered upon Russia’s state system of national education. Stating that the Czar was the 
“head schoolmaster of his realm,” he claimed that this system would create a Russian patriotic 
feeling among all classes and within the “children of many nations, religions, and tongues.”18 
Mayo’s perception of the Russian Empire’s positive mediation of social division and the 
condition of the masses, through maintaining peace and promoting national education, 
influenced his perspective on Ireland and India. 
Defending Landed Interests in Ireland 
                                                 
17 Bourke, 154. 
18 Bourke, 247, 225. 
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Mayo maintained that the imperial parliament needed to respect the Irish landowning 
class’ particular rights and obligations, and treat Ireland on a national basis in regards to 
education and religious reverence. As a Conservative MP and Chief Secretary for Ireland, he was 
an outspoken opponent of London’s attempts to radically re-balance landlord and tenant rights in 
Ireland. His opposition to Irish land reform bills was prefaced by an ideological validation of the 
landlord’s paternal obligation to the community. Moreover, this informed a suspicion of 
commercial middle class interests in rural Ireland.  
  In successive parliamentary debates on Irish land reform, Mayo accused the Whig 
government of serving the exploitative interests of an agitating commercial class. In 1850, Mayo 
challenged new legislation that created a small class of fee paying peasant proprietors as 
“perfectly utopian” and contrary to the interests of the mass population. He contended that this 
would radically change the nature of rural society by removing the landlord’s protection of the 
peasant and tenant “in times of distress and difficulty.” He compared this scheme to the French 
Revolutionary Government’s 1789 edict which confiscated the Catholic Church’s landed estates 
for the creation of fee paying proprietors. Invoking Edmund Burke’s contemporary contention 
that this edict would lead to peasant wealth extortion, Mayo argued that the current bill would 
hand over encumbered estates to “men who had no connexion with the country, but were merely 
land jobbers.”19 Also in 1850, Mayo opposed the Whig’s Landlord and Tenant Bill which 
                                                 
19 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 110, 23 Apr. 1850, cols. 807-810. See Edmund Burke, 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by Conor Cruise O’Brien (London, Penguin Books, 1986), 226. 
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proposed to implement juried deliberation on compulsory tenant compensation for land 
improvement. He proposed that this scheme should be rejected as it represented the radical aims 
of the newly formed Tenant League. He argued that this organization, which promoted fixity of 
tenure for tenants and compensation for land improvement, was motivated by a narrow class 
interest which wished to reduce the landowner to a mere rent collector. He warned that they 
ignored the interests of the laborers “…upon whose strong arms, the prosperity of both landlord 
and tenant depended…”20  
In 1866, Mayo denied that the rural population was leading agitation against the 
Government.  He submitted that the arrest statistics showed that the Fenian conspirators were 
“ninety-nine out of every 100 persons” from the trade and commercial sectors.21 As Chief 
Secretary for Ireland in 1867, Mayo remonstrated, while seeking an extension of the Suspension 
of Habeas Corpus Act, that it was primarily the shop keeping class and tradesmen who were 
sympathetic and involved in Fenian insurrectionary movements.22 To Argyll in 1870, Mayo 
argued that the latest Irish bill would “lead to land jobbery and subdivision in some districts-and 
                                                 
20 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 121, 25 Apr. 1850, cols. 266-278. An alliance of multiple 
local organizations in 1850 led by Charles Gavan Duffy, the Tenant League politically advocated for fair rent 
established by impartial evaluation, fixity of tenure, and compensation for land improvements. See Thomas E. 
Hachey and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, The Irish Experience Since 1800: A Concise History 3rd ed, (Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), 71. 
21 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 183, 17 May 1866, col. 1055. 
22 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 185, 21 Feb. 1867, col. 733. Organizationally established 
with the creation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in 1858, Fenianism sought a democratic Irish Republic. This 
group was influenced ideologically from republicanism in the United States and the 1848 revolutions in France and 
Italy, as well as internal class frustrations among the lower middle class concerning social mobility in Ireland. 
Hachey and McCaffrey, The Irish Experience Since 1800, 76.  
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may increase the attorney and shopkeeping class of landlords who are the greatest tyrants in the 
country.”23 This aristocratic prejudice against the incorporation and activity of an alien 
commercial class in rural Ireland informed a comparable admonishment to an Anglo-Indian 
official and Indian middle class in India. In both Ireland and India, Mayo personified an 
aristocratic governing mentality which imbued the state’s and property’s paternal obligation for 
the larger community.         
Irish Chief Secretary  
As Chief Secretary for Ireland, Mayo pursued a policy on land and education which 
attempted to reconcile growing class and religious division. On land, Mayo, while open to tenant 
compensation for land improvement, favored fixity of tenure for large landowners. He 
vehemently opposed John Bright’s proposal for state loans towards tenant property purchase, and 
John Stuart Mill’s more ambitious plan for the state’s valuing, purchasing, and re-distribution of 
land for the purpose of re-letting. Mayo responded that land tenure was protected under the 
current system of large landlords, and that France and Eastern Europe were examples of the 
failure of small proprietorships.24 In 1867, he proposed a scheme that, he argued, balanced tenant 
and landlord rights. This allowed both parties to seek state permission and funds for land 
                                                 
23 Mayo to Argyll, 22 Aug. 1870, MS 7940/154, MP, CUL. Mayo is referring to the Liberal government’s 1870 
Land Act. This legislation not only forced landlords to compensate evictees for improvements and inconveniences 
they had suffered, but also created an opportunity for tenants of Church property to own their land with help of 
government grants. See Hachey and McCaffrey, The Irish Experience Since 1800, 80. 
24 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 190, 10 Mar., 1868, col. 1356. 
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improvement. The state would also have the power of enforcing repayment.25 Unlike previous 
Liberal proposals which used courts and juries to compel landlords to accept and compensate 
tenants, this plan secured landlord interests by giving oversight and authority to a sympathetic 
Imperial State. 
Beyond being the guardian of landlord and tenant relations, Mayo saw the Imperial State 
as a paternal force which maintained social unity amidst sectarian division in Ireland.  Unlike the 
Conservative Party’s growing religious intolerance towards Roman Catholics, Mayo, with 
Disraeli, sought to use the state to mediate the country’s divergent religious interests. To Disraeli 
in 1859, Mayo expressed a willingness to recruit Catholics into Indian and colonial official 
positions.26 Moreover, the Conservative statesmen tried to counter growing calls for Irish Church 
disestablishment from William Gladstone and the Liberal Party.27 Although Mayo was unwilling 
to diminish the dominant rights and privileges of the Established Protestant Irish Church, he 
advocated for the state’s continued engagement with all major churches in Ireland to maintain 
social peace in a religiously zealous country. To the idea of introducing a voluntary system of 
religious financial support (which would disproportionally hurt the Irish Church) , he responded 
that removing state endowments and grants to the Irish Protestant (Anglican), Presbyterian, and 
                                                 
25 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 185, 18 Feb., 1867, col. 530. 
26 Mayo to Disraeli, 17 May 1859, B/xx/90/2, fol. 28, HP, OBL. 
27 The disestablishment of the Protestant Irish Church was achieved by Gladstone’s Liberal government in 1869 
with the Irish Church Act (1869). Opposed by the Conservatives, this Act placed the Protestant Church as equal 
under the law and removed state aid. See Comerford, “Conspiring brotherhoods and contending elites, 1857-63”, in 
A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 443. 
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Roman Catholic churches would “do nothing but increase religious rancour and strife, and make 
doctrinal differences a greater subject of controversy than they have been hitherto.”28  
With regards to religion and education, Mayo believed that the state had an obligation to 
respect the population’s diverse religious convictions. In 1853, he resisted pressure from political 
colleagues to enhance educational privileges for the minority Anglican community in Ireland. He 
argued that the success of the country’s national system of education to hold “the sympathies and 
affections of so great a portion of the people of Ireland” was its secular foundation. In objecting 
to the suggestion that Protestant clergy could be used to teach Catholics, he “disclaimed all 
desire to convert a system of education supported by the public funds into a system of 
proselytism.”29 By July 1859, Mayo became convinced, from increasing popular discontentment 
against state instruction, that a secular system was unsuited for Ireland, and a truly national 
system of education should be implemented. In government again from 1866-1868, he promoted 
additional educational opportunities for Roman Catholics. He proposed the establishment of a 
third Irish university catering to Roman Catholics to balance the Protestant institutions of Trinity 
College and Dublin College. In attempting to invoke sympathy for Catholics who were excluded 
                                                 
28 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 191, 03 Apr. 1868, cols. 869-871. As of 1861, Ireland 
religious population was 72% Roman Catholic, 12% Church of Ireland, and 9% Presbyterian. See Comerford, 
“Ireland 1850-70: Post Famine and Mid-Victorian,” in A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 286.   
29 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 126, 26 Apr. 1853, cols. 603-604. The national system of 
education in Ireland was established with the creation of the Board of National Education in 1831. This regulatory 
body set the curriculum, provided the majority of funding, instructed teachers, and manage the operations of over 
4,000 schools with 400,000 pupils by 1845. Although envisioned as a mechanism for providing secular education, it 
became largely denominational and therefore popular with the majority catholic population. See Oliver Macdonage, 
“The economy and society, 1830-45” in A New History of Ireland, edited by W.E. Vaughan, 233. 
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from higher education by the largely Protestant House of Commons, he asked MPs to consider 
whether they would object to sending “their sons to Universities where the Roman Catholic 
religion alone was taught.”30 Increasing Irish class and sectarian division informed Mayo’s 
inclination and policy as Viceroy of India. From being the lead Cabinet Minister responsible for 
Britain’s closest imperial possession to the Queen’s Viceroy of its most populated colony, Mayo 
maintained that the state held a paternal obligation to facilitate social harmony by respecting and 
mediating the particular circumstances and needs of the populace.  
Irish-Indian Viceroy  
On his arrival in India in fall 1868, Mayo confided to William Vesey-Fitzgerald, fellow 
Irishman and Governor of the Bombay Presidency (1867-1872), that he understood and could 
apply in India the principles on which all good governance was based.31 In India, Mayo tempered 
a general advocacy for the global spread of British civilization with a conservative policy that 
supported localism and prescriptive institutions. This centered upon an aristocratic social bias 
towards decentralization and paternal obligation. Beyond downloading administrative and 
monetary authority to local governments including Indian member municipal councils, Mayo 
proposed initiatives that made the Paramount Power an authority which respected and 
strengthened India’s indigenous institutions and customs. His support for mass vernacular and 
Muslim higher education at the expense of English instruction, and promotion of collegial 
                                                 
30 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 190, 10 Mar. 1868, cols. 1382-1384. 
31 Mayo to Fergusson, 19 Oct. 1868, MS 7490/147, fol. 30, MP, CUL. 
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institutions for India’s landed class reflected a wider political and ideological reorientation of 
imperial policy towards conciliating India’s “traditional” constituencies to British rule. 
Similar to other Victorian statesman in India and throughout the British Empire, Mayo 
subscribed to a western liberal ideology which championed political, social, and material 
progress. According to Owen Tudor Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary, Mayo was a “progressive 
and liberal man” who promoted education and good governance as the means to obtain India’s 
popular affection to Britain.32 In the Convocation Speech to the graduates of the University of 
Calcutta, Mayo promoted the spread of western civilization in terms which transcended racial 
difference. He challenged young Indians to compare their learned knowledge of history, 
literature, and technological innovation to that of another country. In stating that the British 
Empire was educating the “pioneers of civilization and progress in every corner of the world,” he 
proposed that the practical purpose of this education was to “bring closer together subjects of our 
queen, be they dark or fair-whether they reside in the east or the west…”33 As a political 
conservative, however, Mayo facilitated progress through the improvement of indigenous state 
institutions and social practices. In attempt to broaden instruction to all Indian subjects beyond 
the Hindu middle class, he promoted state funded mass vernacular education and encourage the 
development of Muslim and princely education. These initiatives defined a larger conservative 
challenge to the entrenched legacy of liberal civilizing reform in India.  
                                                 
32 Sir Owen Tudor Burne, Memories (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), 86. 
33 Mayo, 04 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/71/1, MP, CUL. 
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Decentralization  
Mayo’s overarching political objective was the decentralization of imperial governance to 
respond to India’s specific local circumstances and needs. Besides the financial motivations of 
reducing central government expenditure and fiscal deficit, Mayo’s proposal for giving 
provincial governments’ greater authority and resources represented a principled agenda to 
instruct and empower paternal obligation as the central component of good governance. To 
tackle the Indian government’s 1,000,000£ deficit, Mayo proposed cost savings and 
retrenchment through comprehensive program that expanded powers for provincial and local 
governments. In his proposal, the central government would give a lump sum payment to 
provincial and municipal authorities to fund, at their discretion, jails, registration police, 
education, roads, civil buildings, and medical services. A memo summarizing the proposal’s 
objectives and rationale stated that localizing permission and funding enhanced the local 
government’s ability to ensure community prosperity.34 This decentralization policy included 
expanded opportunities for Indian representation and government administration. To William 
Muir, Lieutenant-Governor of the North Western Provinces (1868-1874), Mayo stated that the 
plan to implement a local cess (tax) in the North Western Provinces was the first step in a larger 
policy towards improving administration and gradually developing municipal government across 
India. He argued that this would remedy a disgraceful inaction from the British Indian 
                                                 
34 Financial Department, Government of India to Government of Bengal, 17 Mar. 1870, MS 7490/25/6, MP, CUL. 
For more detail of his decentralization scheme see Hunter, The Earl of Mayo, 14. 
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government towards developing self-governing institutions: “we have been governing in India 
for one hundred years and that if we were to depart tomorrow it should leave no traces of any 
serious attempt have been made to entrust the native of this country in the administration of 
affairs.”35  
On native employment, Mayo gave a conditional acceptance to Indians filling all 
administrative positions in particular departments. He expressed to Lord Napier, Governor of the 
Madras Presidency (1866-1872), the willingness to appoint Indians to the legal and judicial 
departments, but not as officers in the police as they were not fit.36 In responding to Lord Argyll, 
the Liberal Secretary of State for India, sentiments supporting native employment opportunity, 
Mayo contended that this objective “cannot sacrifice energy & honest administration” as this 
would lead to suffering among the poorer parts of the population. In stating that it would be a 
long time before there would be available applicants for the higher branches of government, he 
insisted that to hire “corrupt or stupid natives” in the meantime would cause much popular 
resentment and make it harder to fulfill this object in the future.37 Mayo’s recourse to Victorian 
racial and cultural stereotypes of educated Indians was conditioned by an aristocratic prejudice 
which was skeptical of the middle classes’ suitability in administrating a rural environment like 
Ireland and India.  
Privileging the Land and Landed Interests  
                                                 
35 Mayo to Muir, 17 Jun. 1870, MS 7490/153, fol. 351, MP, CUL. 
36 Mayo to Napier, 18 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 93, MP, CUL. 
37 Mayo to Argyll, 19 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 99, MP, CUL.  
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As had been the case with Ireland, Mayo was specially attached to issues regarding 
the state’s relationship with land and property in India. He argued that as the Paramount 
Power had propriety right over all land in India, it must adhere to ancient customs which 
endowed cultivators with security of tenure and management in exchange for their good 
governance. Early in office, Mayo promoted the creation of a central department of 
agriculture with branches in the Presidencies, as the subject was one upon which all 
interests depended.38 In a note discussing measures for land rent assessment, Mayo 
principally distinguished land revenue from local taxation. He argued that as the latter 
represented a cess (tax) for specific local needs, the former was rent to which the 
government was entitled as the chief proprietor and administer of all land. In advocating 
for a rent assessment tied to a price scale value of produce (a scheme which he proposed 
for Ireland), he contended that the Government was entitled to a profit share as 
compensation for the growing demand of imperial administration.39 He voiced his opinion 
on the Government’s rights and relationship with tenant farmers while deliberating on the 
controversial and divisive Punjab Tenancy Bill. He argued that India’s land customs and 
property rights were based on the proprietor’s strength or cunning to maintain land 
possession and negotiate a fair rent or tax from the state.  
                                                 
38 Mayo to Napier, 18 Apr. 1869, MS 7490/149, fol. 93, MP, CUL. 
39 Mayo, 07 Feb., 1871, MS 7490/26/20, MP, CUL. In regards to his proposed valuation reform in Ireland see 
Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd  ser., vol. 121, 27 May 1852, col. 1205.   
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Although believing that it would be impossible to apply European rules to the 
Punjab, he was, nonetheless, influenced by Ireland when determining landlord and tenant 
rights across India. To Argyll, he advocated for a system which gave “as much security of 
tenure as is possible constituent with propriety right & retaining to the landlord the power 
of obtaining from time to time such as enhancement of rent as fairly proportionate to the 
general increase of agricultural price.”40 In regards to extending Bengal’s Permanent 
Settlement to the North Western Province, Mayo suggested that the deciding principle of 
the fair fixity of land tenure was not dissimilar between Europe and India.41 He contended 
that imperial policy should strive to offer “the greatest amount of permanency in 
occupancy that can be obtained, which is consistent with securing a fair division of profit 
as between the parties who possess a direct interest in the land.”42 Mayo’s belief in the 
state’s proprietary right to collect land revenue and support tenure security and 
management informed a broader policy of instructing good governance in India. For Mayo, 
the state and large land holders’ were jointly privileged and obligated to improve the 
condition of the masses.  
                                                 
40 Mayo to Argyll, 29 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 145, MP, CUL. This bill was a legacy of former Viceroy John 
Lawrence. It recognized the land tenure claims of the region’s smaller proprietors. On the details of the internal 
debate concerning the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 see G.R.G. Hambly, “Richard Temple and the Punjab Tenancy 
Act of 1868,” English Historical Review, vol. 79, 310 (Jan. 1964), pp. 47-66. 
41 Established by Governor General Lord Cornwallis, the Bengal Permanent Settlement of 1793 guarantied 
Zamindars land ownership in exchange for a fixed rent payment to the East India Company. See Peers, India under 
Colonial Rule, 46.    
42 Mayo, 24 May 1871, MS 7490/26, fol. 21, MP, CUL. 
 133 
 
Challenging the Liberal Establishment   
Mayo’s perspective and bias towards the land informed a criticism against Anglo-Indian 
and English educated Indian response to his retrenchment and education proposals. This 
represented a conservative inclination towards India’s national interests over alien race and class 
privilege. In regards to British official and business hostile reaction to retrenchment, he argued 
that this represented their avaricious mentality which sacrificed Indian good governance 
predicated upon obligation. He was not afraid to challenge British privilege for the sake of 
economy. Finding scope for spending reduction, he quipped to Argyll that he had never met a 
communication officer, secretary, doctor, or civil official “who did not complain about their 
accommodations which could probably be provided for half the cost.”43  To Argyll, he proposed 
tax increases against European interests. Beyond an increased income tax, he argued that there 
should be an additional tax on landowners residing out of India and on earned interest off Indian 
debt.44 To Argyll, Mayo attacked the blatant self-interest of Anglo-Indians following their public 
opposition to the income tax: 
They are a class who do not care a farthing for the country. They come here to get as 
much money out of the Blacks as they can, and desire to go home as soon as 
possible. They object to pay a farthing towards the welfare & govt of a country 
which is to them a source of wealth, and their general tendency is to abuse & resist 
any govt who tries to do its duty. I have no sympathy with this class & they know 
it.45  
                                                 
43 Mayo to Argyll, 14 Dec. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 303, MP, CUL.   
44 Mayo to Argyll, 21 Feb. 1869, MS 7490/148, fol. 71, MP, CUL.  
45 Mayo to Argyll, 09 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 31, MP, CUL. 
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To Napier, Mayo believed that personal abuse from Anglo-Indians and the well-to do 
Indian community represented their greedy and selfish nature. He argued that as the former 
“…look on India as a milk cow for themselves…[and] do not pretend to have any other 
object than the rapid acquirement of as much money as will enable them to live at home in 
idleness,” the latter’s “only idea of taxation is to ravish the poor.”46 Amidst this opposition, 
Mayo counseled Argyll against appointing commercial men to the Indian Council, as they 
had no experience with a country where the majority of industry was tied to the land.47 
State funded Mass Education   
Mayo challenged vested interests and prejudices in an effort to expand state funded 
vernacular education for Hindus and Muslims. In Bengal, he argued that the state could 
legally force the land holders’ financial contribution to the expansion of vernacular mass 
education. He contended that as the Indian government had proprietary right over all land, 
it could impose specific taxation for public works to instill the benefits of civilization.48 
Moreover, he dismissed objections regarding the legality of raising additional revenue 
beyond the Permanent Settlement. He submitted that mass social improvement justified the 
imposition of an education cess on landed proprietors.49 In regards to the value of mass 
                                                 
46 Mayo to Napier, 06 Aug. 1870, MS 7490/154, fol. 125, MP, CUL. 
47 Mayo to Argyll, 22 Aug. 1870, MS 7490/154, MP, CUL.  
48 Mayo, 07 Feb. 1871, MS. 7490/26, fol. 20, MP, CUL.  
49 Mayo, Sep. 1869, MS 7490/9/15, MP, CUL.  
 135 
 
vernacular education, Mayo challenged opposition based on social and racial prejudice. 
This included arguments that “native” prejudices hampered a system of popular 
instruction, and that its success would reduce the size of the manual labor force. He 
responded that the state held an obligation to promulgate education and knowledge across 
India. He stated that “we must act on the broad principle namely that it is our duty to 
extend by any legitimate means to all over whom we have influence the opportunity of 
acquiring the elements of knowledge.” Moreover, Mayo denied that the objective of mass 
education in India was “utopian.” Although admitting the difficulty and the length of time 
required, he stated the state should be committed to placing education on a national basis in 
India.  
I never admit that plans of enlightenment and intellectual elevation for the masses in 
this or any country in the world are utopian, or that we have not at our disposal 
means and resources sufficient at all event to commend the performance of what, in 
this respect, I believe to be a national duty.50 
 
Similar to his retrenchment and tax proposals, Mayo interpreted opposition to the 
reorientation of education funding from higher to vernacular instruction as motivated by 
sectional self-interest. Specifically, Mayo warned against India’s English-educated minority 
monopolized state funded instruction at the poor’s expense. A memo from the Home Department 
to Argyll argued that higher education needed to be more self-supporting, and that available 
                                                 
50 Mayo, Sep. 1869, MS 7490/9/15, MP, CUL. 
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resources should be directed towards improving opportunity for the masses who could not afford 
to help themselves. Quoting Lord Stanley’s 1859 contention, as Secretary of State for India, that 
“individuals and classes who require more than a simple elementary education may…be left to 
exert themselves with or without the assistance of Government,” they submitted that it was 
grossly unfair that the bulk of imperial revenue for education went to the higher classes.51 In a 
subsequent memo to London, they contended that lucrative employment alone motivated 
personal expense towards participation in English language instruction. In contrast, vernacular 
instruction required state aid as it led to no such opportunity.52 Mayo addressed local criticism to 
his proposal of reducing the grant to university education by sharply rebuking English-educated 
Indians. To Sir Eskine Perry, former Supreme Court Chief Justice and current member of the 
Council of India, he argued that as the poor received little state aid, the “Calcutta Baboo gets the 
spoils…which enables him to obtain a living as a Doctor or a Lawyer.”53 In subsequent 
correspondence, Mayo related education in India to England and lamented Perry’s support for 
the “filtration theory” of knowledge from high to low classes in the Subcontinent.  He argued 
that “surely England is a good instance of its absolute failure,” as the educated upper and middle 
classes stand apart from “…the masses, in the big towns, and a great portion of the agricultural 
poor, [who are] as ignorant…then they were in the days of Henry VIII.” In comparison, Mayo 
                                                 
51 Home Department, Indian Government to Argyll, 08 Feb. 1870, MS 7490/1/4, MP, CUL.  
52 Home Department, Indian Government to Argyll, 25 Oct. 1870, MS 7490/9/32, MP, CUL.  
53 Mayo to Perry, 23 Mar. 1870, MS 7490/152, fol. 268, MP, CUL. Baboo or babu is a Bengali term for office clerk. 
For the British in late nineteenth century, this term was often used pejoratively to denote English educated Indians 
effeminacy and cultural alienness.    
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stated that in India a “few hundred Baboos,” who could pay for themselves, are state educated at 
the expense of the millions who are left behind. In regards to the small class’ intentions and 
ambitions, he contended that “the more education you give them the more they will try & keep it 
to themselves...and make their better knowledge a means of tyranny.”54 Mayo’s allusion to this 
class’s ambition became a standard conservative reaction, which implied that English-educated 
political reformers and the Indian National Congress were driven by alien and selfish motives in 
the late nineteenth century. 
Muslim Education 
In addition to the masses, Mayo promoted expanded state aid to encourage Muslim 
participation in higher education. He praised and respected the Muslim tradition in India, and 
compared their imperial linage to that of the Protestant community in Ireland. In his notes, he 
expressed the regret that “so large and important class, possessing a classical literature replete 
with works of profound learning and great value...” were not obtaining the benefits of current 
education. After conversing with Syed Ahmed Khan, former civil servant and Muslim 
community leader in Northern India, Mayo perceived a similarity between the India’s Muslim 
population and the Irish Anglican minority. He argued that just as Lord Stanley’s successful 
system of national education in Ireland, officially secular but in practice largely denominational, 
benefited the majority Catholic population and slighted Anglicans, in India most Muslims for 
religious reasons avoided state sponsored schooling. In response, Mayo advocated that grants-in-
                                                 
54 Mayo to Perry, 26 Jul. 1870, MS 7490/154, fol. 85, MP, CUL.  
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aid should be expanded to construct Muslim schools which would instruct in vernacular 
languages including Arabic and Persian.55 In 1875, Syed Ahmed Khan’s subsequent efforts led 
to the construction of Aligarh College, which became a center for Muslim intellectual and 
nationalist thought into the twentieth century.56 Mayo’s promotion of vernacular and Muslim 
education became a popular plank for conservatives who were increasingly skeptical of the 
relationship between English education and a Hindu dominated Indian National Congress late in 
the nineteenth century.  
Princely Education 
 Mayo’s efforts to expand princely education through minority instruction and the 
expansion of exclusive colleges had a substantial influence later in the century. This advocacy 
was predicated on an Irish aristocratic inclination which favored the state’s and landed class’ 
paternal obligation to the larger community. In 1870, Mayo communicated to Rajputana’s landed 
elites his opinion on the British paramount power’s relationship with India’s rulers. He argued 
that in exchange for British protection for their ancient rights and customs, they should assist the 
former in respecting the rights and privileges of the people under their care. This included the 
security of property, construction of roads and irrigation, encouragement of education, and relief 
for the sick. To that end, he expressed a personal desire to assist their education towards the 
establishment of a school at Ajmere. He proposed that this institution should be exclusive to the 
                                                 
55 Mayo, 26 Jun. 1871, MS 7490/9/39, MP, CUL.  
56 On Aligarth see Mumtaz Moin, The Aligarth Movement (origin and early history) (Karachi, Salman Academy, 
1976); Shan Muhammad, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Political Biography (Lahore: Universal Books, 1976). 
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region’s princes, chiefs, and thakdoors, and would offer them instruction to fulfill and strengthen 
their positions as rulers and guardians.57 In correspondence with Queen Victoria, Mayo hoped 
that the “very proud and very ignorant” princes and thakdoors, who “occupy a similar position 
as…the English Barons did in the Reign of King John,” could be educated at a new “Indian 
Eton” established at Ajmere.58 Following the school’s 1875 opening it was named Mayo College 
in commemoration of the former Viceroy. He also supported the efforts of W.W. Anderson, 
Political Resident of Kathiawar (1867-1874), in establishing the Rajkumar College (1870) in 
Rajkot, Kathiawar.59 Mayo and Rajkumar were joined by other Indian “public” schools across 
India such as Daly College, Indore College, and Aitchison College. As we shall see in chapter 
six, these colleges were sites where local princes, chiefs, and nobles strengthened their authority 
and participated in establishing modes of imperial collaboration with the Paramount Power.  
In addition, Mayo promoted minority guardianships for the education of young princes in 
large and small Indian states. His primary focus was the minority administrations in Mysore and 
Hyderabad. In Mysore, Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary, gave a glowing report of the young 
Maharaja’s education and physical activity under British stewardship. Beyond a strict class 
regiment of reading, writing, arithmetic, and geography, the young Prince was allowed, and 
preferred, “fun and merriment”: “The little M. only seems to have one thought-his school and 
                                                 
57 Mayo, 11 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/71/7, fol. 6, MP, CUL.  
58 Mayo to Victoria, 09 Nov. 1870, MS 7490/155, fol. 65, MP, CUL.  
59 Hunter, The Earl of Mayo, 105, 116. On the joint administration see also Javerial Umiashankar Yajnik, 
Gaorishankar Udayashankar (Bhavnagar: Haribhai Vijayashanrkar, 1937), 55. 
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cricket-and it is I am told very amusing to watch how he himself has resisted all the wills of his 
mother & courtiers to prevent his joining.”60 In Hyderabad, Mayo supported the co-regency of 
Nawab Shams-Ul-Umara and Salar Jung during the minority of Nazam Mir Mahabub Ali Khan. 
To Argyll, he stated that with Jung, who “one of the ablest & wisest men in India,” and able 
political residents, there was hope of a lengthy period of good government in the Kingdom.61 As 
a reward for those chiefs who properly administered their polities upon the Viceroy’s standards, 
Mayo welcomed their incorporation and continued instruction as participants in the upper levels 
Indian government. To Lord Napier, he expressed his hope that the Prince of Travancore, 
Maharajah Ayilyam Thirunal, would serve on the Legislative Council in Calcutta. He proposed 
that “I should like to give the council such a character as would induce the chiefs who are 
administrating their own states well, to come & take lessons in good govt with us at Calcutta.”62 
Conclusion 
As an Irishman and Chief Secretary for Ireland in successive Conservative governments, 
Mayo’s experience with social and religious division in Ireland informed his inclination and 
action as Viceroy of India. In continuing a conservative imperial tradition as prescribed by the 
1858 Queen’s Proclamation, he promoted an aristocratic definition of paternal good governance 
which determined the state and landed interests obligation to protect, mediate, and engage 
India’s various prescriptive institutions and customs. This informed a policy of decentralization 
                                                 
60 Burne to Mayo, 15 Feb. 1871, MS 7490/66, fol. 6, MP, CUL.   
61 Mayo to Argyll, 02 Mar. 1869, MS 7490/148, fol. 82, MP, CUL.  
62 Mayo to Napier, 02 Jul. 1869, MS 7490/150, fol. 19, MP, CUL. 
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which localized the utilization of imperial resources and influence. In a direct response to a 
liberal imperialism tradition, Mayo overrode Anglo-Indian and English educated Indian 
opposition to assert the State’s obligation to act for what he deemed to be the national interests of 
the country. Just as he advocated State financial support for the Anglican, Presbyterian, and 
Catholic churches as well as an education system receptive to religious prejudice in Ireland, in 
India Mayo sponsored a Muslim University and mass vernacular primary education to cater to 
and improve the knowledge and condition of the people.  
With regards to the landed political and propertied interests, Mayo saw the state’s role as 
not only a protector, but also as an instructor in the principles of good governance. He argued 
that in return for preserving landed interests’ local autonomy, and security of property and 
tenure, the British Paramount Power had the right to insist upon their financial and political 
contribution towards the implementation of fair justice and economic improvement for the 
masses. For India’s princes, chiefs, and nobility, Mayo’s sponsorship of minority education as 
well as Mayo and Rajkumar colleges reflected a desire to instruct this class on their obligations 
to the imperial state and the population under their charge. As we shall see in the following 
chapters, Mayo’s engagements towards princely education produced the foundation for the 
Indian princes’ collaboration in British imperialism late in the nineteenth century 
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Chapter 5: Lytton’s “Indian Privy Council”   
Introduction 
This chapter examines Robert Bulwer, Lord Lytton’s political program of Indian state 
engagement and collaboration surrounding the Imperial Assemblage in 1876-1877. Specifically, 
it explores his proposed creation of an Indian Privy Council. Beyond a ceremony which marked 
the ascension of Queen Victoria to Empress of India, Lytton designed the Assemblage as a 
means to strengthen the Indian princes’ political and sentimental relationship with the British 
paramount power, constituted in the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. While noting his Victorian 
acceptance of western civilizational superiority, Lytton’s vision was politically and 
philosophically consistent with a British conservative tradition on India. Moreover, Lytton’s 
association with the Conservative Party and Lord Salisbury was affirmed by Liberal opposition 
to the Royal Titles Act (1876), the Assemblage, and the Indian Privy Council. Lytton’s past 
literary criticism concerning a politically declining, morally depreciating, and unimaginative 
British aristocracy informed his political program which encouraged Indian rulers’ imperial 
leadership and contribution towards the governance of empire. Through showing an intellectual 
relationship with Disraeli’s skepticism of British perspective and prejudice on India, this chapter 
contends that Lytton’s princely collaboration resembled a contribution to Ellenborough’s and 
Mayo’s recognition and legitimatization of India’s historical internal differences and 
dissimilarity from Britain. 
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The Unlikely Viceroy 
Unlike Mayo, Lytton, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s second Viceroy of India, was 
not a political or partisan figure. His appointment as Viceroy was the result of Lord John 
Manners, Lord Powis, and Lord Carnarvon each declining the office. Also, it was unusual for a 
Foreign Office diplomat, published poet, and man with no party association or Indian and 
colonial service experience to receive an executive position in India.63 Despite his status as a 
political outsider, Lytton’s inclination and policy represented a contribution to a British 
conservative tradition in India. Just as Mayo utilized the state to instruct a new generation of 
Indian elites on their political and social obligation, Lytton sought to strengthen this group’s 
governing and military leadership as collaborating partners with the British paramount power. 
His objective centered upon the creation of an Indian Privy Council, which he envisioned as a 
consultative body consisting of the Viceroy, leading Anglo-Indian statesman, and high ranking 
Indian princes. Although Lytton’s initiatives were mostly resisted by Anglo-Indians and British 
liberals, he laid the foundation for India’s princes and landed elites to increasingly use British 
imperialism to strengthen their local autonomy and authority.  
A Modern Cynic  
Lytton privately and poetically expressed a comprehensive cynicism about modernity in 
Britain. Although an exponent of small “l” liberalism at home and abroad tied to individual 
                                                 
63 Lutyens, The Lyttons in India, 1. 
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liberty, he increasingly condemned the consequences of democratization, capitalism, and 
scientific rationalism to Britain’s social and political framework. Similar to Disraeli’s literary 
pursuits in the 1830s and 1840s, Lytton lamented the overturning of aristocratic values centered 
on individual leadership and social obligation with the material interests of modern capital and 
democratic governance. This resulted in his criticism of the aristocratic and middle classes, as 
well as growing distrust of British radical politics. To his close friend and Liberal MP John 
Foster, Lytton expressed an early dissatisfaction with the upper and middling classes’ actions and 
sentiments. In 1866, he argued that the upper class had lost their moral leadership and credibility 
on affairs at home and abroad:   
The purely aristocratic element is not without a sort of chivalry of its own kind, but 
unfortunately it is a chivalry always on the wrong side of every great 
question…which would have plunged England into a disastrous and iniquitous war 
for the purpose of pulling into life a barbarous slave power…which would defend, 
against justice, humanity, and common sense, women-flogging and man murdering 
Governor Eyre…and maintain the Irish Establishment Church rates, and every kind 
of vexatious oath, on the plea of standing by the Church versus the nation.64      
 
If the aristocracy had a misguided sense of moral responsibility in the affairs of state, Lytton 
submitted that the middle class was “too wealthy” to have any chivalry at all. With respect to the 
avaricious middle class character “Peckshiff” in Charles Dickens’ story The Life and Adventures 
of Marin Chuzzlewit (1844), he contended that their “political conscience whose organ is the city 
article, has already made England to be esteemed through Europe—somewhat more than justly, 
                                                 
64 Lytton to Foster, Mar.1866, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters of Robert First Earl of Lytton, 214. 
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though not altogether without cause—as the Peckshiff of nations.65 In contrast, Lytton praised 
working class ideals. To Foster, he argued that they held characteristics which he was “proud to 
call English—great fortitude, patience, and endurance, quick enthusiasm and generous sympathy 
for a cause not exclusively profitable…”66 Later to Foster, he contended that the working class 
was restrained by ruling class’ institutions and interests regarding the implementation of mass 
compulsory education. He concluded that compulsory education would have to proceed an 
extension of the suffrage, and if to that end it “must be the dissolution of Church and State. I 
shall fervently rejoice to see that…”67  
“Owen Meredith”  
In the 1850s and 1860s, Lytton used his poetry to express concerns on the social 
consequences of the modern age. This centered on the latter’s curtailment of individual identity 
and leadership. In Lucile (1860), Lytton decried the fall of individual significance and assertion 
in the current complex era “where man becomes the age.”68 A love story centered on the 
tribulations of heroine Lucile, villain Duc Eugene de Luvois, and hero Lord Alfred Vargave, it 
expressed Lytton’s pertinent feelings on the different social classes in modern Britain. As the 
aristocratic Alfred is portrayed as a lost soul and unable to define his self-purpose, he must guard 
against being defrauded by the avaricious middle class banker and liberal philanthropist Sir 
                                                 
65 Ibid, Charles Dickens, The Life and Adventures of Marin Chuzzlewit (London: Chapman & Hall, 1843). 
66 Lytton to Foster, Mar.1866, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters of Robert First Earl of Lytton, 214. 
67 Lytton to Foster, Dec. 1866, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 217. 
68 “Lucile,” in Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton, Earl of 1831-1891: The Poetics Works of Owen Meredith 
(New York: The American News Co., 19..), 21.  
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Ridley MacNab.69 In a small poem titled “The Wife’s Tragedy” (1855), Lytton criticized the 
English aristocracy’s social and political decline. Much allied with his radical sentiments at the 
time, he recounted their previous but now declining leadership of the people now eager for 
constitutional change: 
Strange. These crowds whose instincts guide them 
Fail to get the thing they would,  
Till we nobles stand beside them 
Give our names or shed our blood 
From of old this hath been so,  
For me too were with first  
In the fight fought long ago 
When the chain of Charles was burst 
 
Who but we set Freedom’s border 
Wrenched at Runnymede from John? 
Who but we stand, towers of order,  
Twixt the red cap and the Throne.  
 
In the present day, however, Lytton sees England’s nobles abandoning the people’s noble 
ambitions towards reform: 
And they wrong us, England’s Peers,  
Us, the vanguard of the land,  
Who should say the march of years  
Makes us shrink at Truth’s right hand.70 
 
King Poppy 
 
                                                 
69 “Lucile,” in Lytton, The Poetics Works of Owen Meredith, 114-117, 159-160, 190. 
70 “The Wife’s Tragedy,” in Lytton, The Poetics Works of Owen Meredith, 338.  
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Lytton’s most politically contentious poem was “King Poppy.” Biographer Aureilia 
Harlan contends that this poem, begun in 1874, and kept secret during his tenure as Viceroy, 
revised twice, and published after his death in 1892, should be read as a story of Lytton’s life, 
experiences, and sentiments.71 This work challenges the dominance of scientific rationalism and 
the absence of imagination in modern British governance. This political and social critique 
reflected Lytton’s admiration for poet and literary critic Matthew Arnold. Lytton shared Arnold’s 
contempt for England’s narrow-mindedness, intellectually stagnant aristocracy, and overreliance 
on reason as opposed to imagination, intellect, and aesthetics.72 This admiration informed an 
attempt to solicit fellow English poet and friend Robert Browning to arrange a meeting between 
him and Arnold. Lytton stated that although “I would love to meet him,” if that could not be 
arranged then tell him “I have watched and applauded his combat with the Goliaths of 
Philistia.”73  
King Poppy is a satirical portrayal of the mechanization of government as well as the 
ineptness and hypocrisy of aristocratic statesmen in the late nineteenth century. It is an 
imaginative story of an aspiring poppy’s (the flower) elevation to kingship in the kingdom 
Diadummiania.  Following the trials and tribulations of popular Princess Diadema, the heir 
apparent, who dies in exile, the last section satirically details the kingdom’s future mode of 
                                                 
71 “Harlan,” Lytton, The Poetics Works of Owen Meredith, 253. 
72 Stefan Collini, “Arnold, Matthew (1822–1888),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008. 
73 Lytton to Browning, 13 Mar. 1867, in Aurelia Brooks Harland and J. Lee Harlan, JR eds., Letters from Owen 
Meredith (Robert, First Earl of Lytton) to Robert and Elizabeth Browning (Baylor University, 1936), 223. 
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governance. After hearing of his child’s death, King Poppy instructs the Master Pilgrim to 
construct a replacement for the princess. The Master Pilgrim explains his creation as 
A Government Machine, expressly made 
And fitted with the necessary gear 
For carrying on the business of the realm 
With Regularity. Now, this machine,  
Said Pilgrim, was a puppet, that imposed 
So perfectly on public confidence  
Its representative contrivances…74 
This puppet suited to its age and easily controlled was an invention loved by the public  
As “The greatest invention of the age.”  “the puppet” was beloved by the people and moreover as  
Living Princesses sometimes go astray. 
The Puppet-Princess never will contract 
A misalliance; nor, if rightly work’d,  
Act counter to whatever rules are framed  
For its procedure.75 
 
In regards to the constitution, Pilgrim stated that the puppet’s construction should remain a 
secret. He argued that the government should “never reveal the unreality” to the easily led 
masses, as the “echoes of Departed Royalty” lead  
solemn influence to the hollow forms 
They Haunt for ages. Be upon your guard! 
The People, an incorrigible dunce,  
Is quick to feel, tho’ slow to understand; 
And, in its awkward fits of sentiment.76 
 
                                                 
74 Earl of Lytton, King Poppy (London: Longmans, Green, and CO, 1892), 285.  
75 Lytton, King Poppy, 286.  
76 Ibid. 
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Rejecting a seat in the new Cabinet, the Pilgrim concludes that the Ministers should be 
enlightened liberal statesman and proclaim liberty as part of the Constitution. In response to their 
disbelief and former attempts to curtail liberty, he argued to them 
Your Excellencies are about to start 
A Government exclusively maintain’d 
Upon appearances, and what appears  
Most liberal, looks best. But, after all,  
The little that I ask means nothing much   
 
The Pilgrims last addition was the insertion in the puppet-princess of a little wheel 
 
This new wheel henceforth  
It would be necessary to wind up  
Once every year. ‘Twas call’d “The-Queen’s-Speech-Wheel.”77 
 
This closing reference to the Queen’s Speech ceremony, which inaugurates a parliamentary 
session, should be seen as a sharp critique of the current constitutional establishment and its 
aristocratic ruling class. A monarch limited to the mechanical procedure of formality symbolized 
the submission of individual will and activity to the collective force of a systematic age. 
This poem reflected Lytton’s growing discontent with the consequences to individual 
character and assertion by the heavy reliance of reason over imagination in modern British 
society. Before King Poppy, Lytton expressed an admiration for the strong leadership and 
national ambitions of Louis Napoleon. To Browning in 1860, he defended and praised the 
character and national ambition of Napoleon, who was in his opinion “a man of undoubted 
                                                 
77 Ibid, 288-289. 
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genius, and unquestionably as a great constructor.”78 To Mrs C.W. Earle (1836-1925), his sister 
in law and subsequent publisher on horticulture, in 1880, he stated that the purpose of King 
Poppy was to illustrate “what a poor tissue of unreality human life would be if the much-
despised influence of imagination were banished from it.” In focusing on the lineage of rational 
political philosophy from Bentham to Mill and the lessons from “the modern school of historical 
science,” he argued that governance had become less practical and individual character 
meaningless in a world moved by the mechanism of great forces.79  To Earle in 1882, Lytton 
dismissed the theories and ideas of his youth and espoused a deep cynicism regarding individual 
character in a modern and rational Britain. He argued that scientific positivism led to a 
“dispersion rather than concentration of emotional forces” which resulted in “a general diffusion 
of mediocre comfort and well-being adapted to the satisfaction and production of mediocre 
character.” With respect to democratic politics, he advised the separation of politics from science 
and philosophy. He contended that contrary to the old Tory metaphysical doctrine of the divine 
right of royal and ruling powers, and radical theory prefaced on the Rights of Man and the 
natural equality of society, the growth of government as a “healthy natural organism is not 
logical, simple and symmetrical, but various, intricate, and full of salutary anomalies.”80  
                                                 
78 Lytton to Browning, 03 Sep. 1860, in Harland and Harlan, Letters from Owen Meredith, 159. 
79 Lytton to Earle, 1880, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 313. “The modern school of historical science” is 
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Pennsylvania University Press, 2004), 4. 
80 Lytton to Earle, 22 Jul. 1882, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 247. 
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Modern Democracy and Empire  
Moreover, his post-India review of King Poppy reflected a later pessimism concerning 
English radicalism as a philosophy and political force at the end of the nineteenth century. This 
centered on what he saw as the incompatibility of expansive democracy with the British Empire. 
In India, Lytton, in 1878, had expressed his frustration to Frederic Harrison (1831-1923), 
historian and liberal thinker, on English radicalism’s destructive ambitions. In signifying a wider 
purpose for the British Empire as a moral and European force beyond narrow national interest, 
he feared that its good standing in Europe was threatened by all the political parties and its 
irreconcilability with domestic institutions. In singling out radicalism’s “utter want of patriotism 
and practical common sense,” he contended that “it would willingly burn down every rafter of 
the great fabric of the British Empire in order to roast in the ashes some of its own little half-
addled theoretical eggs.”81 In 1885, Lytton responded to concerns that the introduction of local 
government in Ireland would lead to the oppression of landlords and Protestants. He argued to 
John Tyndall, Professor of Physics at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, that he viewed 
“modern democracy as the hugest humbug under the sun—and, as applied to the administration 
of so complex and artificial an empire as ours, the most mischievous form of social insanity.”82  
1832 and Disraeli  
                                                 
81 Lytton to Harrison, 02 Apr. 1878, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 97. 
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Lytton’s post-India critique of liberal radicalism and political admiration for Disraeli are 
expressed in his biography of his father published in 1883. In recounting Edward Bulwer’s 
(1803-1873) literary and political career, Lytton infused a commentary on significant events 
throughout his life span which was critical of Liberalism.  Although a subsequent biography, 
published in 1948, by his grandson Victor Bulwer-Lytton, 2nd Earl of Lytton, shows that Edward 
Bulwer was in favor of the 1832 Reform Bill, Lytton focuses his attention on condemning the 
Whig movement for reform.83 To Lytton, the Reform Bill was a partisan and publicly unwanted 
event. While stating that “The Whigs saw, and seized with great ability, the opportunity to make 
themselves the mouth piece of an all but universal settlement,” their partisans in the press made 
sure to contrive and enforce the public’s growing excitement for expanded suffrage:  
The Liberal press surpassed itself in the language of personal menace, detraction, and 
vituperation. The noblest characters, the most exemplary lives, the finest intellects, 
and the greatest public services, failed to shelter from its aspirations those who had 
the courage to express opinions adverse to the popular demand.84  
 
Also in the biography, Lytton highlights Bulwer’s friendship with Disraeli, adding words 
of praise to the latter’s literary and intellectual abilities. His view of Disraeli as a politician was 
much improved following his tenure as Viceroy and the former’s death in 1880. Although his 
earlier correspondence reveals an underwhelming response to Disraeli 1858’s Government of 
India Bill, and speech on his 1867 parliamentary reform bill, he labelled the Tory Premier as a 
                                                 
83 Earl of Lytton, Bulwer Lytton (London: Home & Van, 1948), 59. 
84 Robert Bulwer Lytton, The Life Letters Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton: by his son, vol. II 
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man of “indomitable will and persevering genius.”85He shows that his father was an admirer of 
Disraeli’s early work, especially the “Wondrous Tale of Alroy” (1833), and that they remained 
friends throughout their lives.86 In regards to “Tale of Alroy,” Lytton admired the author’s 
achievement of authenticity in depicting the spirt of the East. He remarked that its underrated 
praise reflected the author’s ability to overcome English class prejudices towards the East: 
Perhaps it is that, in all productions inspired by the Spirit of the East, the stamp of 
genius is like the seal of Solomon, which reveals nothing to those who have never 
felt the wizardry of Oriental spells: and whilst, in its conception, the “Tale of Alroy” 
is uncongenial to the taste of a middle-class insular public such as ours, its execution 
transgresses the sobriety of imagination and expression desiderated by our literary 
connoisseurs. 
 
Including Tancred, Lytton argued that “No other English Statesman or author has shown…so 
clear a conception of the permanent conditions of Eastern Life and thought, or so profound a 
penetration in the moral recesses of Eastern Character.” This feat is extraordinary as he contends 
that  
Englishman carry with them, in the balls of their eyes and the convolutions of their 
brain, so much of their own island that, after years of external contact with Orientals, 
they remain unconscious that the formulas of Western thought and habits of Western 
feeling are quite inapplicable to the Eastern World.87 
 
                                                 
85 Ibid, 326, In opposing the Council component of the Government of India Bill (1858), Lytton remarked “Dizzy’s 
ludicrous speech on Indian Legislation has not only disgusted all thinking men in the House, but also a large section 
of his own party. To my thinking it was like a fraudulent attempt to get 20 shillings change out of a bad 
sovereign…” Lytton to Browning, Apr. 1858, in Haran and Haran, Letters from Owen Meredith, 144. On Lytton’s 
underwhelming reaction to Disraeli’s parliamentary performance see Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 217.  
86 Lytton, The Life Letters Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer, 314. 
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Lytton’s admiration for Disraeli centred upon the latter’s ability to transcend the narrow 
confines of western rationalism to explore the East’s essential difference from the West. 
This not only resembled Lytton’s maturing critique of the application of reason in modern 
Britain, but also, as we shall see, his frustrated experiences of trying to incorporate his 
imaginative version of India’s history and difference to construct a foundation for British 
imperialism in India.  
Interpreting India 
As Viceroy (1876-1880), Lytton embarked on an ambitious political program to strengthen 
executive authority and aristocratic leadership in India. While acknowledging Britain’s 
obligation to gradually spread a superior European civilization throughout the subcontinent, 
Lytton focused on strengthening and empowering India’s traditional institutions as collaborative 
partners with British imperialism. He repudiated past failures to entice a growing English 
educated Indian class and mass population with the spread of western education and public 
works. Instead, he argued that Britain’s future as the paramount power in India relied on 
engaging and collaborating with India’s princes and chiefs, in his opinion they were the natural 
leaders of India’s society, as subordinate imperial partners. In 1876-1877, Lytton utilized Queen 
Victoria and the Conservative government’s proposal to make the former styled as Empress of 
India, to institute a wider political program centered upon the Imperial Assemblage and the 
establishment of an Indian Privy Council. In contrast to what he satirized in King Poppy as the 
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weakening executive and aristocratic political leadership in Britain, Lytton sought to strengthen 
viceregal authority through a collaborative relationship with a powerful Indian aristocracy.  
Arriving at Bombay as a political outsider in April 1876, Lytton ended his viceregal 
tenure in 1880 as a partisan and contentious figure. Lytton responded to British Liberal 
opposition to the Royal Titles Bill and Imperial Assemblage by becoming closely associated 
with Lord Salisbury, archconservative and Secretary of State for India till 1878, and the 
Conservative government. On general Indian governance, Lytton continued Mayo’s efforts to 
decentralize control and revenue, as well as to reduce the size of the Indian Civil Service 
bureaucracy.88 With regards to his philosophical perspective on Britain’s purpose in India, 
Lytton, like Mayo, saw British imperialism as a civilizing force for social and character 
improvement in India. While emphasizing India’s internal differences and distinctiveness from a 
morally superior British society, he believed that Britain had a providential obligation to effect 
gradual social improvement and transformation over the conservative and passive society. In 
contrast to liberal or radical approaches, Lytton argued that British obligations were best enacted 
by engaging and collaboration with India’s traditional ruling class.    
Cultural Exchanges 
At the State Banquet during the Assemblage on New Year’s Day 1877, he laid out his 
general sentiments on India. In seeing India as a land “multitudinous in its traditions, as well as 
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in its inhabitants, almost infinite in the variety of races which populate it, and of the creeds 
which has shaped their character…,” he stated that the British Empire has undertaken the goal of 
enhancing the “collective social life and character of the population of the Empire.”89 Lytton 
objected to the protocol of not allowing female members of the Viceroy’s family to attend state 
functions as it would give offence to high ranking natives. Lytton, stated, to Sir Henry Ponsonby, 
Private Secretary to Queen Victoria (1870-1895),  that it was wrong that “we,” meaning English 
or Europeans, were “bound to conform our own social life and customs to the low standard of 
those whose masters we are by reason of our superior social enlightenment.” He argued that 
Britain should continue to encourage, through example and persuasion, the local population to 
modify its customs: “We have put down suttee with the strong hand, and have done much to 
improve the position of Hindu widows and Mahometal wives. We established Zenana schools 
(schools for women) throughout India, and extorting the better class of natives to educate their 
women and humanist female life in their homes.”90 In explaining his 1878 decision to restrict the 
freedom of the vernacular press, Lytton claimed that Britain had to be careful when introducing 
foreign institutions to India. He argued that they were effecting “a gradual but gigantic 
revolution—the greatest and most momentous social, moral and religious, as well as political, 
revolution which, perhaps, the world has ever witnessed.”91 
                                                 
89 Lytton, 01 Jan. 1877, Mss Eur. E218/57, British Library (Hereafter BL), Asian African Studies (hereafter AAS). 
90 Lytton to Possonby, 12 Jan. 1877, in Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 51. 
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Lytton believed that this civilizing sentiment’s gradual success was possible due to the 
social passivity of conservative India. To Lord Cranbrook, the Secretary of State for India (1878-
1880) on the popular custom of infant marriages in northern India, Lytton, although agreeing on 
the conservative approach to social change through legislation and consultation, speculated on 
Britain’s ability to be more aggressive on reforming a historically passive society: 
All I have heard and seen in this country inclines me to believe that we might, 
perhaps, have imposed with impunity any laws of this kind immediately after the 
Mutiny. Had we then proclaimed that henceforth the whole population was to be 
Christianized (being conquered), that no religion but that of the conquering power 
would be recognized, and that all institutions must be brought into conformity 
therewith, it is possible that even the most turbulent of our native subjects would 
have acquiesced…seeing in it only their history has accustomed them to regard as 
fair and natural, or, at any rate, inevitable…92  
 
In a subsequent dispatch to Cranbrook on proposed modifications to the army reserve system, he 
argued that in a country like India which was “the stronghold of social conservatism and 
inveterate habit” a man removed from home for two or twenty years would not affect his position 
in the community.93  
While espousing Britain’s potential benefit to India, Lytton believed that the East once 
had and still could expand the intellectual horizons of the West. This belief centered on the 
harmony of the mystical and imaginative qualities of the East with the practical aspects of 
                                                 
92 Lytton to Cranbrook, 16 May 1878, Balfour, Personal & Literary Letters, 104. On Lytton’s rationale for the 
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western scientific rationalism. At the foundation stone ceremony for the new Muslim Anglo-
Oriental College in Aligarth, a project envisioned and supported by Mayo, Lytton expressed that 
its establishment reflected the repayment of a western intellectual debt to the East. He contended 
that when Christian societies were just emerging out of intellectual darkness and social 
barbarism, Muslims were establishing schools of medicine, math, and philosophy. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the Moorish engineers’ fifteenth century application of science continued to 
sustain the populations of Spain and Portugal. In exchange, Lytton argued that as “providence 
has not confided to any single race a permanent initiative in the direction of human thought,” the 
West would now, through the new college, implant the benefits and understanding of western 
science to India’s Muslim community.94 To the Annual Convocation of the Calcutta University 
in March 1877, Lytton communicated the advantages of harmonizing western and eastern 
characteristics of thinking. While stating that the “highest possible standard of native character” 
would be its elevation in practical thinking towards the “closet possible harmony with western 
thought,” he believed, however, that “the average European intellect needs development on the 
imaginative and sympathetic side of it.” Resembling the sentiment and verse in Disraeli’s 
Tancred, he contended that the East’s intellectual gift to the world influenced “not only the 
parent of the Vedas and Puranan; not merely the inspirer of Budha and of Mahomet. It is the East 
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that raised the first altars of Jahova; it is the East that was the chosen birthplace of 
Christianity.”95   
To an audience of Rajput ruling families at Mayo College in 1879, Lytton emphasized 
the social element of education to instilling good governance and common imperial sentiment.  
He contended that as social relations are based on character or tone, the goal of the College’s 
instruction was to instill “elevating influences” to “the dominant races and superior classes of 
native India…whose tone the social harmony of the whole Empire is so largely dependent—by 
giving to them that community of interest and tendency in the higher activities of mind and 
body.” Lastly, he touched upon the similarities of position and spirit between the Rajput Clans 
and English aristocracy. He argued that both had maintained the premier position in the political 
hierarchy of their ancient races by inhibiting similar characteristics of “energy, fearlessness, love 
of healthful exercise and scorn of unmanly ease.”96 This sentiment towards harmonizing East and 
West, as well as advocating a “community of interest” between Britain and India’s higher classes 
informed Lytton’s political program surrounding the Imperial Assemblage in 1876-1877.  
Enemy to Anglo-India 
Lytton’s reorientation of imperial policy towards conciliating India’s aristocracy to 
become contributing partners in Britain’s Indian empire was opposed by his Viceroy Council, the 
Council of India in London, and the Indian Civil Service. Early in his tenure, Lytton was already 
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complaining, in partisan terms, about the Viceroy Council’s hostility to him. To Disraeli 
regarding the need to keep the plans for an imperial durbar secret, he remarked that “you…know 
that my Councilors are all Liberals-that is to say narrow minded persons, and also practical men, 
or, in their words, men incapable of giving practical effect to an idea.”97 With regards to their 
opinion of him, he quipped to Disraeli “I can only say what Lord North said of his Generals in 
the American War—‘I hope they may frighten the enemy, for I am sure they frighten me.” As to 
any assistance they might offer him, he stated “I might as well consult a committee of 
undertakers as to best means of prolonging my life, as they at present all in a conspiracy to 
oppose everything which is suggested from the India office.”98 On their ability and character, 
Lytton lamented to Salisbury on the danger of a “tyranny of six second rate men, saturated with 
prejudice & personal feeling.”99 This feeling extended to the members of the Secretary of State’s 
Council of India, who were near unanimously opposed to Lytton’s plan for an Indian Privy 
Council. In 1876, he expressed to Salisbury his sympathy for the latter being at the mercy of men 
“who seem to represent the coagulated stupidity of Anglo-Indian prejudices and traditions, 
wholly inapplicable to the present situation.”100 In July 1876, Lytton received the condemnation 
of the Anglo-Indian community, the British official and unofficial community in India, for his 
rebuke of the North Western Province Government’s failure to respond to the low sentence of a 
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fine laid against Mr. Fuller, a merchant, for the killing an Indian.101 Salisbury commended 
Lytton’s action, arguing that “In case of white against black, there is no real public opinion to 
check brutality in India; and your censures must do the work which public reprobation would do 
at home.”102 
Princely Collaboration 
For Lytton, the means to secure Britain’s imperial position over the mass population in India 
was to strengthen a relationship with the country’s princes and chiefs. Rather than continuing, at 
great expense, to be the agent of economic development and social improvement, the paramount 
power had to utilize and strengthen traditional institutions of authority over a conservative society. 
To Queen Victoria, Lytton laid out his planned re-orientation of imperial policy from the modern 
to a traditional focus. He argued that a past policy of placating India’s population through public 
works development had misunderstood the conservative nature of the country: 
I think we have hitherto relied too much for popular gratitude on the great 
improvement we have undoubtedly effected in the position of the ryot, by means of 
costly canals and irrigation works, which have embarrassed our finances, and are as 
yet so little appreciated by the Hindu rustic, that they don’t pay the expense of making 
them.103   
 
Moreover, he drew a parallel with Austria’s failure to halt the Italian nationalist and unification 
movement (1830-1850s) to show the folly of focusing on the masses at the expense of the 
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aristocracy. He argued that when Italy’s nobility became alienated from Austria and conspired 
against it, “the peasantry either remained inert or else followed the lead of their natural superiors 
in rebelling against their benefactress.”104 To Salisbury, Lytton considered this example as 
comparable to British India, and argued that unlike in Italy “the Indian Chiefs and Princes are not 
mere noblese. They are a powerful aristocracy.” This resembled their ability, over English 
educated Indians and even the British, to influence and control the mass population. He contended 
that unlike the pretended political representation of native opinion from the “Baboos...who really 
represent nothing but the social anomaly of their own position,” the inert mass “will move in 
obedience not with its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and princes, however tyrannical 
they may be.”105 
For Lytton, the failure of the British paramount power to create an emotional bond with 
India’s aristocracy represented a lost opportunity to strengthen imperial defense.  Although his 
efforts to engage India’s aristocracy were associated with ensuring a readied defense against 
Russian expansion towards Afghanistan, they were prefaced by an intellectual and social bias 
which utilized history and imagination to validate governing executive authority and leadership. 
In an 1876 confidential memo, Lytton argued that the Indian states have not understood or 
reciprocated the benefit that they have received from an association with Britain. Despite the 
protection they receive from the Paramount Power against external attack and internal rebellion, 
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as well as the extension of civilization through railways, telegraph, and commerce, he contended 
that “it can hardly be said that our relationships with them are satisfactory, or that we have 
succeeded, in any great degree, in securing their effectual co-operation, or in associating their 
personal interest and authority with the imperial administration.”106 To remedy princely 
indifference to imperial security and administration, Lytton proposed that in exchange for the 
Indian states’ military cooperation and contribution to imperial defense, the Paramount Power 
would offer them greater internal autonomy. Without infringing on the spirit of the Queen’s 
Proclamation, he suggested the revision of outstanding treaties to define clearly the responsibility 
of the Political Agents and the native feudatories.107  
In 1877, Lytton expressed, once again in a confidential memo, a determination to seek 
political support in the Indian Government and among the Indian States for the latter’s 
participation in imperial defense. He stated that the Viceroy Council’s refusal to reconsider their 
earlier objection for a scheme of princely political co-operation, and their offhanded rejection of  
two requests from Indian princes, who were Councilors of the Empire and held honorary rank of 
General in the British Army, for purchasing arms reflected an embarrassment for the Government. 
Specifically, he argued that refusing the Maharaja Holkar of Indore’s request for rifled muskets 
and carbines revealed the contradiction of Britain’s relationship with the native feudatories as “we 
set rules for them to ask us for permission, forbidding own manufacture, yet refuse their request 
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with ‘undisguised mistrust.” In response, Lytton expressed his intention to nominate a committee 
whose object would be to determine the present status of the native armies, and whether their 
relationship with the Supreme Government might be remodeled without effecting current 
treaties.108 Lytton envisioned a larger imperial role for the Indian states, who, he believed, were 
“morally bound to contribute to the general defence of the Empire.” To that end, he proposed that 
every chief should furnish a contingent to do garrison duty and general task work, which would be 
placed under British control in a war at imperial expense.109 His proposal would set the formative 
stages towards establishing the Imperial Service Troops in 1885, a reserve force raised by large 
Indian states for service in the British Indian Army.110 Lytton’s attempts to establish a greater 
facility for Indian state engagement in the imperial military apparatus of India reflected a larger 
political program centered upon inspiring the country’s aristocracy to become participating 
subordinate partners in the British Empire. 
Imperial Assemblage and the Indian Privy Council  
 Lytton inaugurated a political program of Indian state engagement and conciliation at the 
Imperial Assemblage held in December 1876 till January 1877. This elaborate assembly was 
held on the plains outside Delhi, the seat of the former Mughal Empire and the spot of British 
defeat and subsequent victory against Indian rebels in 1857-58. It was meticulously orchestrated 
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to inspire loyalty to the British Empire amongst the attending sixty-three ruling chiefs and 
numerous minor nobilities. To that end, Lytton distributed emoluments steeped in history and 
imagination to fortify the feudatory bond between the newly proclaimed Queen Empress of India 
and the country’s powerful aristocracy. The proposed rewards to be dispensed for past and 
continued loyalty at the Assemblage were the presentation of banners, medals, a native peerage 
sanctioned by the Imperial Crown (including the expansion of the Order of the Star of India 
founded in 1861), the appointment of top native chiefs to military commands, and, most 
significantly, the establishment of an Indian Privy Council.  
 Lytton’s Imperial Assemblage employed history and imagination to implement a 
practical program of political collaboration with India’s native states. In an April letter to 
Victoria, Lytton expressed his belief that every possible flattery and award should be associated 
with the new title which “places Her Authority upon that ancient throne of the Moguls, with 
which the imagination and traditions of your Majesty’s Indian Subjects associate the splendor of 
supreme power…”111 Lytton was personally involved with the particular details of the 
Assemblage. To Disraeli, he apologized for nit-picking over the presentation and program of the 
event: “I am afraid I may have seemed fussy or frivolous about the decorative details of the 
Delhi assemblage…The decorative details of an Indian pageant are like those parts of an animal 
which are no use at for butcher’s meat, and are even unfit for scientific dissection, but from 
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which augurs draw the omens that move armies and influence princes.”112 Again to Disraeli, he 
argued that the native population expected that the Durbar announcement would inaugurate and 
incentivize a new era which was more favorable to their feelings and interests. In suggesting that 
the proposed presentation of guns and heralded banners would satisfy the princes’ great 
attachment “to their family pedigrees and ancestral records,” he contended that these 
emoluments were necessary to entice their loyalty to the crown: “Here is a great feudal 
aristocracy which we cannot get rid of, which we are avowedly anxious to conciliate and 
command, but which we have as yet done next to nothing to rally round the British Crown as its 
feudal head.” 113 To Salisbury, Lytton contended that the princes and chiefs’ expense and trouble 
during the latest visit of the Prince of Wales fueled a warranted expectation that they were 
entitled to material recognition.114  
History and imagination defined the character of the material emoluments and the verbal 
expressions of friendship to the Indian princes and chiefs. These themes expressed Britain’s 
recognition and thanks of India’s aristocratic contribution to British imperialism in India. On the 
presentation of banners to the Princes, Lytton exclaimed that they “never be unfurled without 
reminding you, not only of the close union between the throne of England and our loyal princely 
house, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount power to see your dynasty strong, 
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prosperous, and permanent.”115 In stating that the Empress title was in recognition of European 
and Native joint efforts to ensure Her Majesty’s supremacy over India, Lytton called on India’s 
“natural leaders” to further fulfill their responsibilities proscribed “by birth, rank, and hereditary 
influence” to engage with the institutions and ideas of empire.116 Outside the ceremonial 
atmosphere, Lytton met with Mayo College’s governing council, comprised partly by Rajput 
chiefs, for their first meeting. As President of the institution, Lytton sanctioned the council’s 
decisions regarding the plans for the new college buildings, to publish its first report in both 
English and Urdu, set a three month vacation period for pupils, and accept the offer of iron gates 
from former graduate Maharaja of Alwar.117  
The centerpiece of Lytton’s political program surrounding the Imperial Assemblage was 
the creation of a consultative Indian Privy Council. Although adamant that his proposed council 
would not transfer any political power to India’s princes or popular opinion, Lytton pressed for a 
politically significant institution which would incorporate the active participation of India’s 
premier aristocracy to the governance of Indian empire. At the lead and behest of the Viceroy, it 
would be a purely consultative body consisting of high ranked princes, all Governors and 
Lieutenant-Governors, honorary members of the Royal Family, as well as former and current 
members of the Viceroy’s Council. His proposals were discussed among Victoria, Disraeli, and 
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Salisbury, but were kept secret from the Viceroy’s Council, Indian Civil Service, and the public. 
Lytton’s proposals were scrutinized and eventually watered down. In April, Lytton assured 
Disraeli that his scheme would have no effect on administration or “give the least real power to 
the Native Chiefs,” but rather it would “flatter their amour proper” and ensure their ability to be 
personally influenced by the Viceroy. However, he contended that if the princes could have any 
practical effect on the council, it would “tend to check the obstructive propensities of the English 
mercantile members.”118 Lytton’s sentiment reflected a personal class bias which was present 
while planning the particular membership of the council. In rejecting a suggestion, expressed by 
Salisbury, on the inclusion of local European council members in the council, Lytton contended 
that this would “swamp” the native element “composed only of the very greatest Chiefs and 
Princes.” He remonstrated that if the princes found themselves not only outnumbered, but 
outnumbered by “British officials of no rank or status, they would regard the whole thing as a 
mockery.” Lastly, if admission to a council under the Sovereign, which also had honorary 
members of the Royal family, was truly to be respected by the “great natives,” it would not be 
appropriate to “include all the scrubs of the local council, ‘Gibbs’, and others.” 119  
 
Anglo-Indian and Liberal Opposition to the Indian Privy Council 
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On the release of his proposals in November 1876, Lytton was frustrated by the 
resoundingly negative response to his council proposal from the British Privy Council and the 
Council of India in London. For Lytton, this antagonism embodied the combination of Liberal 
Party opposition to the Royal Titles Bill with Anglo-Indian hostility towards his leadership.  
Earlier in September to Salisbury, Lytton communicated his frustration with military and civil 
opposition to his proposed amalgamation of native armies, and entrusting native princes with 
military commands.120 In a lengthy letter to Victoria, he argued that the princes deserved 
recognition for their past financial and military contributions to the Indian government, and that 
the council would be a small concession to this expectation. On the council, Lytton expressed 
frustration at London’s opposition to his proposal which “form[ed] the backbone of our whole 
political programme.” He explained that this was the result of a concerted effort by the Anglo-
Indian press to spread nonsense regarding the Assemblage’s expense and unpopularity with 
native chiefs. Lastly, he suggested that if the Crown ever lost India it would not be because of 
her Indian subjects, but “through party spirit at home, and the disloyalty, and insubordination, of 
those members of your Majesty’s Indian Civil Service…”121 In the same mail dispatch to Britain, 
Lytton was confounded by Salisbury’s inability to convince the Council to support the purposed 
Indian council. He argued that his own Legal Department had claimed that the proposal would 
not need legislation, and that it would be popular at home as it was in accordance with the views 
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of John Bright, Henry Fawcett, and others.122 To a compromise which created the title 
“Councillor to the Empress” to be individually bestowed to selected princes, Lytton praised 
Salisbury’s efforts despite personal disappointment. He stated that although it was sufficient to 
meet his objective, “I should have preferred the creation of an organized council.”123  
The opposition from the Privy and Viceroy Councils centered upon Lytton’s proposal to 
attach the status appendage “Right Honourable” to the title of Indian Privy Council members, 
and how this institution might reduce the Viceroy’s power and leave him exposed to native 
sentiment. Sir. H. Rawlinson, a member of the Council of India since 1868, stated that the 
general feeling of the Council was against the Indian council, as the Councilors believed that it 
would either be too ineffective or dangerous. His personal opinion against the measure was that 
bringing the princes into direct relations with the Viceroy would weaken the latter.124 Sir George 
Birdwood, Indologist and Civil Servant, regretted that the signifier “most honourable” was not to 
be given to the Councilors of the Empress. He stated that the proposed Indian council faced 
overwhelming opposition, and that only Sir Battle Frere and Sir Robert Montgomery were for 
it.125 
 Lytton’s proposals regarding the Imperial Assemblage and the Indian Privy Council were 
discussed and revised with the aid of Salisbury throughout 1876. The Viceroy and the Secretary 
                                                 
122 Lytton to Salisbury, 15 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 605, BL, AAS. 
123 Lytton to Victoria, 22 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. 218/23, fol. 623, BL, AAS. 
124 Rawlinson to Lytton, 10 Nov. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/49, fol. 205, BL, AAS. 
125 Birdwood to Lytton, 15 Dec. 1876, Mss Eur. E218/49, fol. 242, BL, AAS. 
 171 
 
of State for India shared an aristocratic mentality which permeated their perspective on princely 
engagement and conciliation in India. Both critical of democracy and mass politics in Britain, 
they attempted to mediate its influence in India through strengthening the relationship between 
the Queen and her feudal princes. Furthermore, this mentality was informed by a shared class 
contempt for English educated Indians and an Anglo-Indian constituency who, they believed, 
worked contrary to wider imperial interests in India.  
In a July response to Lytton’s May correspondence concerning the politically inert Indian 
masses and the need for engaging the country’s aristocracy for securing the British Empire in 
India, Salisbury evoked his feelings on the masses in Europe to challenge a tradition of liberal 
imperialism in India. He sympathized with Lytton’s view on India’s masses, arguing that nothing 
was clearer in the “history of this century all over Christendom than the political lifelessness of 
the masses,” and that “If this is true in the west-how much more in India?” In moving up the 
social spectrum, he criticized the loyalty of the English-educated middle class in India. In 
referring to them as “a deadly legacy from Metcalf and Macaulay,” he argued that “they never 
give any political strength to the state…In India they cannot be anything else than opposition in 
quiet times, rebels in times of trouble.” On the aristocracy, he argued that despite “English 
arrogance working against you…,” it was worth trying to engage this group as their self-interest 
must be strong on our side.” In emphasizing that “The Point is to get their sentiment with us 
too,” he supported the proposed Indian Privy Council as “a very good idea.”126  
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In June 1876, Salisbury communicated his support, and that of Disraeli, for Lytton’s 
vision for proclaiming the Queen’s new title, but warned of domestic public opinion.127 In 
addition, he backed Lytton’s ideas for conveying military titles and eventual commands to 
Native princes. He argued that if carried out circumspectly and over time, “it is an idea having 
great promise of future strength to the Empire.” As he saw no reason not to confer military titles 
at the Proclamation, he contended that giving some of their armies recognized status in the 
British army, and later allowing them to perform duties outside their own districts might be 
possible.128  
Although supportive of the general scheme of conveying honors, titles, and establishing 
an Indian Privy Council, Salisbury expressed to Lytton his and likely Anglo-Indian objections 
over specific details of his program. These related to the transference of political power from 
established institutions to more representative bodies. For the Conservative Secretary of State, it 
was the possible expansion of Anglo-Indian political power which represented the real danger of 
Lytton’s proposal.  In regards to the council, Salisbury asked Lytton if giving councilors 
honorary seats in the Legislative Council was a necessary component of the plan. He argued that 
in lieu of the loud opposition to the Royal Titles Bill, the difficulty of legislating honorary 
membership would be compounded with Anglo-Indian objections to being outvoted and 
subjected to “coloured” men. In believing that there was no reason to invest the council with any 
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share of government over British India, he preferred Lytton earlier remarks that “The Council 
should be considered entirely separate and distinct from any existing institution.”129  
For Salisbury, the danger of investing the Indian Privy Council with real authority was 
not enhancing the powers of India’s aristocracy, but rather providing a representative outlet for 
the Anglo-Indian community. He warned that the creation of a new imperial council with real 
authority would motivate Anglo-Indian demands, with support from English public opinion, for 
representative institutions. Although arguing that Indians would respond to the idea with 
ridicule: 
In England, however, people are so ignorant, so impulsive, so apt to be cajoled by 
constitutional formulas, and philanthropic catchwords, that the possibility or a 
successful cry for giving power to the “people” is a danger which must not be 
despised. My only apprehension with respect to the new imperial council is lest in 
some way or other it should end in opening a road to power to the white unofficial 
community.130 
 
To Lytton in July, Salisbury linked a distrust over an increasingly unified and racially 
antagonistic Anglo-Indian community with the necessity of imperial collaboration with India’s 
princes. In expressing concern with a unified racist sentiment in the British army in India which 
mirrored that of West Indian planters and confederate slave owners, he argued for the necessity 
of Lytton’s plans of princely engagement accompanying the Proclamation. He stated that if 
England wanted to remain supreme 
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she must be able to appeal to the colour against the white, as well as to the white 
against the coloured. It is therefore not merely as a matter of sentiment and of justice, 
but…of safety, that we ought to try and lay the foundations of some feeling on the 
part of the coloured races towards the crown.131  
 
In a subsequent dispatch to the Viceroy, Salisbury stated his disapproval and concerns over the 
remarks expressed in a recent personal interview with Mr. MacLean of the Bombay Gazette. He 
contended that MacLean represented “a typical specimen of the wild and ferocious Anglo-
Indian” who  
reproduced all that bragging fatuity which is so many places-Jamaica-St. Domingo-
Cuba-Confederate State-and others has induced the resident white population to 
dream that they can defy their own government with one hand and keep supremacy 
over the coloured multitudes by their side with the other. 
 
After this experience, he was further convinced “of the necessity of providing the Indian 
government with an oriental as well as European leg to stand upon.”132 In agreeing with Lytton’s 
acquiescence to dropping honorary membership on the Legislative Council for Indian Privy 
Councillors, Salisbury remarked “The only enemies, I believe, who will ever seriously threaten 
England’s power in India, are her own sons.”133  
In contrast to the Anglo-Indian community, Salisbury believed that the self-interest of 
India’s princes were drawing them closer to imperial partnership with Britain. On the merits for 
their participation in the purposed council, he argued that what they received from Britain, such 
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as a protected border, internal peace, and commercial treaties, as well as an improved culture and 
widened ideas, robbed them of their internal influence and made them more dependant on 
Britain. Therefore, this dependency defined the necessity of such a consultative council in India 
in which “…the common weal of Empire should be exchanged where all can meet and hear, 
rather than by isolated communication.”134 Salisbury’s support for Lytton’s council, and a closer 
political and emotional connection with India’s aristocracy, represented a wider apprehension 
concerning the destructive role of liberal representative institutions to the British Empire. 
Ridiculing the racist sentiments and political aspirations of the Anglo-Indian community, 
Salisbury wished to strengthen Britain’s empire through aristocratic class unity rather than racial 
ascendency.  
Salisbury communicated to Lytton the British Privy Council’s vehement opposition to the 
establishment of an Indian Privy Council. He stated that beyond their contention that legal 
opinion was against it and that parliamentary opposition might upset relations with the native 
princes, the adjoining Anglo-Indian official hostility made opposition too strong. Salisbury 
related Liberal Party opposition to the Royal Titles Bill with hostility against the current 
proposal. He argued that the mostly Liberal membered Privy Council, who disliked the new 
Royal title, was opposed to an imperial counterpart “which you and I had attached so much 
importance.” Beyond remarking that this partisan association made them adverse to all 
propositions, he contended that they represented an “old mercantile dislike of display in any 
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form, and of all the circumstance of power, under which Lord Ellenborough used to suffer.” In 
regards to official opinion in India, he believed that the “violence and unrestrained animosities of 
Gladstone and Lowe” motivated discontent against your tenure which, if the proposal was 
pushed through, would have a dangerous effect in India.135 On the response of the Council of 
India, Salisbury argued that all but two members supported the measure, while “some were 
exceedingly violent” in opposition. Although with “loudly expressed unwillingness,” they 
accepted the other proposals and granted twenty chiefs and great officers to receive the title of 
Councilor of the Empress.136 
Conclusion  
Lytton’s attempt to inaugurate at the Imperial Assemblage a new Indian Privy Council 
with full participation and title given to India’s leading princes reflected a continuation of a 
conservative imperial tradition defined in the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation. If Mayo laid the 
groundwork for instructing India’s aristocracy in the principles of paternal good governance, 
Lytton strengthened their opportunity to be active leaders through their political and military 
incorporation as subordinate feudal partners within Britain’s Indian empire. In decrying the 
decline of individual agency and aristocratic moral leadership in England, Lytton sought to 
strengthen the Viceroy’s and his princely feudatories’ executive authority as agents of the now 
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titled Queen Empress. Lytton’s recourse to history and imagination in the Imperial Assemblage, 
which prescribed an imperial framework which bonded Crown, Lord, and peasant in common 
interest, was a particular Tory concept of validating rank and status through nostalgia and 
emotion. In exchange for Indian princely participation in the Indian Privy Council and 
acknowledgment of other emoluments such as peerages, banners, and honorary military titles, he 
envisioned a collaborative imperial framework in which princes contributed men, money, and 
their leadership to the maintenance of empire. Although frustrated by Anglo-Indian and liberal 
rejection of his measures which, he argued, stemmed from Liberal Party opposition to the Royal 
Titles Bill, Lytton’s ideas for imperial collaboration with India’s aristocracy had a sustained 
legacy beyond the nineteenth century. His tenure strengthened a political and ideological 
association between the Paramount Power and Indian states which became foundational to 
conservative opposition against Indian nationalism from the 1880s. Politically, the Imperial 
Service Corps and later the Chamber of Princes (1920) were institutions which not only allowed 
Britain to maintain some semblance of popular legitimacy, but expanded Indian opportunity for 
willing collaboration with empire. Ideologically, Lytton’s program continued the political 
reorientation of Indian empire from its nineteenth-century liberal foundations to a conservative 
framework tied to an aristocratic mentality which favored locality, prescription, and imagination 
as the basis for good governance. Beyond validating rank, status, and difference, this created an 
alternative imperial framework which encouraged Indians to defend and enhance local interests 
through a vertical imperial identity against British and Indian nationalist interventions. 
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 Lytton’s and Salisbury’s conservative sentiments towards enticing Indian state 
participation in the political and military facets of empire reflected a wider apprehension 
concerning the limits and vulnerability of British imperial control. This reflected a British 
conservative perspective introduced by Ellenborough and strengthened with the Indian Revolt. 
This perspective held that Britain’s Indian empire must remain an “Indian” institution which 
incorporated the country’s local and historical circumstances. Just as Ellenborough’s Somnath 
Proclamation sought to flatter India’s princes with history and “local” verse, Lytton’s Imperial 
Assemblage’s imaginative portrayal of continuity from Mughal to British imperialism was a 
conservative attempt to secure India’s representation in the Empire. This allowed the Indian 
states to take advantage of these efforts of conciliation, and make the British Empire an 
institution which protected and strengthened local autonomy. Challenging the philosophical 
instincts of British liberal empire to politically enforce universally applicable, culturally western 
concepts and institutions, conservative imperialism ascribed the moral and practical necessity of 
local collaboration. This cemented a political and ideological relationship between the British 
paramount power, India’s princes, and cultural minorities which attempted to forestall the spread 
of liberal national and representative institutions in India later in the nineteenth century.   
 
 
 
 
 179 
 
Chapter 6: The Kathiawar States and Conservative Empire. 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how the Indian states of the Kathiawar region in Western India 
contributed to a conservative governing framework of British imperialism in the late nineteenth 
century. Their rulers collaborated with a British conservative political and ideological emphasis 
on locality and prescription to strengthen local sovereignty and authority under Britain’s raj. This 
group of mostly ethnic Rajput states on the Kathiawar (Saurashtra) peninsula, which is north of 
Mumbai (Bombay) and straddles the Gulf of Khambhat and the Arabian Sea, came under British 
informal influence with the Walker Settlement in 1808. This ended decades of conflict, froze 
state borders, and shifted the region’s political suzerainty from the Maratha Confederacy, later 
represented in the Gaekwad of Baroda, to the East India Company.137 In 1822, Britain’s informal 
influenced was enhanced with the establishment of the Kathiawar Political Agency under the 
Bombay Presidency.138 This informal and ambiguous political status sustained disagreement 
concerning sovereignty and authority between the Kathiawar States and the British paramount 
power. 
This analysis shows that following the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation, the Kathiawar States 
appropriated Mayo’s and Lytton’s conservative policies and sentiments on decentralization and 
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aristocratic leadership. It focuses on how the States’ simultaneously resisted and contributed to 
the British Empire through their participation in the Karbharis’ States Meeting and Rajkumar 
College. This apparent contradiction between the States’ resisting and contributing to British 
imperialism reflected the underlying governing reality of Britain's Indian Empire. From the 
outset, British rule was restrained by limited financial and administrative resources. This 
necessitated an imperial policy of securing acquiescence from local political and social groups to 
maintain empire. For British conservatives, liberal imperialism’s attempted mid-nineteenth 
century political centralization and spread of western civilization had shown itself incompatible 
to this policy by causing the Indian Revolt. The Queen’s Proclamation, as well as Mayo’s and 
Lytton’s advocacy for the re-establishment of locality and prescription along aristocratic 
principles, represented a conservative governing framework which understood the physical and 
material limitations of Britain’s authority in India. For Kathiawar’s states, British aristocratic 
bias and habitual reliance on their financial resources for politically consolidating empire 
provided an opportunity and means to strengthen local autonomy and authority. 
The Karbharis’ States Meeting and Rajkumar College represented the Kathiawar States’ 
collective contribution, management, and participation in imperial governance and consolidation 
in the late nineteenth century. These institutions were a response to a series of judicial, criminal, 
and administrative jurisdictional disputes which queried Kathiawar’s political position within the 
Empire in the 1860s and 1870s. Besides disagreement, these institutions represented growing 
cooperation between Kathiawar and Britain in terms of joint British and Indian administration 
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over a minor ruler, public works development, and education. The Karbharis’ States Meeting, 
established in 1869, was a deliberative body of Kathiawar’s State Karbharis (Diwans or First 
Ministers) chaired by the Political Agent. Its conception and raison d’etre represented the States’ 
collective attempt to protect local authority through the finance and management of imperial 
initiatives and institutions. With the Kathiawar States’ financial support, Rajkumar College, 
opened in 1870, was an education and training centre for the region’s future chiefs and ruling 
families. As the British, including Mayo, Lytton, and Lord Curzon, former Conservative MP 
(1886-1898) and Viceroy (1899-1905), envisioned and celebrated the College as an adapted 
English Public School for creating a new aristocratic class, Indian critics saw it as a centre for 
poor education and cultural indoctrination. Nonetheless, Rajkumar and the proliferation of 
princely education across India represented a British and Indian collaboration to shape a new 
imperial ruling class.  
Debating Sovereignty and Demanding Autonomy  
In the post-Revolt period, the Kathiawar States and the British peacefully clashed and 
resolved issues concerning state sovereignty and authority in the region. In the 1860s, the States 
successfully challenged the Indian government’s right to impose an income tax on the grounds 
that they fell outside the borders of formal British jurisdiction. In 1866, the Thakore of 
Bhavnagar, Jaswantsinhji (1854-1870), negotiated, with the efforts of Sir Merwanji N. 
Bhownaggree, father to M.M. Bhownaggree, the repossession of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over 116 villages. This settlement was contrary to previous official opinion which argued, 
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according to an 1859 enquiry on Bhavnagar's claims, that Jaswantsinhji was just a hereditary 
lease holder and not a sovereign ruler.139  
This ruling reflected Kathiawar’s active response to British interference, and official 
disagreement concerning the region’s sovereignty and the appropriateness of intervention. These 
considerations were apparent in the response to Maj. Keatinge’s, Kathiawar Political Agent from 
1863 to 1867, comprehensive set of reforms for Kathiawar. These reforms included the 
establishment of new administrative divisions, the introduction of a standardized currency, a new 
code of laws, British judicial intervention for the Garasias, an ethnic tribal group, and a new state 
classification. The latter allowed 1-4 Class states to have varying internal control over judicial 
and financial administration. In the First Class State of Bhavnagar, whose classification allowed 
for full internal jurisdiction, Jaswantsinhji checked Keatinge’s reforms which imposed British 
governing authority over his territory. Although receptive to the Political Agent’s efforts to 
standardize law and monetary practice, he opposed the adoption of the British Indian Civil and 
Criminal Codes of Procedure in Bhavnagar. Alternatively, he codified the country’s customary 
laws along the framework proposed by Mountstuart Elphinstone while Governor of Bombay in 
1827.140 
In London, the India Office repeatedly questioned the depth and tone of Keatinge’s 
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reforms. In 1864, Charles Wood, Liberal Secretary of State for India (1859-1866), argued to 
Viceroy John Lawrence (1864-1869) that these measures should have been considered in detail 
by the Imperial Government, and that the loyalty and dignity of Kathiawar’s chiefs necessitated 
discretion when considering reform.141 To the Government of Bombay, Wood regretted 
Keatinge’s “premature action” and contended that British involvement in Kathiawar should be 
guided by “past promises and pledges to the Chiefs.” Moreover, he was uncertain that the chiefs 
agreed to the reforms.142 The subsequent Conservative administration in London was more 
disparaging of Keatinge’s reforms. Writing to the Indian government, Viscount Cranborne, 
Secretary of State for India (1866-1867) and later the Earl of Salisbury, censured the Political 
Agent for his new code of laws and continued “minute interference” in Kathiawar. In stating that 
the British were dealing with chiefs “remarkably tenacious of their rights and dignities, and by 
no means keenly alive to the advantages of English Civilization,” he argued that the latter’s 
alarm to the reforms was “very natural.” Furthermore, Cranborne lamented that the Political 
Agent “appears to have taken pleasure in ostentatiously forcing upon them a European system of 
administration.”143 
Col W.W. Anderson’s, Kathiawar Political Agent from 1867 to 1874, continued 
implementation of political and administrative reforms faced local resistance from the region’s 
larger states. They successfully rebuffed Anderson’s attempt to appoint a Judicial Agent to hear 
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Garasias complaints against state rulers, and to create a new Kathiawar police force paid for by 
the States. The 1884 Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency states that Anderson’s establishment of 
the Sabha Court (Courts of the States), which intervened on behalf of the Garasias “who failed to 
get justice from the chiefs,” represented a victory, as it made the chiefs relinquish internal 
jurisdiction over their vassals to British supervision.144 However, Harilal Savailal, biographer of 
Samaldas Parmananddas, Diwan of Bhavnagar (1879-1884), contends that the First Class States 
successfully rebuffed the Political Agent by appealing and receiving a compromise from the 
Bombay Government. After the Kathiawar Chiefs’ personal appeal and consultation with 
Seymour Fitzgerald, Governor of Bombay (1867-1872), the Judicial Agent scheme was replaced 
with the Sabha Court which had the power to hear grievances and fix obligations.145 Also known 
as the Rajasthanik Court, it consisted of the Political Agent, as President, and six government 
appointed members from a list recommended by the States. 146 Savailal argues that the Court, 
which lasted over 25 years, and the precedent of appealing directly to Bombay’s Governor above 
the Political Agent, was seen a significant victory by the States.147 
Again, Anderson’s scheme to create a re-vamped Kathiawar police force to replace the 
established Federal Seebundy (police corps) was vigorously and successfully opposed by the 
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States.148 The former’s contention that this force was needed to respond to an elevated level of 
violence and lawlessness failed to convince local rulers to fund its creation. The Agent’s views 
were collaborated by official reports. The Superintendent of the Federal Seebundy in the 
Southern Division of Kathiawar expressed that the current force was inefficient due to low 
morale. He argued that the contingent, manned by foreigners and desis (local people), received 
no tenure or pensions and therefore suffered from low character and a high turnover rate.149 In 
1873, the Kathiawar Political Agency contended that the States were apathetic in their response 
to elevating levels of violence, which included thirty-nine villages being attacked, dozens killed 
or wounded, and over Rs92000 in stolen property.150 In response to Anderson, the States 
communicated their strong apprehension concerning the necessity of further expense on policing, 
and the possibility of losing internal jurisdiction over criminal proceedings. In discussions which 
revolved around the dispute over the Sabha Court, the States again appealed directly to 
Fitzgerald. A letter from the Princes of Nawanagar, Bhavnagar, and Junagadh questioned 
Anderson’s rationale for a new police force, and hoped that the Governor would maintain an 
earlier promise that no decision would be made without further consultation with them. 
Specifically, they argued that the measure was “unnecessary, needlessly expensive, and seeking 
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to introduce quite an anomalous authority, ill calculated to serve the end it may have in view.”151 
They responded with a counter proposal which maintained their sovereignty and jurisdiction. It 
suggested that local taluqdars should be responsible for law enforcement on their own land, be 
given allowance to follow, apprehend, and kill resisting criminals across jurisdictional 
boundaries, and seek state assistance if needed.152 Moreover, they expressed their continued 
confusion over the necessity for a new police force. They argued that the country was more 
peaceful, and that many states had already organized disciplined forces at enormous expense. 
Lastly, they recalled an 1861 Bombay government resolution authorizing native state 
responsibility for capturing criminals and promising British non-interference.153 
In a reply to Charles Gonne, the Government of Bombay’s Political Secretary (1864-
1884), Anderson argued that he kept the States’ Karbhari fully informed of his intentions, and 
that their proposed reforms were an act of procrastination. Additionally, he remarked that the 
Bombay government’s acceptance of delay would only “encourage an unseemly and unnecessary 
contest between the political agent and the chiefs under his control.”154 Whether delay or the 
legitimate expression of grievance towards the Agent, Kathiawar’s rulers continued to 
communicated their concerns to the Bombay government. In 1872, the Rana of Porbandar 
complained about Anderson’s refusal to return 100 hundred men loaned to the Federal Seebundy 
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to repress Wagheer (a caste group in Kathiawar) criminals in 1866.155 In 1874, the Nawab of 
Junagadh, in correspondence with Philip Edmund Wodehouse, Governor of Bombay (1872-
1877), labelled Anderson’s police proposal “unwise, unnecessary and uncalled for,” and that the 
Wagheers were forced into a criminal element by the latter’s policies.156 The States’ ability to 
resist and supersede the Political Agent’s authority on the Sabha Court and a new police force by 
exacting compromise from the Bombay government, revealed British administrative and 
financial limitations in exercising paramount control. Into the 1870s, the States collectively took 
advantage of these limitations to maintain their local autonomy and authority by utilizing British 
initiatives towards decentralization and princely education and leadership. 
Joint Minority Administrations   
Amid this increasing disagreement, the 1860s and 1870s saw the British and the Kathiawar 
States undertake constructive schemes of joint minority administrations. Supported and 
expanded under Mayo, this framework facilitated joint British and Indian governing 
administration and supervision over minority age rulers. This occurred in the State of Rajkot in 
1867, the State of Gondal in 1869, and Bhavnagar in 1870. In the latter, E.H. Percival, later J.W. 
Watson, and Gaorishankar Udayashankar’s, the State’s Diwan, joint administration, during 
Takhtsingji’s (1870-1896) minority between 1870 and 1877, demonstrated successful British and 
Kathiawar state cooperation. This included major reforms to the revenue system, reduced tariffs 
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on exported and imported goods, construction of bridges and canals, planting trees, and the 
opening of a high school in Bhavnagar.157 According to David Wedderburn (1835-1882), Liberal 
MP, world traveller, and brother-in-law to Percival, in his article titled “Protected Princes in 
India” (1878) for The Nineteenth Century, the combination of Indian and British influence made 
Bhavnagar’s joint administration the most successful minority government in India. Although 
noting that the European administrator had overriding authority in a disagreement with the 
“Native” member, he maintained that this had never occurred in six years as “a happy blending 
of European and native ideas was accomplished.” To Wedderburn, this blending effected a 
particular advantage in regards to enacting appropriate reform in Kathiawar: “The Native 
minister, thoroughly understanding his own country, kept his European colleague clear of the 
besetting error of forcing on changes beneficial in themselves, but premature.”158 
Udayashankar’s influence and Percival’s consideration for Bhavnagar’s interests was 
demonstrated over the Sabha Court and Kathiawar police force. In his note to Gonne, Anderson 
noted his frustration and surprise that Percival was “participating” in the States’ “procrastination” 
over the issues.159 The success of Bhavnagar’s joint administration raised the profile of the 
States’ Karbharis, and informed the States’ association and contribution to the establishment of 
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Rajkumar College. 
Karbharis States’ Meeting 
In 1869, Anderson proposed a constitution for Kathiawar centred upon the creation of a 
“Legislative Council of Kattywar”. In a draft copy to Gonne, Article One stated that the 
Council’s political and administrative purpose was “To legislate rules and regulations for the 
better administration of civil as well as criminal justice in the province and for the purpose of 
securing the rights and privileges of the several states.”160 With the Political Agent as President 
and twenty-two state representatives, the Council would be restricted to criminal and civil 
administration, and prohibited from interfering with the internal affairs of an individual state. 
Moreover, the President could veto any legislation which was deemed contrary to the spirit of 
British Indian legislation, Imperial government policy, or contrary to the Walker Settlement. 161 
Anderson’s proposed constitution met overt opposition from the Bombay government and the 
First Class States of Kathiawar. Bombay argued that although one day a need would arise for 
such a council, “There are other antecedent reforms necessary” before the establishment of such 
an institution.162 On the other hand, the Kathiawar Chiefs contended that their local autonomy 
and legislative power would be curtailed by the council. A year later, they responded by 
establishing their own representative institution for joint deliberation and uniform action called 
the Karbharis’ States Meeting. 
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Established in 1870, the Karbharis’ States Meeting was a representative body of Class 1-4 
Karbhari that convened annually and maintained a series of committees which operated year 
round. According to its self-produced 1947 manual detailing its history and organization, the 
Karbharis’ two central objectives were to deliberate as well as take joint and uniform action in 
response to Agency proposals which may affect all states, and maintain, manage, and operate all 
the States’ Central Institutions. To that end, it established a Cadre Committee, which received 
reports from the Central institutions, a Re-appropriation Committee, which transferred available 
funds to earmarked budget items, a Falo Committee, which collected money to fund the budget, 
an Audit Committee, and a Standing Committee which administered correspondence and fixed 
the agenda for the Annual Meeting. The latter ensured that the Karbharis could negotiate and 
reach a unanimous agreement at the Annual Meeting.163 
To the Bombay Times of India, the Karbharis’ States Meeting was a significant and 
colourful event despite the internal secrecy of its proceedings. In their 1886 report of the 
Meeting, they commended the institution as representing a “modified form of local self-
government,” and praised its contribution to the civil hospital as well as Garasias and female 
education. This approval was tempered with the comment that its praiseworthy activities relied 
greatly upon the Political Agent’s “tact and temper” as the Meeting’s President.164 In addition, 
the Times of India usually remarked on the outside carnival atmosphere surrounding the event. 
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As the 1886 report remarked that the Meeting’s “usual liveliness” was moderated by the illness 
of the Governor’s wife, an 1888 editorial contrasted the jovial sport and entertainment 
surrounding the event with the Meeting’s internal secrecy.165 
The Karbharis represented an important mechanism for the Kathiawar States to assert 
their local autonomy and authority through financing and managing British inspired institutions 
and reforms. Primarily, this represented the Karbharis’ financial contribution, management, and 
supervision of the General Fund and Central Institutions. Established in 1879, the General Fund 
spawned from an earlier gift of Rs35000 by Kathiawar’s major states and Rs100000 by the State 
of Bhavnagar in a demonstration of loyalty upon the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh in 1871. In 
the 1870s, these states each made significant Rs10000 contributions to a permanent road fund 
which had constructed 559 miles of road by 1878.166 The General Fund consolidated state efforts 
towards financing public works and the Central Institutions. It called for an Rs121000 annual 
contribution to be supplied by Class 1-4 States, with additional funds available only after 
negotiations between the Political Agent and the Karbharis.167 Additionally, the States’ agreement 
with the Agency prescribed that in exchange for this annual contribution, District Officers could 
no longer levy money for projects. Moreover, the Fund’s annual budget had to be jointly 
sanctioned by the Karbharis and the Political Agent.168 
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As stated in the Karbharis manual, the Central Institutions were “items of 
contribution…paid for and maintained by the States of Kathiawar for the common benefit of the 
States and the Agency.”169 The Karbharis maintained complete financial management as well as 
decision over appointments regarding these institutions. With regards to education, the major 
items of funding were the Hunter’s Training College, Barton Female Training College, and 
Rajkumar College. The States’ monetary contribution to Hunter, which increased yearly from 
Rs1000 in 1879 to Rs9200 in 1886, and Barton, which they allotted Rs36300 through a special 
subscription with an additional Rs3960 yearly in grants and scholarships, ensured their 
supervision and control over these institutions.170 The construction and maintenance of Rajkumar 
College was the most significant expenditure under the Karbharis’ supervision. Until the 
establishment of an Indian government grant in 1904, the Kathiawar States were primarily 
responsible for funding the College. In 1868, Kathiawar’s states subscribed Rs30000 out of the 
Rs50000 needed, the remaining Rs20000 coming from the Bombay government’s Infanticide 
Fund, for the construction of the original buildings. In 1874 and 1878, the minor Thakore of 
Bhavnagar, under joint administration, donated Rs70000 to establish a permanent Endowment 
Fund for the College. In August 1897, a Karbharis resolution established that the States would 
contribute yearly the amount equal to the Fund’s interest or deficit so that the Fund’s principal 
could grow.171 
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The Kathiawar States’ financial contribution and supervision of Hunter, Barton, and 
Rajkumar Colleges allowed their Karbhari to prevent unwanted British interference over 
budgetary issues and staff appointments. In 1899, the Karbharis affirmed their control over staff 
appointments at Hunter by overriding the decision of the Principal. This led to the Bombay 
government’s confirmation that all candidates forwarded to the Political Agent for approval must 
be chosen by the States’ representatives.172 With regards to Rajkumar, the Karbharis defended its 
budgetary authority against the School’s College Council which was strongly influenced by its 
President, the Political Agent, and other European members including the Principal and the 
Government’s Director of Education. The Karbharis rejected proposals in 1885, 1908, and 1910 
to surrender their budgetary authority to the College Council.173 In 1911, the Karbharis defended 
their trusteeship over the Endowment Fund after a challenge from the School’s Principal. 
Moreover, the Principal’s request that the College Council should have the right to spend beyond 
the Karbharis’ prescribed budget was refused by the States. 174 In 1923, they successfully 
rebuffed the Political Agent’s attempt to supersede their budgetary authority over Rajkumar.175 
Maintaining financial control over the Central Institutions remained paramount for the Kathiawar 
States. In 1880, they refused an offer of a state grant for Rajkumar from the Bombay 
Government who were concerned over the School’s repeated deficits.176 Although adamant to 
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maintain their prescribed authority, the Karbharis were willing to provide additional money and 
allow outside financial support for the improvement of the College under the right conditions. At 
the request of the College Committee in 1892, they approved additional funds to appoint a Law 
Lectureship for the purpose of giving students an education on basic legal principals.177 In 1904, 
they accepted Viceroy Lord Curzon’s (1899-1905) proposal to standardize and centralize funding 
for Rajkumar and a system of princely education in India. This meant relinquishing their control 
over the appointment of a European Vice-Principal in exchange for a grant to the College from 
the Indian Government.178 The Karbharis’ Meeting agenda papers for 1933 demonstrates its 
supervisory function over the Central Institutions and public works in Kathiawar. Beyond a 
series of accounting tables listing the minute budget elements of Hunter, Barton, and Rajkumar 
Colleges, there is included a series of explanatory notes requesting additional funds from the 
Karbharis. With an ending statement from the Political Agency concerning the merit of the 
request and a recommendation on its acceptance, in 1933 Barton College requested a recurrent 
Rs100 travel grant, two new harmoniums worth Rs150, and Rs50 for a new globe. 179   
The Karbharis represented the Kathiawar States’ collective response to the political 
agent’s administrative interference over the region’s judicial, criminal, and educational 
initiatives. In a 1900 speech to the princes and chiefs of Kathiawar, Curzon praised their 
                                                 
177 Ibid, 294. 
178 Ibid, 284. 
179 Agenda Papers for the Karbharis’ Meeting: to be held on the 10th March (Morvi: Maharaja of Morvi, 1933), 20-
21. 
 195 
 
representative body as resembling a “species of local diet or parliament.” Moreover, he 
commended the States’ for their beneficial mutual cooperation: “The Chiefs of this Province 
reminded me in fact of a soft medieval guild constituted for the purposes of co-operation in 
matters where the interests of all coincide, or can be best be advanced by common actions.”180 
The States’ ability to supersede the political agent and gain recognition from Bombay, Calcutta, 
and London represented their contribution and management of   British inspired public works 
education. The Kathiawar States appropriated these reforms not only to strengthen local 
autonomy and authority, but also develop a voice to influence the constitutional makeup of 
British India into the twentieth century, 
Rajkumar College 
The Rajkumar College represented a joint British and Kathiawar contribution to 
developing a new imperial ruling class in India. As the British saw the institution as the means to 
mould a Victorian valued, aristocratic class in India, Kathiawar’s chiefs viewed their financial 
contribution and physical enrollment as validating an elevated political status within the British 
Empire. Rajkumar’s facilitation of these twin objectives made it an imperial institution. 
Conceptually, Rajkumar College was founded and operated upon British racial prejudice 
informed by Victorian and aristocratic social values. Initially promoted by Keatinge, Rajkumar, 
located centrally at Rajkot in Kathiawar, represented an expansion of princely education as 
communicated by Mayo’s 1870 speech in Ajmere. Following Rajkumar, Mayo College (1875) in 
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Rajputana, Daly College (1882) in Indore, and Aitchison College (1886) in Lahore served as the 
major centres for princely education in the late nineteenth century. 
In an attempt to counter what they believed to be the degrading social influence of a 
ruling court’s child rearing practices, the British employed Eton and the English Public School 
model to disseminate aristocratic and Victorian values for training young chiefs and their 
families as future governors. Removed from their courts, either as State Wards or upon 
agreement of the child’s family, and placed in these colleges which resembled highly decorative 
boarding schools, Kathiawar and Indian ruling families were exposed to an academic and 
physical curriculum which attempted to instill the values of independence, manliness, chivalry, 
and loyalty. Although Rajkumar was officially inspired and intellectually defined by British 
initiatives, the role of Indian financial contribution, supervision, and student participation made 
this an imperial institution. It represented a space in which not only the Kathiawar ruling elite 
could contribute and participate in the British Empire, but also gain knowledge and social 
legitimacy for strengthening state autonomy and authority. 
For the British, the establishment of schools for princely education reflected their 
concerns over the lack of proper education and negative character influences emanating from 
ruling courts across India. In a response to the Government of Bombay’s circular seeking opinion 
on education for chiefs, Keatinge communicated the necessity of such an endeavour to mitigate 
domestic influences: 
 
No person acquainted only with our own Province, or with the educated Natives of 
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our Presidency, can conceive the degraded atmosphere in which lads are brought up, 
who are destined to rule over several hundred villages, to enjoy incomes amounting 
to lacs of rupees, and to possess powers of life and death over their own subjects. 
 
Keatinge elaborated that in the smaller states youths were negatively affected by   “the contact 
with slaves, opium-eaters, and drunkards…”181 At Rajkumar College’s opening ceremony in 
December 1870, Anderson and Governor Fitzgerald defined the institution’s role as intellectually 
and physically fitting Kathiawar’s ruling class with the moral strength of manly character. 
Anderson stated that at Rajkumar, the region’s youths would be exposed to “a manly education 
and physical training in order to make them strong and healthy and intelligent governors and 
administrators of the people of their ancestral dominions.”182 After, Fitzgerald praised 
Anderson’s emphasis on the physical as well as mental education at the College. In associating 
physical assertion with genteel values, he argued that the pupils should “take pleasure in feats of 
strength and activity, to ride well, to shoot well, to have the taste for manly pursuits which as 
English country gentlemen seldom fails to obtain at a public school.”183 Speaking at the 
College’s Tenth Prize Day Ceremony to assembled pupils, alumni, staff, and officials in 1880, 
James Fergusson, Governor of Bombay (1880-1885), expressed that the pupils’ study and 
exercise were suited for purposes beyond developing intelligence and strengthening 
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“constituencies.” In determining that the College served to build character, he contended that it 
would fit them to “lead manly lives, to rise above indulgence in sensual ease, and to practice 
virtue in [their] future spheres.”184 At the Twelfth Prize Day Ceremony in January 1883, Mr. 
Selby, the acting Principal of Rajkumar, elaborated on the College’s political and social influence 
upon its graduates. He argued that although at first their education in English ideas had only 
facilitated contact with English opinion and society, later the pupils’ shared experience and 
education produced a community of interest which was novel in Kathiawar: 
They feel the benefit of their education in their own enlarged capacities and extended 
influence. In this way there is, I believe, growing up a corporate feeling which is of 
great value from an educational point of view. It acts in their way when men or boy 
begin to feel that they are no longer isolated units, but that they are bound together 
by membership of one body and at one a standard of conduct in created to which 
every member of the body must conform.185 
 
Beyond Kathiawar, the attempt to create an aristocratic class in India with British values, 
through the establishment of princely colleges modelled after the English Public School, became 
a political objective of the British Raj into the twentieth century. In 1902, Curzon headed a 
conference at Calcutta dedicated to consolidating and improving a system of princely education. 
Its goals were to inquire into princely college operation, and propose means to increase Indian 
state participation. Opening the conference, Curzon speculated upon the failings of the current 
system and Indian state objections towards participation. He proposed solutions which 
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emphasised the applicability of the English Public School model to instructing India’s 
aristocratic class. Similar to wider British rationale for establishing princely colleges, Curzon 
considered it an opportunity for India’s ruling elite to disassociate themselves from “the hot-
house atmosphere of indulgence and adulation in which bygone times too many of the Native 
Aristocracy have been brought up.” Similar to Mayo’s contention that British guidance in 
developing princely instruction strengthened the legitimacy of ancient rulers, he argued that this 
education would make “their sons and relatives better and more useful men; and not to stunt their 
liberties, but to invigorate their freedom.”186 For Curzon, India’s ruling class’ consistent 
opposition and non-involvement with British guided education represented the deeply 
conservative nature of Indian society. He submitted that in trying to model the colleges after the 
English public school, which represented a combination of British aristocratic and democratic 
principles, they were seen as an affront to India’s prescribed race and class distinctions.187 
Curzon proposed that to induce more chiefs to commit their sons and family to these institutions, 
they should remain distinctive from the broader system of English higher education in India. 
Therefore, the princely colleges must be “seminaries for the aristocratic classes” in which 
education had a businesslike and practical focus and “…constituted not to prepare for 
examination, but to prepare for life.” Lastly, Curzon purposed an appropriate standard 
curriculum. He submitted that the lesser chiefs and jagirdars or zamindars should be taught 
                                                 
186 Speech of Curzon, 27 Jan. 1902, in George Nathaniel Curzon, Lord Curzon in India: being a selection from his 
speeches as Viceroy & Governor General of India, 1895-1905 (London: Macmillan and Co, 1906), 258. 
187 Speech of Curzon, 27 Jan. 1902, in Curzon, Lord Curzon in India, 251. 
 200 
 
cultivation and administrative skills, and that prominent rulers should receive “all-round 
education” in political science, history, geography, mathematics, and political economy.188 Most 
of Curzon’s proposals informed the development of a common curriculum and Diploma Program 
in a second conference held at Ajmere in 1904. Beyond the established subjects of History, 
English and Indian, and Geography, the Diploma required courses in law, political economy, and 
land revenue. In addition, the 1904 reforms included the establishment of imperial grants for the 
colleges to lower the costs of tuition and hire European staff. Lastly, it made college instructors 
Indian Civil Servants and facilitated their transfer between institutions.189 
 Although Rajkumar’s conception and curriculum were defined by British initiative and 
values, the Kathiawar States’ substantial contribution to its operation and enrolment created a 
new space for personal and state relationships among the region’s future rulers. As the Bombay 
Government’s Director of Public Instruction determined the curriculum and the Principal 
controlled the School’s daily operation, the States participated on its governing bodies. These 
were the College Committee, later the College Council, and the Board of Visitors. The College 
Committee, established by an 1871 Karbharis Resolution, was body of twelve members entrusted 
with the school’s general management. It consisted of six European officials, including the 
Political Agent and Director of Public Instruction, and six Indian members chosen by the States. 
In 1889, four extra members from the States were added to the Committee.190 Three years later, 
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the Bombay government reformed the Committee in an attempt to increase Indian participation 
and enrollment in the College. Now known as the College Council, it settled at fifteen members 
plus the President in which twelve members were elected from the Board of Visitors. The latter 
body consisted of every prince, chief, and administrator who made a substantial financial 
donation and enrolled their son or ward, all former pupils, and those who were once an 
Education Commissioner, Judicial Officer, or Political Agent. The vote remained with the 
Chiefs.191 
The College had an enrollment of twelve pupils in its augural years, among them 
important Court Wards including the Thakores of Bhavnagar, Morvi, Rajkot, and the heir-
apparent of Wadhwan. In this period, Rajkumar and other princely colleges relied on the 
enrollment of Court Wards under the supervision of a Political Agency or provincial government. 
In two years, the number of pupils increased to twenty-two. J.B. Pelie, Acting Political Agent in 
1873 and Political Agent 1874-1878, submitted that the pupils were not wanting in their studies 
and were “equally happy and full of spirit at cavalry drill, in the gymnasium, and at a match of 
cricket or foot-ball.”192 In 1878, enrollment increased to thirty-five students, although a 
significant number were still Wards. In this year, the Kathiawar Agency reported on the students’ 
excellent conduct and the rising confidence of the local chiefs in sending their sons to 
Rajkumar.193 As per the intentions of British officials and Charles McNaughton (1870-1894), the 
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School’s first Principal (1870-1894), the pupils received a combination of academic and physical 
instruction during their time in Rajkot. Usually enrolled between the age of twelve and nineteen, 
the pupils were placed in a class system tied to age and skill attainment. Until 1904 and the 
introduction of the Diploma Course, there was no degree requirement for students. They simply 
left the School at their parents’ request or upon the completion of their minority. 
At the First Prize-Speech Day Ceremony, the pupils performed readings of English and 
Gujarati works. These included the Thakore of Limbdi’s rendition of Matthew Arnold’s “Sohrab 
and Rustum” (1853), Harisinhji of Bhavnagar’s performance of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s 
“Clive” (1840), and the Thakore of Morvi’s recital of Mansukram’s “The Duty of Man.”194 These 
readings represented the importance that history and biography featured in the College’s early 
curriculum. A report from the Bombay Education Department on the College’s operation argued 
that these subjects were producing positives effect on the young princes.195 A report by Mr. M. 
Macmillian, future Principal and Professor of English Literature at Elphinstone College, 
questioned the appropriateness of the pupils’ additional labours on poetry and classic literature. 
Rather than learning how to read and recite Shakespeare’s Macbeth and Homer’s Iliad, he argued 
that the pupils should focus on the acquirement of written and conversational English for 
communication with high government officials.196 Pupils were routinely tested in reading, 
composition, grammar, dictation, and recitation. At the age of fourteen, the Thakore of Gondal, 
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Shree Bhagvat Sinhjee, was receiving English instruction in subjects including English and 
Gujarati literature, verse, history of England and India, astronomy, geometry, algebra, arithmetic 
and natural philosophy.197  A sample of Rajkumar’s Diploma examination in 1910 and Class One 
curriculum reveals a later significance on history and geography specifically relating to the 
British Empire. As the pupils read from Cyril Ransome’s History of England (1899) and Vincent 
Arthur Smith’s History of India (1906), in geography they learned and replicated maps of India 
and the British colonies.198 
Physical instruction was significant in Rajkumar’s daily routine and extra-curricular 
activity. This included military-styled drills, riding on horseback, gymnastics, athletics, and field 
sports. Although it is unclear whether Rajkumar’s physical instruction reflected British 
stereotypes concerning Rajput’s society martial nature, Kathiawar did possess a cultural and 
social tradition which emphasized militant characteristics and attributes. J.A. Mangan, in his 
study of the association between British imperialism and the Victorian game ethic, views India’s 
princely colleges as conduits in which Victorian imperialists attempted to reproduce 
characteristics of manliness and leadership among the country’s young ruling class.199 On the 
other hand, Tambs-Lyche’s study on Rajputs in Kathiawar and Malavika Kasturi’s analysis on 
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Rajput lineages in North India demonstrate how this ethnic and Hindu community maintained a 
social adherence to martial valour, skill, and loyalty which sustained a cultural definition of 
masculinity.200 In regards to Kathiawar, Tambs-Lyche sees that a local devotion to Rama (God-
King) informed kingship and vassalage ideals which promoted obedience to authority and a code 
of honor from the seventeenth century. Moreover, he argues that the requirement of martial 
valour and skill to obtain and hold territory, made the horse an important symbol for power and 
ceremony. The similarity between Victorian and Rajput ideals of masculine behaviour 
encouraged Kathiawar’s future ruling class to participate and excel in Rajkumar’s curriculum. 
According to British reports from Rajkumar, the Kathiawar pupils showed considerable 
horsemanship and were enthusiastic on the playing field.201       
As a former pupil, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan’s 1898 study of the College illustrates the 
institution’s daily physical and academic routine. At 6am they began drills, gymnastics, and 
exercises. Following their class time from 10am to 5pm with an hour’s lunch, the pupils engaged 
in further physical assertion by rotating through different sporting activities including cricket, 
racquets, football, and tennis until dinner at 8pm and bedtime at 10pm.202 The Principal and 
faculty measured pupils’ physical activity along with their academic achievement. Although 
academically gifted, Sinhjee of Gondal was criticized by Principal Mcnaughton for being “too 
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much inclined to be sedentary and physically inactive.”203  In addition to a resident drill master, 
from 1897 the College employed a Cricket Coach at a pay of Rs75 per month.204 The promotion 
of cricket and its appropriation by the pupils, past and present, made the sport a vehicle for inter-
Kathiawar competition and friendship. In 1876, Rajkumar College competed in its first match 
with the Kathiawar High School, with its side losing 77 to 46.205 Besides playing matches against 
Mayo and Daly Colleges, the Rajkumar side competed against teams organized by former pupils 
Jasvatsinhji of Limbdi and Kalubha of Wadhwan.206 In 1899, Rajkumar’s Principal, C.W. 
Weddington, established the “Old Boys Gathering,” a recurring event in which alumni interacted 
with current pupils in a series of physical activities.207 Like external political interference which 
motivated the establishment of the Karbharis’ States Meeting, the appropriation of cricket shows 
that a British-inspired educational and recreational curriculum facilitated common experiences 
and collective reactions from pupils at Rajkumar. 
Britons acquainted with Kathiawar were pleased with the class of Indian English Public 
School graduates at Rajkumar College. In 1873, Peile expressed to Gonne that the early class of 
pupils at Rajkumar were now demonstrating “a mental and physical activity, a cultivated lively 
and natural manner, and a capacity for school boy friendships and for mixing with English 
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society…”208 To the British and British Indian Press, the College had created a class of loyal, 
liberal, manly, and independent princes keen to be junior partners in the Empire. Blackwood’s 
Magazine, in a larger feature on Kathiawar in 1876, expressed admiration that at Rajkumar the 
region’s chiefs were “well-instructed, well-trained, well-looked after even during their 
amusements” which were “regulated so as to aid in the development of manly and social 
qualities.” Beyond creating a new type of chief quite unaccustomed in Kathiawar, they believed 
that practices at Rajkumar would, if applied to England, “effect a good deal of change in the 
rising nobility and gentry of England.”209 In 1879, the Times of India preferred education at 
Rajkumar to the previous practice of hiring resident English tutors in Kutch and Baroda. In 
reviewing the College’s character building, academic, and physical activities, they remarked that 
its education “is something more than mere knowledge of books…the young princes acquire 
some notions of chivalry, manliness, and practical experience of the ways of life.” Moreover, 
they argued that this instruction and the environment, which treated the pupils equally, resembled 
“the manner of our public schools at home.” They cautioned, however, that due to India’s class 
divisions “English equality cannot quite be expected in an Indian College.”210 Emphasizing 
Mayo’s desire to create an “Indian Eton” at Ajmere, the Times of India anticipated that the 
College’s graduates would play an important political and social role in British India. In 1884, 
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they contended that as Rajkumar’s pupils were learning “new ideas and responsibilities fitted to 
their position,” it could be imagined that just as “The Duke of Wellington is popularly reported to 
have said that the Battle of Waterloo was really won on the play-grounds of Eton. The Rajkot 
Eton is likely to have an influence quite as important upon the future history of Western 
India.”211 In 1886, the Times of India listed the accomplishments of recent graduates. It argued 
that “The Eton of Western India is now a very important political factor,” which represented an 
“increasing amount of confidence on the part of the native aristocracy.”212 Sir William Wilson 
Hunter’s 1892 study of the Bombay Presidency argued that Rajkumar College, and the general 
incorporation of English education had a significant influence on the latest generation of 
Kathiawar rulers. He especially credited Rajkumar’s influence for Takhatsinhji’s conduct and 
character. He proposed that this represented Takhatsinhji’s ability to rule independently from 
officials, and his proclivity to spend revenue “wisely and liberally” while remaining “thoroughly 
loyal to the British Power.”213 
Unlike their English counterparts, the Indian Press mostly criticized academic and 
cultural instruction at Rajkumar. Representative of growing nationalist sentiment, this press 
questioned the type and quality of administrative instruction as compared to the system of higher 
education. It also noted that British cultural indoctrination alienated Indian princes from the 
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indigenous population. The Native Opinion, published in the Times of India in 1877, questioned 
the Kathiawar princes’ desire to utilise the disseminated education, and criticized its impact on 
their relationship with the British. They recalled an incident in which the young Maharaja of 
Kolhapour stood at attention when the Assistant Political Agent entered the room, and 
communicated with the visiting Governor that he was told at Rajkumar to offer a standing salaam 
to every European he saw. They argued that this incident was “indicative of the fashion in which 
the mind of the Princes is being moulded and taught to regard as heaven-born every European 
they meet with in the street.”214 In 1887, the Mahratta submitted that the chiefs’ education at 
Rajkumar not only ill-prepared them for their sole responsibility of governing states, but also 
taught them morally questionable British practices. It argued that beyond a lack of knowledge 
and training in judicial and administrative work, the College taught them to “become fine 
gentlemen; they learn to appreciate manly sports such as cricket, racing or any other of the 
nature; they are well taught how to spend money like princes.”215 In 1888, the Indu Praskesh 
highlighted Rajkumar’s social and cultural indoctrination. It contended that although the training 
of princes was of “national importance,” the Government’s efforts to reform princely schools had 
not improved these institutions. In addition, they compared the schools’ graduates to the 
“completely Anglicized” Dulip Singh to show how English education was separating princes 
from their subjects.216 Two years later, the Praskesh again summed up the Anglicizing influence 
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emanating from Rajkumar and similar colleges: 
The education at present imparted to the Native Princes in the Rajkumar Colleges is 
not what it should be. It only makes them regular, neat, liberal-minded, jolly, 
appreciative…In fact, they thereby acquire qualities possessed by an English 
gentleman, along with some English vices which it would be better not to enumerate. 
But the education required to make a good administrator is, in the opinion of some 
men, kept out of reach.217 
 
Outside the press, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan maintained that Rajkumar needed various 
reforms to improve the educational and social experiences of its pupils. Beyond the introduction 
of higher educated and gentlemanly European and English instructors, the College should 
provide more instruction and examination on revenue and judicial subjects, as well as practical 
training in administration. Moreover, he argued that it should associate more closely with 
Kathiawar’s public school system, and accept enrollment from a larger section of wealthy 
families as this would facilitate beneficial contact among social groups.218 
It is apparent that Kathiawar’s princes and chiefs were mostly pleased with their 
instruction and experiences at Rajkumar College. Takhtsingji of Bhavnagar, one of the first 
pupils enrolled in 1870, donated Rs50000 to expand the College Hall.219 At its opening ceremony 
in 1879, Takhtsingji communicated his commitment to the Empire with a fondness for his 
experiences at Rajkumar 
These two buildings here in Rajkot, which we are opening to-day, are indeed the 
fulfillment of the natural wishes of my heard: It is natural that, as a Chief, I should 
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wish to celebrate the assumption of the title of Empress by that great Sovereign under 
whose sway our small Principalities enjoy the blessings of peace. It is natural, too, 
that I should wish to increase the capacity of the influence of a College in which I 
spent the early years of my youth, and of which I have very present and happy 
recollections, that’s to the care and kindness of my preceptor, Mr. Macnaghten, for 
whom I cannot but always have the greatest affection.220 
 
Upon taking their state thrones, Kathiawar’s princes and chiefs communicated a belief that 
Rajkumar’s instruction would benefit their personal rule and relationship with the British 
Empire. In 1882, the Maharajah of Edar expressed a hope that his education at Rajkumar and 
from private tutors “would show good results.”221 Sinhjee of Gondal, at his installation ceremony 
in 1884, expressed gratitude to the Bombay Government and Rajkumar College, especially Mr. 
Macnaghten, for their attention to his studies in India and England.222 In 1885, the Thakore of 
Wudhwan stated that “I owe much to the Rajkumar College and to Macnaghten personally, who 
has taken great interest in the progress of my studies.”223 
Although most pupils ended their education at Rajkumar, a few prominent students 
continued their studies in England and India. Some also received positions in the Indian 
government. For example, Sinhjee, following Rajkumar, studied Medicine at Edinburgh 
University in 1886, and received an honorary LL.D degree from Edinburgh in 1887.224 
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Harbhamji of Morvi, who earned an M.A and later became a Barrister of Law, and Jehangir 
Mian, Shakh Saheb of Mangrol, attained positions in the Indian Civil Service.225 The latter 
received an appointment as a Statutory Civilian, was posted in Ahmedabad and placed in charge 
of the Dholka Taluka.226 Jasvantshingji of Limbdi was the College’s first student appointed to the 
Bombay Legislative Council in 1884, a position held for two years.227 The conferences at 
Calcutta and Ajmere to standardize princely education reflected a continued wariness from 
Indian ruling families to sending their sons and heirs to Rajkumar and other colleges. The 
Maharaja of Kolhapur’s, Shri Shahu Chhatrapati, experiences and reflections of Rajkumar, 
between 1886 and 1889, provides a mixed account of the institution’s value in developing a 
princely class in India. A.B. Latthe’s memoir of Chhatrapati details how the young Maharaja 
enjoyed and excelled at Horse Riding and Shikar (big game hunting), and made a lifelong friend 
of Bhavsingji, Prince of Bhavnagar (1896-1919), as well as sporting and vacation partners with 
the Princes of Jumnagar and Dharangadra.228 Later in life, Latthe’s accounts Chhatrapati’s 
dissatisfaction with instruction at the chiefs’ colleges, and his refusal to send his sons to any of 
them. The Maharaja expressed his opinion concerning the colleges’ limitations in a note to his 
fellow princes before the Conference of Princes in 1916. In disputing the notion that India’s 
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princes refused to educate their sons due to carelessness or tradition, he argued that they were 
willing “to send them to colleges like the Deccan or the Elphinstone College or even to England 
and America. But they are not sent to our present Chiefs Colleges. This is because these Colleges 
are not properly equipped and manned.”229 
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Section Conclusion 
Rajkumar College and the Karbharis’ States Meeting provided spaces for the Kathiawar 
States to define their engagement and collaboration with the British Empire. In responding to the 
Queen’s Proclamation’s conservative emphasis on locality and prescription, which informed 
Mayo and Lytton’s efforts to support princely authority and leadership, the States strengthened 
their autonomy through contributing to imperial consolidation. The Karbharis’ General Fund and 
administration over the Central Institutions allowed the States to set the parameters of British 
intervention. Moreover, the States utilized their financial and participatory contribution in 
disseminating western infrastructure and education to strengthen state power and forge an 
external relationship with the Imperial government. For Kathiawar’s young princes and chiefs, 
Rajkumar College provided the means to legitimate personal rule through the adaption of 
European ideas and practices. Takhtsingji, Sinhjee, Chhatrapati, and an early generation of 
graduates pursued education and sport to forge new personal relationships and open conduits to 
collaborate equally and independently with Britain. Greater political decentralization and 
princely participation in English education informed future imperial engagement in the Imperial 
Cadet Corps and the Chamber of Princes (1920). Moreover, this sustained a conservative 
political opposition to Indian nationalism in the late nineteenth century. 
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Section III: A Conservative Challenge to Liberal Imperialism and Nationalism 
Introduction 
This section focuses on conservative imperialism’s reaction to heightened British and Indian 
nationalist sentiment in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. It is shown that 
British and Indian conservatives maintained an adherence to the principles of locality and 
prescription to interpret a politically divided and socially diverse Indian Empire. The following 
chapters examine Sir Roper Lethbridge’s (1840-1919) and Sir Mancherjee Merwanjee 
Bhownaggree’s (1851-1933) contribution to a conservative imperial framework for India. Both 
men applied conservative principles, defined in Britain and Western India, to develop positive 
alternatives to liberal imperialism and nationalism. While espousing Britain’s engagement with 
India’s national interests, they favored an imperial framework which determined a conception of 
an aggregately populated and geographically defined “Indian nation.” As a result, Lethbridge and 
Bhownaggree rejected metropolitan and liberal centralization as the guiding theme of imperialist 
and nationalist identity. They challenged metropolitan initiated liberal free trade, laissez-faire 
economics, and democracy as ignoring India’s diverse political, social, and material conditions. 
Instead, they favored the Imperial state’s political and financial support for the specific and 
diverse national interests of the Subcontinent. Moreover, they espoused an imperial identity 
based upon individuals’ and groups’ “vertical” relationships with the Crown, and denied the 
applicability of horizontal national associations in India.     
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Chapter seven examines Lethbridge’s conservative advocacy for British imperial 
conciliation and collaboration with India’s political and economic national interests before the 
First World War. It is argued that his Indian Civil Service career and Tariff Reform Movement 
association conditioned an attempt to include India within contemporary British conservative 
schemes to strengthen empire through political and economic federation. This chapter shows that 
Lethbridge contended that British constitution of princely state sovereignty and obligation, and 
conciliation of educated Indian aspirations for political participation and economic swadeshi 
(self-sufficiently) would create an inclusive imperial subjecthood and strengthen the Empire. 
Chapter eight explores how Bhownaggree’s Indian conservatism and conservative imperialism 
was influenced by employment in the Kathiawar State of Bhavnagar and relationship with 
Bombay’s Parsi community. This analysis shows that buoyed by Parsi and Muslim minority anti-
Congress sentiment, he promoted a Kathiawar and Bombay model of British-Indian cooperation 
to develop female and technical education for India’s mass population. It is argued that 
Bhownaggree maintained that the British Empire held a benevolent obligation to encourage the 
peoples of India’s individual, communal, and mass economic and social prosperity in India, 
South Africa, and throughout the British Empire. 
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Chapter 7: Sir Roper Lethbridge and Imperial Federation with India 
Introduction  
This chapter examines Sir Roper Lethbridge’s conservative advocacy for a nationally inclusive 
imperial framework till the First World War. With rhetoric that often evoked a partisan 
association to Disraeli and Lytton while decrying Ripon and the “radical party,” he, and 
likeminded conservatives such as Frederic Pincott, proposed that Britain should increase their 
collaboration with India’s princely and educated elites. To that end, he proposed expanded 
political and economic opportunity for India’s educated class, a “constituted union” between 
Princely and British India, and a fiscal system of imperial preference. 
Conservative Critic 
Returning to England in the early 1880s after state service in India, Lethbridge shared 
British conservative concerns regarding the growing association between English radicalism and 
Indian educated opinion and its threat to the stability of British rule in India. Lethbridge’s 
avoidance of racial arguments in support of British power, which were popular among 
conservative commentators, signified an ideological association with Disraeli and a conservative 
imperial tradition defined in 1858 and 1877. Nonetheless, Lethbridge and British conservatives 
felt that the Marquis of Ripon’s, Viceroy of India (1880-1884), application of British radical 
principles to accommodate Indian demands for political and economic reform was unsuitable and 
dangerous. Through associating Ripon with Gladstone’s Irish policy, they argued that repealing 
Lytton’s vernacular press restrictions, the Ilbert Bill (1883), Local Government Resolution 
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(1882), and the Bengal Tenancy Act (1885) instigated harmful race and class animosities which 
imperiled India’s peace and security.  
Lethbridge’s avoidance of metropolitan racial stereotypes in explaining Britain’s Indian 
Empire represented a dissociation with conservative journalism in the late nineteenth century. 
With Irish and Scottish home rule becoming contentious issues in British politics, conservative 
periodicals argued that India’s internal race, class, and gender divisions required British strength 
and force of character to keep peace and promote social development.  In April 1886, the 
Quarterly Review suggested that recent Indian demands for local self-government did not 
originate with the population. It argued that their inspiration lay with “the sentimentalists and 
philosophers…” of the English radical party who “tried their utmost to persuade the natives that 
what they want is ‘home rule’—that panacea for all the evils of modern life which is likely to 
entail so many new burdens and trials upon us.”1 In January 1888, the Quarterly Review 
emphasized the relationship between Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule support and Ripon’s precepts 
in India:  
It is a serious thing to find that the same theories, which have given us Fenianism and 
Parnellism to encounter, are being actively promulgated in India by Englishmen as 
well as by Hindoos. There can scarcely be a question that, if Mr. Gladstone had been 
permitted to carry out his scheme of disintegration in Ireland, the demand of the 
same kind in India must either have been granted, or we should had to resist by force 
of arms.2 
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 218 
 
The Scots Observer, later the National Observer in 1891, argued that Gladstone, Ripon, and 
British radicals were ideologically determined to break up the United Kingdom and the British 
Empire. In 1890, they claimed that if the Liberal Party returned to office, “they would speedily 
set about the work of disintegration in India and colonies which they have already begun in the 
United Kingdom.”3 In 1891, they warned of India’s dismay if Ripon returned to Simla, the 
summer residence of Anglo-India, amidst the resurgence of treason in Ireland.4  
The Observer and other conservative periodicals emphasized British racial superiority 
over India’s divided population to argue for continued despotic rule and limited self-government. 
In an article depicting the English national character, the Observer boasted of an Englishman’s 
forceful ability to face the terrifying complicity of ruling India: “he sets his foot on the Hindoo’s 
neck; and it is found not only that is the only possible way but also that it is the best of all for the 
hindoo…” In 1897, it argued that Britain ruled India by the sword and conquest, and that western 
styled self-governance was an impossibility as “No training or evolution can change a women 
into a man.”5 In 1885, the Saturday Review ridiculed Ripon’s returning address to the Leeds 
Liberal Club which stated that English education would lead to Indian admittance to high office. 
It reproached the former Viceroy and his friends for their “Association to Continental theories” 
and attempt “to construct and to govern nations on the strength of a skillfully concatenated series 
of abstract propositions.” Moreover, it suggested the childlike Bengalis “needed to learn the facts 
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of life”; that without Britain they would face extinction from the “fiercer and hardier peoples of 
the peninsula.”6 Moreover, the Saturday Review derided the Indian National Congress’s request 
for simultaneous examinations as the forerunner for their oligarchic and despotic rule. In 
suggesting that the educated Bengali wished to monopolize control of political and 
administrative state offices to control India, it argued that the martial races would not acquiesce 
to being ruled by a race they have repeatedly conquered.7 The above viewpoints represented a 
British conservative racially-focused anxiety about Indian nationalism and its threat to British 
power. While sharing the same broad concerns, Lethbridge accentuated a non-racial conception 
of imperial subjecthood predicated within the inclusion of distinctive national interests to the 
British Empire.   
Like Lethbridge, Frederic Pincott, published linguist, orientalist, and frequent columnist 
in conservative periodicals, sought to conciliate India’s national political and economic 
aspirations within a conservative framework of empire. In the National Review editorial pages of 
October 1891, Pincott lambasted the Conservative Party’s antagonistic attitude towards the 
moderate, and now political organized, intelligent classes of India. Stating that the Party had 
abandoned its eighteenth-century political reform roots, he proposed that it was losing an 
                                                 
6 Saturday Review of Politics, literature, science and art, vol. 59, 1527 (31 Jan. 1885), p. 139. 
7 Saturday Review, vol. 77, 1999 (17 Feb. 1894), p. 171. Heather Streets argues that in the late nineteenth century 
British viewed Northern ‘races’ such as Gurkhas, Sikhs, and other Punjabi groups as culturally suited for military 
service. Heather Streets. The Military, Race, and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004), 8-9. 
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opportunity to represent naturally conservative populations at home and in India. He argued that 
the Party’s disinterest or hostility towards redressing grievances, such as police oppression, 
manipulation of juries and municipalities, severe taxation, appropriation of India’s trade, 
disregard for public feeling with regards to the Age of Consent Act, and renewed 
“Dalhousianism” in Manipur, had caused agitation from all classes in India. As a result, he 
contended that “Indian Conservatism finds itself in alliance with English socialism…,” having to 
“agitate for the most elementary rights of humanity by the assistance of the open opponents of 
Conservatism.”8 His solution was to abandon British despotic rule, and allow for the election of 
“independent men” to the legislative councils.9 
In the National Review in 1889 and 1890, Pincott defended the Indian National Congress 
and the proposed Indian Councils Bill against British conservative “prejudice and anger.” He 
denied that Congressmen were acting in a seditious and ambitious manner, but were experienced 
British and Indian statesmen who embodied educated opinion across the country.10 In the 
subsequent article, Pincott contended that extending local election and legislative debate to India 
would install a system cherished in England’s past which was suited for the current state of 
India’s society. He stated that these moderate reforms simulated Tudor era parliaments which 
merely “…discussed, advised, objected, ratified, provided funds, demanded, but did not always 
                                                 
8 Frederic Pincott, “Discontent in India.” National Review, vol. 18, 104 (Oct. 1891), p. 275-277. 
9 Pincott. “Discontent in India,” p. 278. 
10 Frederic Pincott, “The Indian National Congress: The Other Side.” National Review, vol. 13, 76 (1889), p. 527, 
531. 
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obtain…” In both articles, Pincott suggested that Disraeli supported the incorporation of Native 
members to the Supreme Legislative Council in 1858. Therefore, Pincott proposed that 
Conservatives had a “special interest in the introduction of the representative and elective 
principle into India, because it is a right which Mr. Disraeli himself sought to confer on the 
country thirty years ago.”11 Though unclear whether Disraeli made this specific proposal, Pincott 
and Lethbridge utilized his past expressions of national sympathy for India with respect to the 
Indian Revolt, Queen’s Proclamation, and the Royal Titles Act to convince British conservatives 
and Indian nationalists that their interests could be conciliated within an imperial framework.  
Conservative India and Disraeli  
 Lethbridge’s official experience with conservative governance in India, and engagement 
with its educated and landed elites informed a Disraelian national perspective on empire as a 
British politician. In 1877, Lethbridge defended the Indian government’s interventionist frontier 
policy as opposed to the “Masterly Inactivity” doctrine under former Gladstone appointed 
administrations. He argued that Mayo’s initiation and Lytton’s continuation of a forward policy 
recognized that Britain’s lack of internal support and strategic position in India necessitated the 
appeasement or destruction of potentially hostile foreign powers in Central Asia to forestall 
possible Russian expansion.12 In 1878, a friendship with O.J. Burne, Mayo’s Private Secretary 
and then Lytton’s Secretary of the Political and Secret Department, secured Lethbridge the post 
                                                 
11 Frederic Pincott, “Home rule not wanted for India.” National Review, v. 15, 86 (May 1890), p 323. 
12 Roper Lethbridge, “Our Indian Frontier Policy: Past and Present.” Blackwood’s Edinburgh magazine, vol. 122, 
742, p. 220-226.  
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of India’s only Press Commissioner under the Vernacular Press Act (1878).13 In 1880, 
Lethbridge defended Lytton’s press policy as “remedial legislation” which addressed the “vast 
amount of absolutely irresponsible and reckless writing, and amongst the more disreputable 
papers, a system of extortion and black-mail…” He argued that this legislation which, through 
the Press Commissionership, provided official information was meant to assist the majority of 
vernacular press editors, who were “men of thought and education; earnest and true men, anxious 
to lead their fellow-countrymen aright in the path of enlightenment.”14  
Exiting the Indian Civil Service following the abolition of the Press Commissionership in 
1881, Lethbridge was a likely detractor of Ripon’s viceregal policy. Specifically, he criticized 
the Ilbert Bill, Bengal Tenancy Bill, and blamed higher education reforms for causing popular 
and official dissension against the Government.  With regards to the Ilbert Bill’s initial proposal 
to allow Indian judges to adjudicate and sentence Europeans outside the Presidency cities, 
Lethbridge alleged that Ripon and Courtenay Ilbert, legal adviser to the Viceroy’s council, were 
unnecessarily concentrated on issues of race and prejudice.15 Apart from challenging inherited 
British “rights and privileges”, which were “accepted with good will” by our “native friends and 
fellow-subjects,” he argued that Ripon’s capitulation from the controversial provision 
                                                 
13 Burne to Lethbridge, 30 May 1878, Mss Eur. B. 182A, fol. 54, Sir Roper Lethbridge Papers (hereafter LP), BL, 
AAS. 
14 Roper Lethbridge, “The Vernacular Press of India.” Contemporary Review, vol. 37 (Mar. 1880), p. 464-67. 
15 Roper Lethbridge, “The Government Surrender on the Ilbert Bill.” National Review, vol. 2, 10 (Dec. 1883), p. 
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legitimated an incendiary claim by the Bill’s Anglo-Indian critics of “native” unfitness. Lastly, 
he wondered to the National Review readers: “how long before other privileges are taken away 
by the next viceroy desirous of making a name for himself in the radical party.”16  
Also, in 1883 Lethbridge condemned Ripon and Ilbert’s Bengal land reforms. His criticism 
was informed by a long standing dispute over state, landlord, and tenant rights in Ireland. In a 
speech, later published, to the East India Association, he believed that the proposed legislation 
represented a revolutionary upheaval of the relationship between the state, zamindar, and ryot. 
He contended that the Bill, which gave proprietary right to the ryot to sell his tenancy and 
allowed the state to set a fair rent, stripped landlord privilege and right as bestowed by the 
Permanent Settlement. In addition, the ryot’s right to sell empowered a “new class of 
middlemen, consisting chiefly of money-lenders.”17 He reasoned that unlike the landlord’s state 
and tenant obligations, the Bill reduced the ryot to “day labourers” or “mere serfs” at the whims 
of those who were ‘utterly devoid of sympathy for the actual cultivators.”18 He concluded that 
although action was needed to appease popular hostility against the exploitative practices of 
Indigo planters, this process was hijacked by reformers looking to Ireland for inspiration:   
In the meantime a school reformers had come into power in India, whose eyes appear 
to been dazzled by the splendid achievements of slap-dash land-reform in Ireland. 
And thus it has come about, that what was to have been a tiny measure of redress has 
grown into a magnificent measure of confiscation.19 
                                                 
16 Lethbridge, “The Government Surrender on the Ilbert Bill,” pp. 577-78. 
17 Roper Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill: a paper read before the East India 
Association (London: East India Association, 1883), 4-9. 
18 Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill, 22. 
19 Lethbridge, The mischief threatened by the Bengal Tenancy Bill, 29. 
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Two years later, Lethbridge disparaged an article in the National Review which proposed that the 
Bengal Tenancy Bill was a conservative measure. He stated that he could understand “a Socialist 
or Radical approving of such a measure; for he goes back to the nature rights of man, or to the 
figments of the antiquary, to justify spoliation.”20 
A member of the Bengal Education Service for eight years including the Principal of 
Krishnagar College, Lethbridge defended English higher education and its graduates in India. 
Unlike the growing resentment and opposition to this instruction by fellow British conservatives, 
he believed that the state was obliged to train a new class of “leaders and pioneers” for the 
propagation of western learning to India’s masses.21 In his A Short History of India (1881), 
Lethbridge appreciated Bentinck’s social and administrative policy and Rammohan Roy’s (1772-
1833) efforts to promote western learning, labelling him the “Great Bengali Reformer.”22 In 
1882, he opposed the Hunter Commission Report which recommended the eventual end of direct 
state support for higher education, encouraged private institutions, and grants-in-aids for 
                                                 
20 Roper Lethbridge, “The Bengal Tenancy Bill.” National Review, vol. 5, 27 (May 1885), 433. 
21 Aparna Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920 (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), 10-11. 
22 Roper Lethbridge, A Short History of India (London: Macmillan and Co, 1881), 288-290. On the political and 
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vernacular instruction.23 While not objecting to state sponsored primary education, he maintained 
that funds should not be diverted from higher education which filtered knowledge to the 
population.24 Although teaching the ryot reading, writing, and arithmetic was important, he 
argued that the present system’s key benefit was the “creation of a class of instructors and 
leaders, of inventors and intelligent capitalists, of jurists and legislators, of schools and savants, 
of statesmen and philanthropists.” Moreover, he believed that the men trained in these 
institutions would eventually “bring India into her proper place in the comity of nations.”25 His 
official experience with English education informed a career advocacy for the political and 
economic aspirations of its growing class of graduates inside the British Empire.  
Conservative Candidate  
As a Conservative Member of Parliament for North Kensington, Lethbridge maintained 
an intellectual association with Disraeli’s views on empire and trade. Lethbridge campaigned as 
a Disraelian “progressive conservative,” promising a sympathetic approach to Ireland, Indian 
administrative reform, and fiscal reform towards “fair trade.” On Ireland, he advocated for the 
highest level of self-government compatible with continued membership in the Empire, and a 
“frank sympathy with their feelings on religious education and similar questions.”26 In regards to 
                                                 
23 Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
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26 Mss Eur. B. 182A, fol. 116, LP, BL, AAS. 
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India, his election pamphlet and address supported Lord Randolph Churchill’s call for a detailed 
inquiry on Indian administration that confronted the “grievances of our fellow-subjects, without 
distinction of race, creed, or color, in that country.” Moreover, he believed that strengthening 
Britain’s ties with the Colonies and India would “pave the way for a British Imperial Federation 
that would be at once the dominant factor in the commercial system of the world, and the most 
powerful champion of peace and civilization.” 27  
Conciliating Princely and Educated Elites  
In Parliament, Lethbridge queried the Imperial government on behalf of the career and 
political interests of India’s English educated community, and expressed a growing frustration 
over the government’s inaction over administrative reform. This included their employment in 
the uncovenanted branch of the Indian Civil Service, and election to India’s legislative councils. 
In 1886 and 1887, Lethbridge questioned the Under Secretary of State, Sir John Gorst, as to 
whether Bengal’s “Native officials” promoted to previously European-held positions were being 
paid one-third less and therefore being fined for their exceptional ability.28 In September 1886, 
he requested government clarification on whether a proposed royal commission to investigate 
uncovenanted and covenanted services would include “Native opinion” and the possibility of the 
“native” employment into higher ranks.29 He later admonished the Indian government’s 
                                                 
27 Mss Eur. B. 182 A, fol. 110, 116. LP, BL, AAS. 
28 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 302, 23 Feb. 1886, col. 1030; Hansard Parliamentary 
Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 314, col. 352.  
29 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 308, 07 Sep. 1886, col. 1474. 
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committee on these subjects for excluding the uncovenanted service and “native opinion.30 In 
1888, he argued that a royal commission on the Indian government’s administration, a key 
Congress request, was wanted by the people of India as well as official and unofficial 
Englishmen. Beyond the “enormity” of the Home Charges, he stated that India’s growing 
expense for external military expeditions, and the prey of “Native States and Native Potentates” 
from “London speculators” showed that “the interests of India were neglected in favour of the 
interests of England.31 Apart from stating that there were educated, qualified, and eminent 
“Natives” who could serve on such a commission, Lethbridge supported legislative council 
interpellation, or the right of Indian members to questioned and debate legislation such as the 
budget, to increase popular consultation.32 In response to parliamentary resolution which 
highlighted a rumored fiscal deficit by the Indian Government, he argued “that the Government 
ought to study wiser and more intelligent economy in their administration, and endeavour to 
meet Native Public opinion both in matters of finance and administration…”33 This included 
indigenous representation on legislative councils, in which they were “admirably qualified for.”34 
In addition to the educated classes, Lethbridge advocated for the rights and privileges of 
India’s princes and chiefs. He maintained that just as the Imperial parliament had a responsibility 
to protect their interests, the Indian Government should consult and incorporate them into the 
                                                 
30 Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 309, 13 Sep. 1886, col. 185. 
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Empire’s political and military machinery. This argument was informed by an appreciation of the 
1858 Queen’s Proclamation and Lytton’s policy of princely collaboration. In Parliament, 
Lethbridge frequently questioned the Under-Secretary State for India regarding princely 
grievances and imperial contributions. These included the infant Gond Raja of Nagpur’s claim 
that the Indian Government had reduced a hereditary allowance since the State’s annexation in 
1854, and whether recognition had been given to the Maharajah of Darbhanga, Maharajah of 
Mysore, and Nizam of Hyderabad for material contributions towards imperial defense.35 In an 
1906 article on the Prince of Wales’s proposed visit to India, he associated the turn from a mid-
nineteenth century “Little England” anti-imperialism to support for the “Imperial Idea” in Britain 
and India with Victoria becoming Empress and the 1877 Imperial Assemblage. He argued that 
this event and the previous Royal tours gave India’s chiefs and soldiers a felt association and 
prestige in the Empire: 
Potentates whose ancestors for a thousand years have traced their pedigrees back to 
the sun or the moon, and who scorned alliances with the Moghul conquerors, have 
gladly accepted the suzerainty of the Kaisar-i-Hind—for he is no longer a foreigner, 
and his crown and sceptre are those of Rama himself.36 
 
In his Short History of India, he credited the princes and chiefs’ “noble spirit of patriotism and 
fidelity” to the Indian Government during the 1857 Revolt. From this, he credited Mayo’s 
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“introduction of a true spirit of friendship between the Indian Empire and Feudatory Princes,” 
including the concept of an “Indian Eton” at Ajmere.37 Lethbridge’s association and support for 
this class was indicated by his published encyclopedia of ruling princes and aristocracy titled The 
Golden Book of India (1893). In the preface, he stated that compiling such a record was to 
encourage the Indian Government to establish a “Heralds’ College” or “Chancery of Dignities,” 
as Lytton purposed in 1877, to redress the lack of coordinated recording and certification of 
Indian and Imperial honors and titles.38  
Lethbridge’s financial relationship with the State of Hyderabad was criticized by the 
Indian government. Their apprehension focused on Lethbridge’s financial arrangement with the 
Nizam, and whether this motivated the former’s published statements regarding the Hyderabad’s 
Berar territorial claims.39 In 1894, Hyderabad Prime Minister’s complained to the Political 
Resident about Lethbridge’s “violent and disgraceful” response to his refusal to sanction the 
latter’s offer to publically support the Berar claim in exchange for money. This included 
Lethbridge’s refusal to leave the Prince’s residence unless he received jewelry which could be 
exchanged for money in England.40 Lethbridge maintained a long and lucrative financial 
arrangement with Hyderabad, which included eight years of annuity as high as Rs80, 000 until 
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1894.41 In an 1894 article for the Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, Lethbridge advised 
Lord Elgin, the new Viceroy, to respect the Paramount Power’s reciprocal obligation to Native 
States. This included Hyderabad’s Berar claims which the government had resisted by past 
threats and coercion.42 The above circumstances injured Lethbridge’s reputation at the India 
Office and in Calcutta. Despite the Indian Foreign Department’s patronage of the Golden Book 
of India, they expressed wariness about future associations with Lethbridge because of 
Hyderabad.43 It is unclear to what extent his Hyderabad advocacy was motivated by financial 
gain over ideological considerations. However, his consistent public activity to redress princely 
grievance, as well as similar action to conciliate educated Indians, reveals a deeper intellectual 
interest in British and Indian national collaboration. Moreover, he contributed to a larger public 
dialogue on incorporating Princely India within a constituted imperial framework which gathered 
importance into the twentieth century. 
In the 1894 article on Elgin, Lethbridge waded into a growing debate concerning the 
position and status of Indian feudatories in relation to imperial governance in India. He argued 
that the 1858 Proclamation, the imperial style, and the proposed “Council of the Empire” had 
revolutionized the relationship between the Crown and the feudatories, and promulgated an 
“imperial constitution” in India.44  In a subsequent article for the Review, which reviewed C.L. 
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Tupper’s Our Indian Protectorates (1893) and Lee-Warner’s The Protected Princes of India 
(1894), he expounded the possibilities of strengthening this relationship for imperial unity.45 
After historically tracing British policy towards the Indian states, he advocated for a “political 
code” or “constitutional union” to establish clear lines of authority and obligations between the 
Indian Government and princely states. He argued that although 1877 halted an encroachment 
policy, a code was needed to show feudatories “exactly where their independence ceases, and 
where British interests legitimately begin.” 46 Lethbridge believed that Lytton’s 1877 
“Proclamation of the Empire” and appointment of Councilors of the Empress went far towards 
establishing a “Constitutional Union.” Moreover, he expressed “no doubt” that the reason why 
these proposals remained just words, without practical effect to the Princes receiving greater 
independence or acknowledging more responsibilities, was due to “the ignorance and stupidity of 
a section of the English Press…”47 Agreeing with the sentiment expressed in the Earl of Meath’s 
recent proposal in the Nineteenth Century to include a self-selected contingent of Indian Princes 
in the House of Lords, he argued that the Princes should be functional Councilors of the Empress 
and elevated to “hereditary constitutional rulers of their provinces under the Empire, with 
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recognized sovereign rights, and with Imperial Rank suited to their position as Princes of the 
Empire.”48  
Below the ruler, Lethbridge believed that expanded Princely authority and independence 
meant increased opportunity for Indian statesmanship and administration. He argued that “under 
a properly constituted unit,” the states’ prime ministers should be accorded equal status with 
Lieutenant Governors and Chief Commissioners. In addition, this system would allow the 
educated classes’ further capacity to develop their administrative abilities. In conclusion, he 
stated that a “constituted unit,” which clearly defined a state’s autonomy within a broader 
imperial union, would expand natural state patriotism to a larger loyalty for the Empire.49 
Lethbridge’s advocacy for expanded Indian participation in the legislative councils and a 
constitutional apparatus to strengthen Indian state cooperation with British power, reflected a 
mostly conservative preoccupation with establishing a nationally inclusive imperial framework 
to oppose narrow nationalist sentiment in Britain and India.  
Tariff Reform and Imperial Preference  
Lethbridge was actively associated with predominantly British conservative movements 
for protective tariff reform and wider imperial economic federation between Britain, the 
Dominions, and India. These movements represented a challenge to a liberal imperial orthodoxy 
of free trade and laissez-faire economics. They advocated for the state’s participation in 
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enhancing national economic and social development through enforcing trade restrictions against 
foreign interests and promoting local industry. Unlike many tariff reformers in Britain, 
Lethbridge recognized and legitimated Indian economic nationalism, crystallized by the 
Swadeshi movement and boycott beginning in 1905. Although triggered by Curzon’s 1905 
Bengal partition, this movement represented a longstanding Indian resentment against British 
trade privilege centered in free trade.50 Lethbridge’s objective was to convince British and Indian 
opinion that divergent national interests could be reconciled through imperial commercial 
federation.  
In Britain, Lethbridge was an original member of the Imperial Federation League (1884) 
and Vice-president of the Tariff Reform League. At the local level, he was President of the 
Devonshire Tariff Reform League, which represented the county of his principle residence, 
Exbourne Manor, and compiled a history of Devonshire families who had settled in the colonies 
and America.51 Lethbridge’s political association to tariff reform and imperial economic 
federation was influenced by Disraeli’s policy and partisan rhetoric which amalgamated imperial 
and national interests. In an article on Disraeli and Tariff Reform, Lethbridge argued that the 
former retained a political opposition to British radicalism’s anti-imperial and socially divisive 
free trade program: 
By temperament and inclination he was disposed to view with suspicion the 
demagogues of the Anti-Corn Law League, who appealed—like their Radical-
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Socialist successors of to-day—to the class jealousy, to sectarian bigotry, and to 
partisan prejudice, in order to subvert the capital institutions of the country.52 
 
In challenging a historical narrative of Disraeli’s eventual embrace of free trade, Lethbridge 
argued that he maintained support for a distinctive “Tory Free Trade” reciprocity policy pursued 
by young William Pitt, Viscount Bolingbroke, and William Huskisson. Moreover, he linked 
Disraeli to the current political debate over tariff reform. He contended that Disraeli believed that 
trade reciprocity promoted working class employment interests, and strengthened the 
connections between Britain, the Colonies, and India.53  
 Beyond India, Lethbridge and George E. Foster, Canadian Conservative statesman, 
appealed to the British public to oppose Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier’s 1911 
reciprocity agreement with the United States. This appeal evoked conservative partisan criticism 
that alleged that liberal anti-imperialism in Canada would be applied to India. Foster argued that 
Laurier betrayed his support of Canada’s former Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald’s 
“National Policy” of developing joint “national and imperial aspirations,” for a fiscal union and 
possible amalgamation with the United States. Taking the British perspective, Lethbridge 
directed blame at radical politicians Henry Asquith, Britain’s Liberal Prime Minister, and James 
Bryce, Britain’s American ambassador for this agreement. In pointing to the agreement’s likely 
inclusion of a “most-favoured nation-clause” which would “smash at one blow the whole of the 
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great national and Imperial system that Canada has built up for herself…,” he contended that 
Asquith and Bryce were disciples of Goldwin Smith’s view that Canada would benefit from 
absorption by the United States.54 Lethbridge replicated an argument that Canada’s national 
interest was tied to the British Empire to convince British and Indian public opinion to support 
India’s inclusion within a scheme of imperial commercial federation. 
 From the 1880s, Lethbridge maintained that a British favored free trade fiscal policy 
stoked Indian nationalist sentiment by hampering India’s internal development and external 
trade. He proposed that the British and Indian governments respond to economic swadeshi by 
abandoning trade tariffs which harmed India for the benefit of Lancashire cotton and other 
metropolitan interests. Specifically, he argued that an imperial free trade or preference system 
would mutually benefit British and Indian economies, and would create a politically secure and 
materially self-sufficient empire based upon an expansive and incorporative imperial 
subjecthood.  
As early as 1885, Lethbridge placed India at the center of a scheme for imperial economic 
federation. In the National Review, he proposed that India’s potential for investment and supply 
of raw material and consumers would compensate for any loss in foreign trade.55 As a Member 
of Parliament in 1888, Lethbridge was critical of the Imperial government’s trade and excise 
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policy with India. He submitted that “the hideous cynicism of our fiscal system in India” 
centered upon a contradictory and harmful free trade policy:  
We forced India to sacrifice immense sums of revenue and to admit our cotton goods 
free of import duties, because, forsooth, of the immutable verities of Free Trade, and 
then we put heavy duties on every pound of tea that comes into this country from 
India, we tax Indian tobacco up the hilt, and we laid upon the Indian silver industry 
such restrictive duties and regulations that that industry was in a fair way to be 
altogether destroyed.56    
 
To the Times of India in 1905, Lethbridge lamented the reintroduction of a five percent general 
tariff on Indian cotton goods originally introduced by the previous Liberal government in 1884. 
This levy was meant to equalize the tariff paid by British and Indian cotton producers. While 
labeled an act of free trade, this policy allowed high cost British producers to protect themselves 
in the domestic market against Indian producers.   He expounded that the House of Commons 
should act for the Empire’s common good, and not upon materially selfish motives or reasons of 
race. While stating that British rule was admirable for its history of political and religious 
toleration, he argued that the imposition of free trade represented a breach of an established 
policy which allowed India to manage her own fiscal system for her own interests. He believed 
that London’s needed to trust the “man on the spot” and solicit intelligent opinion from India, 
and, therefore, not force “on India at the point of the bayonet” a prejudiced policy “to maintain a 
free market for British manufactures.” Lastly, he was certain that if imperial free trade was ever 
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realized “…Britain and India, thus welded together as one great commercial and industrial unit, 
will be self-contained and self-sufficing, and able to defy the competition of the world.”57 
Lethbridge’s sympathetic responses to swadeshi attempted to promote imperial free trade 
and preference as a fiscal solution to satisfy Indian and British economic interests. With partisan 
rhetoric representative of Disraeli, Chamberlain and the Tariff Reform League, he maintained 
that prejudicial British “Cobdenite” free trade motivated a legitimate response from educated 
Indians who wished to foster and support India’s nascent industry. In 1907, Lethbridge 
confronted British skeptics concerning swadeshi’s representative nature. He submitted that it had 
universal appeal in India, which included past free trade advocates such as Dadabhai Naoroji, 
Indian National Congress, and Liberal MPs. In response, he proposed that imperial preference 
represented the middle ground between free trade and protection.58 A year later, he again 
challenged British opinion to recognize Swadeshi as a legitimate national aspiration: “If we will 
consent to put aside our Cobdenite fanaticism…and recognize swadeshi as the wise and 
legitimate application of that modern spirit of Nationalism in the organization of industry and 
commerce that has inspired every civilized community in the world….” Moreover, he eulogized 
Dr. Rash Behari Ghosh’s words that as Indians, “We love England, with all her faults, but we 
love India more,” as the sentiments of the “truest imperialism.”59 
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Lethbridge faced significant British and Indian opposition, official and public, to his 
proposals of imperial preference in India. In Britain, Joseph Chamberlain’s 1903 tariff reform 
proposals offered increased import duties to protect the manufacturing sector of the economy, 
and imperial preference for raw materials from the self-governing Dominions. These proposals 
were unpopular among free trade advocates in the Conservative government and Liberal Party. 
In regards to India, Conservatives Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India (1895-
1903), and Curzon were free traders who opposed an extension of Chamberlain’s vision to the 
Subcontinent.60 Curzon and the Indian government’s opposition to imperial preference in India 
reflected a sound economic argument regarding the country’s external trade and domestic 
economy. In 1903, an Indian Finance and Commerce Department Report to the Secretary of 
State of India argued that India’s position as a debtor country, especially in regards to interest 
and pension obligations to Britain, and general reliance on a raw resource export trade to nations 
outside the Empire made imperial preference a risky proposition. This included the threat of 
retaliation from foreign countries, which could reduce their purchase of raw resources to an 
extent that the British market could not absorb, and increased costs for consumers by the 
exclusion or raised prices of cheaper foreign goods.61 Lastly, the Report argued that the powerful 
Lancashire cotton manufacturing lobby in Parliament would not allow the Indian Government to 
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pursue a tariff policy contrary to their interests, as shown by the imposition of the excise cotton 
duty on Indian mills in 1894.62 This opinion was reiterated by Sir James Mackay, the Indian 
Government representative, at the 1907 Imperial Conference. Moreover, influenced by 
swadeshi’s popular support, Mackay, an avid Free Trade advocate and member of the Cobden 
Club, argued that if Britain enacted a protective tariff, Indian manufactures would demand an 
equal right to protect their own industries.63 Growing Indian nationalist sentiment in favor of 
non-discriminative economic protection through tariff barriers challenged the rising of support 
for imperial preference led by British conservative statesmen and Anglo-Indians following the 
First World War.  
In substantial publications in 1907 and 1913, Lethbridge promoted imperial free trade and 
preference as the means to satisfy British and Indian economic nationalism, and encourage a 
nationally inclusive imperial subjecthood. In India and Imperial Preference (1907), Lethbridge 
utilized quantitative and qualitative analysis to argue that imperial preference answered India’s 
educated classes’ legitimate national aspirations towards industrial and trade development. In 
seeing swadeshi as a substantive response to Indian fiscal inequality, he submitted that it 
symbolized “India…awakening like Japan, to her own greatness and inherent capabilities.” 
Therefore, the United Kingdom and India must be held together “on the strength of mutual 
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interest and respect.”64 He contended that this inequality was maintained by the radical party’s 
“free trade fanaticism.” This continued prejudicial tariffs against India’s trade to Britain, 
especially on tea and tobacco, and allowed foreign powers to dump low cost goods in the 
subcontinent.65 He contended that British radicals used an intellectual free trade adherence to 
mask their overt racial discrimination against Indian interests:  
They are also fond of pretending that they make no difference of class, colour, or 
creed; and yet, I maintain, not even a Free Fooder would seriously contend that we 
should force on the Canadians or the Australians such excise duties as those which 
are imposed on the Indian products of Indian mills and factories merely to gratify 
Cobdenite prejudices. 66 
 
He concluded that as a result of treating Indians as foreigners in fiscal matters, Britain “cannot be 
surprised if India carries out the rule to the disagreeable extent of socially boycotting British and 
foreign goods with impartiality.” 67  
Next, he argued that the current fiscal system allowed foreign countries to drain India’s 
raw materials for domestic industrial expansion and then sell their cheap products back to the 
subcontinent. For this, he ridiculed the radicals’ lack of patriotism at the expense of clouded 
abstractions which seemed to be unhinged from the present realities of national ambition and 
rivalry: 
If there was no such things as Foreign Governments with hostile tariffs, or foreign 
nations with clashing ambitions, who are delighted to take full advantage of our 
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cosmopolitan philanthropy, though very careful not to reciprocate it—then indeed we 
might hope to see a Cobenite millennium ruled by the laws of a cosmopolitan 
political economy undisturbed by considerations of patriotism. 
 
In contrast, he submitted that like British adherents of Chamberlain’s ideals towards the 
constitution of a “United States of the British Empire,” India’s educated classes subscribed to 
Alexander Hamilton’s and Frederic List’s theories of national commercial federation.68 
Lethbridge contended that imperial preference satisfied these demands. It would protect nascent 
industries, increase custom revenue to pay debt and fight famine, increase standards of living and 
purchasing power of the masses, secure markets for the country’s commodities, and give 
opportunity for thousands of young Indian gentleman seeking employment.69  
In conclusion, Lethbridge believed that the Government of India should enter a 
commercial federation on equal and sovereign terms with Britain and the Anglo-Dominions. 
This would remove an Indian feeling of “alienness” from the rest of empire, as it would facilitate 
their rightful claims for “equal imperial rights” and a “common imperial citizenship.” To that 
end, he argued that the “ultra-democratic colonies” might need further “education and 
persuasion” to accept “the ordinary rights of imperial citizenship as inherent in every Indian-born 
subject of the King-Empire.” Regardless, India must enter into “Imperial Commercial 
Federation” as “sovereign states, under her own emperor and Government, on absolutely equal 
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terms with other member of that federation.”70 Although unclear concerning the representative 
nature of India’s sovereign status, Lethbridge’s conditions regarding its equality in economic 
federation resembled those advocated by educated Indians. It was the unresolved question of 
Indian representation which made Indian nationalists and British conservatives skeptical of 
imperial preference for India.  
In 1913, Lethbridge published a revised statement The Indian Offer of Imperial 
Preference. This responded to Gandadhhar Chitnavis’, Imperial Legislative Council Member for 
the Central Provinces, resolution for the introduction of imperial preference. In the preface, 
Lethbridge highlighted the views of Bhownaggree, Joseph Chamberlin, and Bonar Law on 
Indian fiscal policy. Austin Chamberlin, former Chancellor of the Exchequer (1903-1905) and 
future Secretary of State for India (1915-1917), provided the introduction which criticized 
British economic policy towards India. He argued that “No one who is willing to face facts and 
admit the truth, even when it is unpalatable truth, will deny that the fiscal and economic policy 
now imposed on India by its British rulers is hateful to Indian opinion.”71  
In the text, Lethbridge praised Chitnavis’ resolution favoring an increased tariff against 
foreign manufactures to compensate for the recent loss of opium revenue. Moreover, he 
concurred with the latter’s condemnation of the excise tax on Indian cotton production. In 
remarking that many Indian Councilors were trained economists who “have their Friedrich List 
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at their fingers’-ends,” he agreed with Chitnavis that foreign countries were the real rivals to 
Lancashire cotton sold in India and that the duty remission from all English and Indian goods 
benefited the poor population.72 Lastly, he stated that Chitnavis’ argument that a “Customs 
Union” provided India a secure and dignified fiscal position, showed “remarkable political 
insight.” 73 Similar to 1907, Lethbridge concluded that India’s “request” for closer commercial 
federation must be allied with greater individual and national equality: “unfair and improper 
treatment of British Indians in the Transvaal…shows clearly enough that these considerations are 
of infinite importance where national self-respect is concerned.”74 Although Chitnavis’ 1913 
resolution was supported by the Council’s elected and non-official members because it 
advocated protection, wider Indian intellectual and popular opinion was skeptical of India’s 
advantage under a scheme of imperial preference.   
The Indian English language press and academics uniformly condemned imperial 
preference as a novel method to maintain British political and economic dominance over India. 
In Allahabad, The Leader exposed the inherent contradiction of argument made by conservative 
tariff reformers and Anglo-Indians regarding the mutual benefit of preference for British and 
Indian economic development. As the scheme was formulated to protect and enhance British 
industry, including the lucrative Lancashire cotton manufactures who already dominated India’s 
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import market, how could this proposal help Indian cotton mills?75 In 1917, Calcutta’s Amrita 
Bazar Patrika, responding to the 1917 Imperial Conference’s imperial preference discussions, 
believed that this scheme would hold India hostage to British and colonial exporters who would 
destroy the competition, raise prices on consumers, and enforce lower prices for raw materials. It 
argued that unlike the Dominions who had fiscal autonomy and could enter into this agreement 
on their own terms, imperial preference would be imposed in India  
not by the chosen representatives of India, but by the representative of the British 
nation, by the Government of India which owes no manner of accountability to the 
Indian taxpayer, and which is itself completely controlled by the Secretary of State 
for India, who is himself again, subject to the authority of the British Cabinet and the 
British Parliament, who hold their high and profitable office at the pleasure of the 
British voters.76   
 
This sentiment was shared by Indian economists, who emphasized that India’s desire for 
trade protection for its infant industries was incompatible with an imperial preference system. 
V.G. Kale, Professor of History and Economics at Fergusson College in Poona, argued that 
Lethbridge and his allies had no support in India. He argued that although the Indian people were 
opposed to free trade, which had “killed or assisted to kill our national industries and is the 
stumbling block in the path of our industrial progress,” an imperial customs union was worse as 
it would consign India, who had no say in shaping policy, to a purely agricultural nation.77 In 
1915 and 1922, Pramathanath Banerjea, the Minto Professor of Economics at the University of 
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Calcutta, contended that imperial preference clearly benefited British industry through cheaper 
raw materials and increased its market share at the expense of Indian and foreign competitors. 
Moreover, he stated that India should not be asked to sacrifice in any “imperial zollverein” while 
it remained at an inferior political position, and while its people were subjected to race prejudice 
from fellow members of the Empire.78  
 In Britain, Lethbridge actively corresponded with Conservative and Indian statesman to 
promote India’s inclusion within an imperial preference system. This included Austin 
Chamberlain and Andrew Bonar Law to whom he sent published articles and congratulations on 
tariff reform speeches. The former, along with Joseph Chamberlain, encouraged Lethbridge to 
seek high profiled support in India in order to encourage more discussion in the Tariff Reform 
League.79 Bonar Law received his articles with great interest, agreeing that the current fiscal 
system was unresponsive to Indian interests.80 In 1913, Bonar Law chaired a meeting which 
included the public exponents of India and Imperial preference, Lethbridge, Sir Edward Law, 
former financial member of the Viceroy Council, Sir Edward Sassoon, Conservative MP and Sir 
Charles Elliot and others who propose detailed investigation and promotion of public sentiment 
for imperial preference in India.81 Although the First World War interrupted this work, 
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Lethbridge’s advocacy and arguments shaped a critical debate on Indian participation in schemes 
of imperial economic federation.     
In 1919, Britain introduced a preferential rate on existing import duties for empire 
producers. This was its first effort to reciprocate preferences given to British products by the 
self-governing dominions since the late nineteenth century. In 1920, this led the Indian 
Government to form a committee to study imperial preference. Chaired by Dinshaw Edulji 
Wacha, its Report, representative of mixed Indian and British official opinion, argued that 
India’s adoption of preference would have a neutral effect, and that the fear of tariff retaliation 
was unwarranted in the current atmosphere.82 A year later, at the behest of the newly elected and 
reformed Legislative Council, the Government established a Fiscal Commission lead by Ibrahim 
Rahimtulla to investigate tariff policy and adopting imperial preference. Reflecting a series of 
consultations across the major industrial centers of India, its 1922 report argued that India’s 
incorporation within a scheme of imperial preference needed to be voluntary and beneficial to 
the country’s economic development.83 Led by Rahimtulla and the Indian majority on the 
Commission, the report’s dissenting opinion argued that India’s adoption of preference must be 
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conditional upon attaining political fiscal autonomy and addressing Indian racial discrimination 
throughout the Empire.84  
Conclusion  
Lethbridge’s attempt to conciliate distinct British and Indian national interests within schemes of 
imperial federation represented an intellectual and political development out of the conservative 
imperial tradition in India. For Lethbridge, British consultation with elite interests, such as 
English educated Indians and a princely “constituted union,” would allow the Imperial and 
Indian governments to avoid policies which favored metropolitan trade and finance. From 
personal experience with both groups, he applied British conservative ideals of tariff reform and 
imperial preference to promote imperial unity. This represented an alternative to liberal 
imperialist and nationalist orthodoxy which were increasingly in conflict in the late nineteenth 
century. Similar to the situation with Canada, this meant conciliating India’s divergent national 
political and economic interest within a common imperial commercial policy and subjecthood. In 
channeling a Disraelian national sympathy for Ireland and India, and building upon a critique of 
liberalism’s abstract and universal precepts, he admonished “Cobdenite” free trade dogmatism 
for disregarding Indian swadeshi’s legitimate and patriotic aspirations.  His proposal to “square 
the circle” with imperial preference, or “Imperial Swadeshi,” which mutually protected and 
enhanced Indian and British national interests, reflected a distinctly conservative alternative to 
liberal empire. Lastly, Lethbridge demonstrated that despite metropolitan conservative popular 
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opinion, British and imperial conservative traditions could sustain a nationally inclusive and non-
racial perspective on Indian Empire. This allowed Indian conservative interests and individuals, 
such as the Kathiawar States and Bhownaggree, to be represented in metropolitan opinion and 
imperial policy.  
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Chapter 8: M.M Bhownaggree and Conservatism in Western India 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on Mancherjee Merwanjee Bhownaggree’s contribution to imperial and 
Indian conservatism in India. It is shown that his experience as the Judicial Agent and Councilor 
for the Bhavnagar State in Kathiawar, and ethnic and social association with Bombay’s Parsi 
community informed a conservative governing perspective on Indian Empire. This perspective 
defined his self-claimed and self-defined representation of “conservative India,” which promoted 
imperial state benevolence to enhance the mass population’s economic and social opportunity. 
Tracing Bhownaggree’s political and intellectual association with a Parsi and Muslim Indian 
conservative “anti-Congress party” in Western India, this chapter reveals how he pursued a 
Kathiawar and Bombay model of economic and social development which emphasized local 
decision as well as British and Indian collaboration. As an Indian and British political 
representative, he proposed a state-supported system of female and technical education to revive 
national industries and reverse economic and social stagnation in India. In prefacing these 
reforms as the imperial state’s obligation towards India’s unrepresented and loyal masses, we 
shall see how he extended this argument to define Britain’s responsibility to secure civic and 
economic rights for Indian communities across the Empire. Bhownaggree’s inclination and 
action represented the coalescence of Indian and British conservatism which challenged the 
universal and centralizing aspects of liberal imperialism and nationalism heading into the 
twentieth century.      
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Bhavnagar  
Bhownaggree’s official experience with Kathiawar’s State of Bhavnagar, and social 
association with Bombay’s Parsi community, shaped his conservative imperialism which 
opposed Indian nationalism and promoted state sponsored social development in India. As 
Bhavnagar’s Judicial Agent in Bombay and Judicial Councilor, he developed an appreciation for 
the benefits of British modeled administration to Indian princely governance. Moreover, this 
experience informed his advocacy for state support for public works and education and his deep 
hostility towards India’s vernacular press. As noted in the previous section, the Kathiawar States 
defended their local autonomy and authority through liberally funding public works and 
education across the peninsula. The First Class State of Bhavnagar provided substantive support 
for various public initiatives, including the Bhavnagar to Gondal Railway and multiple 
contributions to Rajkumar College. In regards to the former, Bhownaggree, as Bhavnagar’s 
Bombay Agent, negotiated the railway’s financial terms with the Bombay government in 1878.85 
In 1885, the construction of Samaldas College was an addition to the existing establishment of 
134 schools, including 12 schools for female education, in Bhavnagar. Moreover, Takhtsinghji, 
Thakore of Bhavnagar, sponsored female medical education and contributed to a new Arts 
College in Karachi.86  
                                                 
85 Savailal, 184. 
86 IOR/R/1/713/24. 
 251 
 
The 1877-88 Kathiawar Administration Report described Bhavnagar’s administration 
as “liberal and progressive under the personal care of His Highness Sir Takhtsingki.”87 
This report referred to ongoing reforms to the State’s ruling council, established in 1887. 
As noted, Bhavnagar and the Kathiawar States were a small representation of a larger 
movement by Indian polities to incorporate western political and administrative reforms to 
strengthen local authority and autonomy. Occupying one of Bhavnagar’s four council seats 
as Judicial Councilor, Bhownaggree was an outspoken proponent of introducing western 
practices to reform council. For Bhownaggree and other councilors, reforms were needed 
to provide greater oversight for large financial outlays on road and rail expansion. These 
reforms included proposals for monthly council meetings, council approval for 
expenditures totaling over Rs5000 and appointments costing over Rs200, increased council 
supervision over public works, greater competition for public works over Rs1000, and 
council approval of annual budgets before submission to the Prince.88 In an explanation of 
his vote supporting the above proposals, Bhownaggree argued that they would promote 
transparency and communication among the various state departments: 
while there would be ample opportunities afforded to the Councillors to check or 
minimise any inherent or newly-imported defects in any branch of administration, the 
good influence of the more efficient departments would be reflected on the rest, and 
eventually a degree of harmonious proportion would be attained which is essential to 
the effective working of any well-meaning government.89  
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Vernacular Press and Princely India 
As Bhavnagar’s Judicial Agent in Bombay, Bhownaggree’s obligation was to defend and 
exonerate the Princely State from false accusations of misrule made by individuals and the 
vernacular press. In the late 1880s, Takhatsinhji and his councilors, including Bhownaggree, 
were accused of misrule and violence in petitions to the Bombay government and in the 
Guajarati press. In January 1887, the Nyayadarshak, from Ahmadabad, argued that the Bombay 
government should appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate state sanctioned murder and 
land confiscation in Bhavnagar.90 The Praja Mitra, from Karachi, raised concerns over 
Bhavnagar’s Nagar Brahmin officials’ dominant and tyrannical conduct, and the State’s expense 
towards acquiring a knighthood for Takhatsinhi, which included an Rs80000 gift and Rs36000 
annuity to Bhownaggree.91 In 1889 and 1890, Brahmachair Madhawanand Sadanand, local 
merchant, published the most explicit claims of abuse in multiple issues of the Bhavnagar 
Exposure Gazette. In this publication and an earlier petition to the Bombay government in 
August 1889, Sudanand accused Takhatsinhji of murder, tyranny, oppression, bribery, and lavish 
expense on different women. Moreover, he claimed that his chief advisers, including 
Bhownaggree, were encouraging these practices, and profiting from their assurance that they had 
unlimited influence with the Bombay government.92 The Gazette was also informed by a 
separate petition submitted by Chhuggunlal Soonderjee, Bhavnagar resident and professional 
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pleader. In September 1889, he accused Bhavnagar’s ruler of intimidating and falsely accusing 
two female servants of stealing state ornaments in order to cover up his “illicit intercourse” with 
them.93 The Bombay Presidency press mostly discredited Sadanand’s and Soonderjee’s charges. 
The Native Opinion, Gujararti, and Kathiawar Times saw these accusations as frivolous, arguing 
that they should be answered in court or suppressed. 94 
In 1890, Bhownaggree pursued a successful defamation suit against Sadanand, 
Soonderjee and their accomplices. In a letter to W. Lee-Warner, secretary to the Bombay 
government’s Political & Judicial Department, requesting a record of telegraph, railway, and 
registered letters, Bhownaggree argued that Sadanand’s allegations were groundless and that “a 
strong conspiracy had been formed to procure the downfall of his Highness and of his 
administration.” Moreover, he contended that these actions represented “an act of treason and 
revolt against the state.”95 In correspondence with Edward Ollivant, Kathiawar’s Political Agent, 
Takhatsinhji expressed hope that the Government might enact the means of protecting native 
states from “scurrilous attacks” made in British territory.96 On 17 January 1890, Bombay’s 
government informed the Kathiawar Political Agent that they would assist Bhownaggree and 
other agents prepared to instigate criminal proceedings against Sadanand or the publisher.97 In 
Britain, the Saturday Review praised Bhavnagar’s ruler for taking action against Sadanan and 
                                                 
93 IOR/R/2/737/240. 
94 IOR/L/R/145 1890. 
95 IOR/R/2/744/273 1890. 
96 IOR/R/2/744/273 1890. 
97 IOR/R/2/737/240. 
 254 
 
Soonderjee. In addition, it proposed that a penal code modification should target seditious 
remarks from political agitators who were likely to prey on the ryot.98  
Bhownaggree’s official experience in Bhavnagar and the Kathiawar States informed a 
lasting apprehension of British influence on Indian administration, and the value of princely rule 
to Indian empire. In 1903, Bhownaggree argued, in response to Lee-Warner’s Society of the Arts 
paper on the Bombay Presidency, that the “Native” states represented a bulwark for British 
power and provided a system where “native” statesmen could adopt British methods of 
administration.99  In 1905 to the House of Commons, Bhownaggree proposed that the 
Government of India should reconsider Lytton’s scheme for an “Indian Privy Council.” He 
submitted that such a council would create a mechanism for a new generation of well-educated 
and intelligent chiefs to advise and consult the Viceroy. He argued that their advice was valuable 
and legitimate “by the large stake they held in the safety and welfare of our Indian Empire, and 
by virtue of their representative and responsible positions…”100 His experience reforming and 
defending Bhavnagar, influenced an ideological association with conservative imperialism which 
criticized Indian nationalism and its medium in the vernacular press. With the support of a larger 
anti-congress party in Western India, Bhownaggree was able to attain electoral success in the 
British Conservative Party and promote social reform for the Subcontinent.   
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For Bhownaggree, Bhavnagar’s treatment informed a subsequent view that the vernacular 
press was a dangerous outlet which echoed the socially unrepresentative opinions of young and 
English-educated Indian nationalists. In 1897, Bhownaggree’s article in the Fortnightly Review 
vilified British radicalism’s influence on the vernacular press for enticing agitation and violence 
against British rule. He argued that Ripon’s Ilbert Bill and Vernacular Press Act repeal led to the 
proliferation of political organization and opposition across India. This allowed a new generation 
of politicians and journalists to use this press to criticize the Government, and propose unrealistic 
remedies for India’s real and imagined problems. Moreover, the press represented the opinions 
of a minority and unrepresentative English-educated class in Congress who were eager to apply 
western political notions of nationalism and individualism to a divided India: 
The example of the agitators against the Ripon regime, gave reality and living 
impulse to those sentimental and theoretical precepts which they has imbibed in their 
school-days from English classics regarding the rights and liberty of the subject, the 
freedom of speech and the Press, and the integrity of nations, without their able to 
discriminate between the natural and physical constitution of a united and well-
developed people and a disjointed, divided and dwarfed conglomeration of such 
communities as form the populations of India.101 
 
Conservative and Anti-Congress Represented for India 
Bhownaggree maintained that India needed a conservative and anti-Congress spokesman in 
Britain that truly represented the country’s majority and landed interests. As Bhavnagar’s 
Bombay agent, Bhownaggree used his position to pursue a determination to enter British politics 
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on the Conservative Party ticket. This included building an association with Conservative 
statesman and Governor of Bombay Lord Harris (1890-1895). As a former Conservative House 
of Lords member and Under-Secretary of State for India (1885), Harris vouched and arranged 
contacts for Bhownaggree with Party statesman and operatives. This reflected their personal 
acquaintance. In February 1891, Lord and Lady Harris opened the Awabai Bhownaggree Home 
for Nurses, instituted in commemoration of Bhownaggree’s recently deceased sister.102 Later that 
month, Harris invited Bhownaggree to a luncheon with the family.103 In March, Harris penned a 
letter of introduction for Bhownaggree to Lord Cross, Secretary of State for India (1886-1892). 
He explained his deed on the grounds of Bhownaggree’s Bhavnagar service, financial 
contribution to female education in the Presidency, and advocacy for the suppression of disloyal 
and seditious newspapers. Although not agreeing on the last point, the Governor believed him to 
be “quite safe” and a “loyal, trustworthy and intelligent Parsi.”104 In the spring of 1891, 
Bhownaggree met Curzon, Lord Dufferin, Lord Northbrook, and was granted an interview with 
Cross. The latter remarked to Harris that he “…had a very interesting meeting with M. 
Bhownaggree though I entirely differ from him as to the suppression of native papers.”105 
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To his friend Sir George Birdwood, Bhownaggree described a recent interview with Harris 
in which he expressed thoughts on India, the parliamentary “India Party,” and representing the 
Conservative Party in Britain.  In this letter, he detailed how he expressed a worry to the 
Governor on the serious danger that the British might perceive India as being “all liberal and 
radical” which hated the Conservative Party. And that he believed Congress advocacy for 
political reform was misrepresenting India’s traditions, customs, religions, and surrounding 
“atmosphere” which made her “solid conservative.” Therefore, he proposed that his 
Conservative Party candidature and representation for “conservative India” would discredit 
radicalism as a political force in the Subcontinent. Lastly, he communicated to Harris that his 
proposal found support among an important Parsi constituency in Bombay: 
Every one of wealth and influence and most of all Parsees, who have seen me, 
wonder why I haven’t yet stood for a conservative constituency. They all think it was 
time the congress fad of radicalism was laid bare, and nonsense talked to the English 
public unchallenged in the name of the people of India was exposed.106 
 
Bhownaggree left that meeting with Harris’ support and personal letter of introduction for 
Capital Middleton, Political Agent for the Central Conservative Association.107 Later in 
1894, he met with Middleton and was introduced to Party Leader Salisbury.108  
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In Britain and India, Bhownaggree maintained that the British Empire was a benevolent 
institution and force which allowed political participation, social elevation, and equal rights. 
Moreover, he argued that it allowed parliamentary representation for India’s conservative and 
uneducated majority who were opposed or ambivalent to Indian nationalism. As chair of the 
dinner celebration for Dadabhoi Naoroji’s 1892 election victory as a Liberal candidate in 
London’s Central Finsbury, Bhownaggree emphasized how this event reflected the Empire’s 
allowance for equal opportunity. Although Bhownaggree was an opponent of the Congress 
which Naoroji advocated for in Britain, he argued that Naoroji’s victory was a “patriotic act” by 
the local constituents.109 More importantly, it signified that “the British Empire embraces in its 
fold…the millions of their Indian fellow-subjects whom the electors of central Finsbury regard 
as fit for the enjoyment of equal rights with themselves.”110 In his own 1895 election campaign, 
Bhownaggree defined his possible, yet narrow, representation of a divided India. He stated to the 
Mercury that he represented the large groups in India who opposed the Indian National 
Congress’s western program of political reform. While stating that no one person could represent 
India “in the complete sense of the term,” he claimed to speak for the majority population who 
opposed “those of the natives of India who demand impossible rights and advocate advanced 
methods of government utterly unsuited to the conditions of India.” 111 Furthermore, he 
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promoted the “large hereditary of territorial class who have stake in the country,” and understood 
that the “…maintenance of the rights of property are wrapped up in the paramountcy of a great 
overshadowing power like the British.” Lastly, he described India as the “most intensely 
Conservative country under the sun, and rapid change is abhorrent to all the instincts and 
traditions of its inhabitants.”112 
Dinshaw Edulji Wacha’s correspondence with Naoroji reveals that Bhownaggree’s 
claimed representation for “conservative India,” and praise from the Parsi and Muslim 
community were met with abhorrence and anxiety from Congress supporters in Western India. 
Specifically, their negative reaction centered on an apprehension concerning the size and profile 
of Bhownaggree’s support in the Bombay Presidency. This concern represented Bombay’s 
history of factional politics between commercial elites, or Shetias, and the English educated 
minority on issues regarding municipal reform and Indian nationalism.113 For Wacha, Naoroji, 
and Bombay’s vernacular press, the Conservative MPs’ anti-Congress views were motivated by 
self-promotion and career opportunity. In 1893, Wacha complained to Naoroji that 
Takhtsinghji’s pronouncement that he did not sympathize with Congress was “of course…Mr. 
Bhownuggree’s [sic] inspiration.” He added that the latter’s reasoning was “simply to advance 
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his own interests.”114 In the subsequent year, Wacha felt betrayed that Bhownaggree, “under the 
aegis of Salisbury and Balfour” and with the “ear of the India office,” might stand as Naoroji’s 
rival in the upcoming election. He asked “Could political arrogance and personal conceit go 
further.”115 In response to Bhownaggree’s British electioneering and claims of Indian 
representation, Wacha told Naoroji that “so deep-rooted is the conviction of India as to the 
hollowness of B’s pretension to pose as the representative of ‘conservative India’ that even long 
before you said anything about the matter, the Indian papers hurled back the pretension.”116 
Parsi and Muslim Support for Bhownaggree and British Imperialism 
The above anxiety peaked during Bhownaggree’s 1896 tour of Western India when he 
was met with admiration from Parsi commercial and official elites as well as sections of the 
Muslim community. Leading up to the visit, Wacha’s correspondence with Naoroji demonstrated 
the Congress Party’s concern that this event might be used as government propaganda which 
showed conservative and anti-congress support. Specifically, it revealed nationalist efforts to 
discourage public memorials and demonstrations in Bhownaggree’s honor. This included 
Nanabhoy Chichgur and the Chichgur family’s attempt to hold a demonstration at the Phoenix 
Club. Their discouragement of Dosabhoy Framji Karaka and R.D. Setna’s door to door soliciting 
to raise participants for a public dinner. They also ridiculed Dr. Cowasji Hormusji, Chairman of 
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the Municipal Corporation, R.M. Patell, later Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court, Noor 
Mahomed Jairaj Peerbhoy, Sheriff of Bombay, Harkisondas Narotumdas, Municipal Councilor 
and Sheriff of Bombay, and others’ attempts to form a representative committee.117 In addition, 
Wacha acclaimed Sir Cowasji Jehanghir, N.N. Wadia, Merwanji Dalal, and Shapurji Bharucha 
as part of the “Bhownuggree [sic] clique.”118  
 In December 1896, Omar Jamal and the Bombay Muslim community gave Bhownaggree 
a public rally at the Muzafferabad Hall. Wacha argued that this gathering was made possible by 
the followers of Aga Khan, a British ally and the leader of the Khojas community who were a 
key component amongst the Ismaili community, who favored the Bhavnagar State because of a 
recent beneficial ruling over property. Moreover, he interpreted this event as demonstrating the 
Indian MP’s actual unpopularity with Bombay’s enlightened and representative elements: “If the 
enlightened and educated refuse to give him a demonstrative, he seeks the backward 
Mahomedans, backward Jains and so forth to give him éclat.”119 The Kasier-I-Hind, an English-
Marathi newspaper in Bombay, shared similar views as to the demonstration’s representative 
nature. They contended that although led by a wealthy, albeit politically and socially 
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uninfluential, part of the Muslim community, the crowd’s majority were “so backward that they 
hardly understand what politics is, much less party politics and Parliamentary warfare.”120 In 
contrast, the Pioneer, an Anglo-Indian newspaper from Allahabad, remarked glowingly that the 
gathering was a novel occurrence in a racially divided Bombay: “It may be mentioned that is 
perhaps the first instance in the history of the city, in which the Mahomedan community has in a 
public meeting assembled and entertained a member of another community and presented him 
with an address by way of acknowledging his public service.”121 
 The encouragement that Bhownaggree received from Bombay’s Parsi and Muslim 
communities reflected the broad outlines of an anti-congress constituency in Western India. For 
the Parsi official and business elites listed above, the British Empire protected their security, 
financial prosperity, as well as an active participation in local governance. The Parsis’ public and 
political reputation were directly associated with their private and associational benevolence to 
Western India’s economic and social development.122  The Jejeebhoy and Tata families were 
consistent benefactors to the social and economic development of the municipality.123 Active 
supporters of Bhownaggree, the Wadia family spent the proceeds of their successful shipbuilding 
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company on various causes, including the Obstetric Hospital in 1888.124 Prominent banker Sir 
Cowasjee Jehanghier, titled Baronet Readymoney, financial success facilitated civic 
appointments as Justice of the Peace and Income Tax Commissioner, and charitable donations to 
Bombay hospitals and a Rs 50,000 gift to the Civil Engineering College.125   
Publications by Dosabhoy Framjee Karaka and S.B. Bharucha maintained that Parsi 
loyalty to the British Empire represented the latter’s ability to secure local culture as well as 
India’s social and economic advancement. Karaka, a consummate biographer, Chairman of the 
Bombay Municipal Corporation, and advocate for Parsis in India, deeply admired his 
community’s association with the Empire. Amidst the Indian Revolt in 1858, he published a 
vindication of British rule which highlighted its advantages for personal and property security 
compared to preceding Muslim and Maratha governance.126 In his comprehensive History of the 
Parsis (1884), he stated that Parsis held a “deep rooted conviction” of the British power’s 
blessings in enabling prosperity, and were therefore proud to be seen as the most loyal 
population in India.127 In a speech titled “Unrest in India” to the Edinburgh Parsi Union in 1908, 
Bharucha argued that the Parsi religion’s “clannish” nature “cultivated a passionate loyalty to the 
Empire…under which we have the freedom of conscience and the freedom of individual 
initiative.”128 In terms of growing Indian unrest, he jointly criticized the negatives aspects of 
                                                 
124 Jehanghier, Life of Sir Cowasjee Jehangier Readymoney, 29-32. 
125 Masani. N.M. Wadia and His Foundation, 69. 
126 Dosabhoy Framjee, The British Raj: Contrasted with its Predecessors (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1858), 7. 
127 Dosabhai Framjee, History of the Parsis (New Delhi: Indigo Books, 2002), 282. 
128 S.B. Broacha, “Unrest in India,” Edinburgh Parsi Union, 31 Jul. 1908, 4. 
 264 
 
European imperialism and the radical elements of Indian nationalism. To the former, he 
lambasted Mr. Kipling and the “White Man’s Burden” for the white race’s violence in Africa and 
China, as well as the prejudice and aloofness of young “Competition wallas” in India. To the 
latter, he condemned the growing violence and agitation of Indian anarchists. He argued that 
although the upper classes and masses were not affected by this movement, the involvement of 
self-interested and misguided students and youth represented a clear danger for India’s future.129  
In Bombay, the Rast Goftar represented Parsi communal and anti-congress opinion late 
in the nineteenth century.  In 1897, the Goftar responded to the negative torrent of Indian press 
comment on Bhownaggree’s visit by demonstrating his reception in Kathiawar, Sholapore, 
Hyderabad, and other places across India. They argued that until some other Indian “proves 
himself worthy of the honour” of entering parliament, “he is the only representative there of the 
teeming millions of India.” 130  In subsequent articles, they demonstrated the positive reaction of 
the English press and politicians to Bhownaggree’s anti-congress parliamentary sentiment.131 In 
receiving a Knight Commandership of the Indian Empire, the Goftar praised Bhownaggree’s 
anti-congress representation of India: “His name is familiar all over India; and we have no doubt 
that as the selfish aims and objects of those who have identified themselves with the Congress 
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movement are more and more laid bare and exposed, his services to this country will be better 
appreciated and recognized.”132 
 The Goftar’s support for Bhownaggree represented a wider Parsi communal 
apprehension concerning the centralizing, democratizing, agitating agenda of the Hindu 
dominated Congress Party.133 In 1889, it tempered enthusiasm for the Congress’s existence and 
aims with a concern over their methods, particularly their claim to represent the grievances of all 
India’s communities. Moreover, it created a distorted and dangerous view of deplorable British 
rule in India: “At the very best, a one-sided view of the administration will be presented to the 
millions who are too illiterate and ignorant to balance the good they enjoy with the evil which 
they are told they endure.” In regards to Congress political reform advocacy for greater aspects 
of home rule, the Goftar cautioned the loss of British control and implementation of 
representative government for India’s peace: “…far from ushering in a gold era of universal 
brotherhood among the peoples of India, would create disunion ad disaffection.”134 In 1892, 
amidst the Indian Council Bill debate, it remarked on the Salvation Army’s William Booth’s 
visit to state that the Congress had ignored India’s social and economic questions.135 In 1897, it 
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categorically argued that the Parsis community remained “staunch supporters of the British” and 
would “never join the INC congress party.”136 
 With regards to Western India’s diverse minority Muslim population, the late nineteenth 
century saw political organization proliferate in response to increasing majority Hindu 
involvement in the Indian Civil Service, local, provincial, and imperial legislative councils, and 
the Indian National Congress.137 In the 1890s, Muslim opposition to Congress was additionally 
informed by the latter’s friendship with Gladstone’s Liberal Party, who condemned the treatment 
of Christian minorities in the Balkans by the Sultan of Turkey and Muslim Caliphate. Moulvi 
Rafiuddin Ahmed was a leading spokesman for Muslim opposition to Congress, Muslims equal 
rights in India, and British support for the Turkish Sultan.  Ahmed was the son of Moulvi Ahmed 
Sabib, a prominent religious leader in Poona. Ahmed obtained an English education in India 
before studying for the bar in England. While there, he was engaged as Queen Victoria’s 
Hindustani language tutor, and became Vice-President of the Aujuman-I-Islam (Muslim Society) 
in London.138 In India, Ahmed was instrumental in establishing provincial Muslim Leagues in 
Bombay, Poona, and Bengal between 1907 and 1909.139 
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In 1894, Ahmed’s speech to the Leeds Junior Conservative Club started rumors, in the 
British and Indian press, that he might be considered as a Conservative Party candidate in the 
1895 general election. Although this remained just a rumour, his speech in Leeds, commended 
by Sir John Gorst, former Under-Secretary of State for India, revealed how Muslim dual 
opposition to the Congress Party and the Liberal Party found an appreciative audience among 
British conservatives. He argued that India was “not fit for democracy” and that Home Rule was 
“madness” due to the Hindu population’s political dominance. He related these requests to an 
ambitious Hindu-dominated Congress that was attempting to establish control over India’s 
Muslims through association with the British Liberal Party. In revealing how Ripon’s Municipal 
Resolution allowed complete Hindu control of Pune’s local council despite only representing 
60% of the population, he compared besieged Muslims to Ireland’s minority Protestant 
community. In relating Naoroji’s twin advocacy for Irish Home Rule and Indian self-governing 
reform, Ahmed sought the audience’s support in sponsoring a Muslim Conservative MP:  
If India had, indeed, become a party question and the Radicals in India had got the 
support of the Irish Party and of the Radicals in the House of Commons, then the 
Mahomedans could not do better than follow the good example of the Irish 
Protestants and make common cause with the Unionists.140 
Although not adopted by the Conservative Party in 1895, Ahmed maintained that the 
British authority should defend and enhance the political and social prospects of Indian 
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Muslims against a Hindu Congress, as well as condemn incendiary remarks regarding 
Islam and Turkey made by William Gladstone and British liberals.141 
In the British Press throughout the 1890s, Ahmed combatted Muslim political and social 
exclusion in India, and the harmful effects to pan-Islamic public opinion across the Empire of 
British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan of Turkey.142 In the National Review, 
Ahmed stated that the change in Turkish popular “Islamic feeling” away from Britain and 
towards Russia had consequences for British power in India. In stating that the British Empire 
was the greatest Muslim power in terms of population, he contended that Britain should 
acknowledge and remedy Muslim social and civil disabilities in India. In comparison, he pointed 
out that Russia afforded Muslims better opportunities for education, advancement in the military, 
and in the diplomatic service.143 At an 1894 meeting of the Anjuman-i-Islam in response to 
recent British metropolitan agitation against Ottoman treatment of the Armenian community, 
Ahmed’s resolution condemned the protests as furthering a “misrepresentation of Islamic Law 
and religion…for political purposes.”144 In 1897, he blamed recurring excitement on “designing 
ministers Christian ministers, imbued with a secret hatred of Islam, and Forward Liberals 
inebriated with party fanaticism…” He argued that this resulted in the growth of an Islam versus 
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Christianity mentality which pulled Muslims away from Britain as “the more Mr. Gladstone and 
Exeter Hall denounced the Caliph, the closer did the Moslems draw towards him.”145 He 
concluded that compared to Disraeli’s policy of supporting Turkey’s internal reform, now 
“England is of opinion that Turkey will not improve herself, and that therefore she should cease 
to support her.”146 For Ahmed and Bhownaggree, their Congress Party opposition was predicated 
on the idea that British power should protect and enhance local interests through expanding the 
social and economic prospects of the mass population. 
 
A Benevolent Imperial State and Education in India 
From the 1880s, Bhownaggree advocated for the imperial state’s benevolent participation 
in promoting social and economic development for India’s masses. This included the expansion 
of female medical education, and technical instruction in commercial and industrial knowledge 
to revive indigenous forms of material prosperity. As seen with his opposition to the vernacular 
press, Bhownaggree was a consistent critic of state-supported English education in India. 
Bhownaggree maintained an early conviction that this instruction was unnecessary and inhibited 
India’s modern development. In 1882, this conviction informed a negative response to 
Lethbridge’s paper to the National Indian Association, a non-political organization which 
promoted educational opportunities for Indians in India and Britain, on the public utility of state-
                                                 
145 Rafiuddin Ahmed, “A Moslem’s View of the Pan-Islamic Revival.” Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, vol. 
42, 248 (Oct. 1897) pp. 517-518. 
146 Ahmed, “A Moslem’s View of the Pan-Islamic Revivalism,” 525. 
 270 
 
funded English higher education. Though praising Lethbridge for his sympathy for India’s 
people, Bhownaggree believed that state education had begun thirty years too soon and “at the 
wrong end.” He argued that any beneficial education system must begin with the masses, and 
that funds should be diverted from higher instruction towards that purpose.147 In 1897, he argued 
that English education had instigated agitation against the Indian government on behalf of the 
Indian National Congress. Moreover, it continued India’s economic decline through enabling the 
proliferation of lawyers, journalists, and clerks who added nothing to the country’s industrial and 
commercial development.148 
To the Society of the Arts, the House of Commons, and in speeches across India, 
Bhownaggree promoted state support for female and technical education. In 1885, Bhownaggree 
promoted female education to the Society of Arts. He encouraged the Indian government to 
support an initiative which had deep historical roots in the country, and would elevate the mental 
and material condition of women across India. In claiming that the recent Muslim conquest 
hardened Hindu caste distinctions and practices such as child marriage and female isolation, it 
was contact with western civilization and the coordinated interests of Parsee, Hindu, and 
Europeans which had begun to restore the traditional treatment of women. 149 With state material 
support, even redirected from male education, and encouragement, he argued that educated 
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Indians could take the lead on changing current prejudices against women.150 Specifically, 
Bhownaggree encouraged female medical training as nurses. As noted, he funded, with the 
Indian government’s assistance, the Awabai Bhownaggree Home for Nurses. This facility 
provided training for twenty nurses at a time for community service.151     
With regards to technical education, Bhownaggree promoted a state system of industrial 
and commercial instruction to revive indigenous and national economic prosperity across India. 
As seen in the preceding chapter, hastening India’s industrial and economic development was a 
popular demand among Indian commentators and academics heading into the twentieth century. 
Responding to a Society of Arts paper on the production and consumption of tussur silk in 
Britain by Mr. Wardle in 1890, and a subsequent question by George Birdwood, Bhownaggree 
quipped:   
While you gentlemen are engaged in developing such industries as constitute the 
wealth of your nation, we, in India, are only industrious in manufacturing Bachelors 
and Masters of Arts. The mad race after so-called academic education on which 
people in India are started, accounts for a good deal of their sad neglect of solid 
industrial pursuits.152 
 
In 1897, Bhownaggree presented a paper to this forum outlining the necessity for a technical 
education system in India. He argued that it would address the country’s current economic 
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stagnation caused by the decline of native industries against advanced western competition. He 
proposed that India’s export of raw resources and labor to the West was the result of the neglect 
of technical education by the state and educated Indians. Specifically, he focused on India’s lack 
of industrial and commercial expertise in agriculture and manufacturing. He provided statistics 
on the raw export and finished import totals of wool, seeds, and sugar to show that a lack of local 
expertise in developing such products sustained a transfer of wealth to foreign countries and 
commercial middle men. With regards to the manufacture of personal and household items for 
the middle and wealthy classes, he challenged the lasting fallacy that India represented a huge 
emporium of industries. He demonstrated that all these items were European made, and that even 
local furniture was only put into form by springs, lining, hinges, nails, locks, and tools made 
abroad.153 He contended that “a little labour on the spot” through local manufacturing would 
“offer to millions of her poorest inhabitants the means of subsistence.154  
 Moreover, he submitted that this transference of wealth was sustained by a generational 
prejudice against industrial pursuits in favor of literary and professional education. As an 
example, he showcased the changing attitude of Bombay’s Parsi community in regards to the 
growing popularity of non-trade work: “The sons of former merchants and dockmasters, of 
furniture makers and ship-chandlers, are most of them glutting the medical and legal professions 
                                                 
153 M.M. Bhownaggree, “Technical education in India – Part II., present condition and prospects, ‘tech. ed. Cong.” 
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or content to be petty clerks and school teachers.”155 In terms of a way forward, he highlighted 
Bombay’s Victoria Technical Institute, a state sponsored institution which taught the production 
of household and office goods, and Raja Deen Dayal’s photographic business as demonstrating 
India’s capacity for industrial pursuits. He concluded that technical instruction would raise the 
people’s estimation of British dominion over the subcontinent. 156 
In a 1901 Times of India interview regarding famine in North-central and Western India, 
Bhownaggree proposed that the current devastation was the result of the population’s over 
reliance on the agricultural industry.157 Moreover, he argued that this was compounded by a 
drain of money from the export of raw materials and importation of foreign made goods from 
continental powers. In contrast to Naoroji’s famous “drain theory” that laid the blame for India’s 
poverty on its official and commercial financial obligations to Britain, Bhownaggree maintained 
that the wealth drain was the consequence of prioritizing academic over technical instruction.158 
He argued that if industrial, scientific, and technical workshops were founded fifty years ago 
instead of universities, “the natives of India would have…been by now manufactures, skilled 
artisans and labourers…they would not be a quarter so dependent as they are now upon foreign 
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manufactures…which they require for everyday use.” 159 Later in 1901, he traveled to Bombay, 
Bhavnagar, Surat, and Ahmedanagar to promote technical education for social and economic 
development. In a public address in Surat, Bhownaggree stated that a lack of industrial growth 
had caused perpetual famine and disease in India. He urged the audience to equate industrial 
development to national strength: “If it is your aim…to strengthen her national existence, to 
enable her to retain the benefit of her vast resources, to hold her own against the attacks and 
affronts levelled against her by more enterprising rivals, you must insist on this weakness being 
removed, this decay of your industrial energy.”160 In Ahmednagar, he proposed that there existed 
a crying want for a well-regulated system of technical education in India.161 In a large reception 
hosted by N.N. Wadia and Jametjee Jejeebhoy at Bombay’s Town Hall, Bhownaggree stated that 
he was pleased to see the early development of industrial schools and training in the City. Trying 
to reach a note of conciliation with political opponents in the nationalist camps, he proposed that 
different viewpoints towards achieving national progress and prosperity should be freely 
discussed.  He argued that the development of indigenous crafts and resources, and the treatment 
of Indians in South Africa were issues which everyone could “unite to educate the whole country 
of her just privileges.”162 
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To the United Wards Club of the City of London in 1902, Bhownaggree, with N.M. 
Wadia, advocated for the development of technical education and industrial development in 
India. Focusing on India’s tea industry, he related the consumptive interests of his English 
working class constituents with the employment needs of Indian laborers. He encouraged the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer to consider protecting this industry from foreign competition by 
lowering the tariff on Indian tea.163  In 1903, Bhownaggree attempted to mollify English 
mercantile interests to India’s industrial development.  In response to a Society of Arts paper on 
cotton growing in the British Empire, he argued that beyond state support for base technical 
training, the Government should promote indigenous production by removing the injustice of the 
excise duty forced on Indian cotton manufactures. He proposed that the maintenance of “this 
monstrous duty” would be detrimental to Lancashire interests as it encouraged “a middle 
educated class of great influence” to prevent the growth of Indian cotton for English 
production.164 Although at odds with the political demands of Indian nationalists, Bhownaggree 
partnered with them in advancing a demand for the State’s obligation to support India’s technical 
and material development. In denying that Indian Home Rule would reverse India’s economic 
degradation, he maintained that a nationally inclusive British Empire could enhance the 
country’s social and material prosperity.   
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During and after his tenure as Conservative MP for Bethnal Green North-East, 
Bhownaggree’s political position on tariff reform and Indian emigration centered on the 
advantages that the Empire could have for British and Indian national and individual prosperity. 
To that end, he negotiated India’s inclusion within Joseph Chamberlain’s vision of imperial unity 
which pervaded conservative politics early in the twentieth century. Like most others in the 
Conservative Party following Joseph Chamberlain’s 1903 pronouncement in favor of preferential 
tariffs to protect British and imperial trade from foreign competition, Bhownaggree transitioned 
from an early caution to eventual support for the program. To his constituency, he initially 
argued that although personally unconvinced by preferential tariffs, he supported an inquiry to 
determine whether they would improve the standard of living for London’s working men. 
Moreover, in comparing Britain’s 1.4 million in starvation to the prosperous tariff protected 
countries of the United States, Germany, and France, he wondered whether the Empire could 
alleviate the material condition of the population: 
We have at our disposal the market of a world-wide empire; we have the skill and the 
resources and the energy to fill those markets, and yet we find ourselves beaten in 
those very markets by foreign competitors, our own workmen left unemployed, while 
those of other countries find profitable occupation.165 
 
In November 1903, the Times of India credited Bhownaggree’s correspondence with 
Chamberlain for incorporating India into a larger debate on imperial preference. Although stating 
that he doubted the advantages, the Times related his support for an inquiry with the likes of 
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Lethbridge and Sir Edward Sassoon. 166 In a meeting with the North-East Conservative and 
Unionist Association a month later, he aligned with the constituents’ view by stating that 
depressed local handicraft and industrial production had shown that Cobden’s free trade ideals 
were not working.167 In the 1905 election, in which Bhownaggree was defeated by Sir E. 
Cronwall, Chairman of the London Country Council, he supported tariff reform and imperial 
preference which, he argued, would inhibit foreign goods from entering Britain, Ireland, India, 
and other parts of the Empire.168  
Bhownaggree solicited British understanding and action towards protecting the economic 
and social rights of Indian communities throughout the Empire. Responding to lascar living and 
working conditions and abuses against Indian migrants in South Africa and Canada, he 
contended that the Imperial government was obligated to defend their equal status as common 
imperial subjects. In terms of Lascars serving on British merchant and government vessels, 
Bhownaggree challenged English attempts to deter their employment. This included being a 
witness in the Merchant Marine Committee’s 1903 investigation of Lascar employment in 
Britain. He challenged J. Havelock Wilson, British Seamen’s Union member, on the point that a 
recent ruling proscribing lascars equal living accommodations was fair. Although personally not 
opposed to the principle of equal accommodation, Bhownaggree argued that Lascars did not 
need the increased space and comfort, and it discouraged their employment by raising costs on 
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the employer.169 To a lascar filled hall in Bombay, Bhownaggree stated that their labor competed 
with European and not British sailors, and that the English working class’s natural tendency to 
protect themselves from foreign labor would be checked by patriotism for the Empire and India. 
He believed that the knowledge that they were depriving “their fellow-subjects their inherent 
right to legitimate occupation and to deprive them of their almost sole means of subsistence…” 
would encourage their sympathy. 170 In 1904, Bhownaggree condemned the Australian 
government’s decision to refuse an imperial mail contract due to deliveries possibly being made 
by lascar-manned ships. In a Society of Arts discussion, he proposed that advocates for imperial 
unity should begin by denouncing restrictions on Indian movement and emigration which caused 
irritation in India: “He did not think he would be doing his duty as a citizen of Imperial Britain, 
if…he did not point out that great defect which had been made manifest in many ways in the 
policy of Australian Commonwealth.”171   
Bhownaggree’s predominant concern was the equal treatment of Indian emigrants and 
overseas communities and emigration throughout the Empire. Specifically, he condemned the 
denial of equal economic and social rights to Indians in South Africa and Canada. He argued that 
rather than a national concern for protecting local trade, their restrictions on Indian emigration, 
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possession of property, and civil rights were due to the racial prejudice of white colonialists. He 
maintained that Britain had an imperial obligation to protect and enhance Indian interests within 
the empire as common imperial subjects. In an interview for the Graphic, published in the Times 
of India, Bhownaggree proposed that Indians in the Transvaal had been better treated under the 
Boers than they were under current British rule. He argued that although British opinion 
condemned Paul Kruger’s, former President of the South African Republic, unfair treatment of 
Indians leading to the South African War, the current British government continued to treat 
British Indians “as if there were semi-savages” at the prejudicial behest of the Colony’s White 
League.172 In 1902 correspondence with Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Bhownaggree detailed the deteriorating plight of Indians in the British Transvaal. 
Emphasizing Britain’s previous pledges towards color non-discrimination, including 
Chamberlain’s 1897 Colonial Conference speech opposing restrictive immigration laws, he 
argued that the Imperial government had the right and obligation to protect the Indians against 
Transvaal’s attempts to remove their civic and economic liberties. This included provisions that 
all new Indian traders must live and transact in designated Bazaars unless they pass an English 
education test. In addition, Indians were subjected to property appropriation without the right to 
appeal, disallowed from municipal electoral rolls, and coolies, Indian indentured labor, were 
restricted from remaining after their employment.173 In referring to Chamberlain’s mission to 
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strengthen imperial unity, Bhownaggree warned that a failure to redress Indian humiliation and 
injustice would mean “the Imperial connection is dissolved into a mere figment.”174 With a close 
association to Bombay’s merchant community, he took issue with the social degradation faced 
by traders. He argued that this included their forced congregation with lower class coolies, and a 
broad colonial terminology that classified Indians with the Chinese as “Asiatic” or with 
“uncivilized” Africans as “Native”.175  
In 1905, Bhownaggree introduced a parliamentary motion lambasting the degrading and 
harsh measures faced by Indian subjects in British colonies, especially South Africa.  It called on 
the Imperial and Indian governments to intervene for Indian fair treatment as British subjects. He 
argued that if the colonial governments would not protect “the elementary rights and liberties of 
British citizenship,” the Government of India should retaliate with a reciprocation of restrictive 
laws against colonials. This would clearly show that “the real sting…against British Indians 
consisted in lowering them in the sight of other peoples of the globe.” 176 In 1913, Bhownaggree 
presided over the London Canadian Indian Immigration Committee which protested against the 
Government of Canada’s newest restrictions on Indian immigrants. This centered on their 1907 
“continuous journey clause” which excluded Indian entry into Canada if they stopped at another 
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port on route. Bhownaggree contended that this ordinance made Indian immigration, which had 
already amounted to 4,500 people who were mostly Sikh, employed in agriculture, and settled in 
British Columbia, almost impossible as no commercial steamship travelled directly from India to 
Canada, and no direct ticket could be purchased in India to Canada. 177 While a twin Parsi and 
British identity informed a class and race prejudice, Bhownaggree argued for an incorporative 
common imperial subjecthood which entitled certain “alienable” rights to Indians under the 
Crown. In a career elevation through Bhavnagar, Bombay, and Bethnal Green, his opposition to 
Indian nationalism, advocacy for female and technical education, and protection of Indians 
abroad, was predicated on the principle that the British Empire had a benevolent obligation to 
encourage expansive economic opportunity for India’s diverse populations.  
Conclusion 
Bhownaggree’s experience with Bhavnagar and Parsi’s benevolent collaboration with the British 
paramount power informed his contribution to a conservative imperial tradition in India. His 
contention that the Imperial state was reciprocally obligated to encourage local and prescriptive 
actors to jointly contribute for India’s national development represented a challenge to liberal 
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imperialist’s and Indian nationalist’s centralizing and democratic ambitions in India. 
Bhownaggree proposed definitions of empire and nation to suit the subcontinent’s particular 
divisional landscape.  Rather than the universal application of metropolitan political laissez-faire 
economy and representative institutions, Bhownaggree saw the Imperial state as obliged to 
promote the social and economic development of the aggregate national interests of India. In 
rejecting the Indian National Congress’s determination to create a homogeneous Indian 
nationality, he proposed and defended, in the case of lascars and in South Africa, the people of 
India’s vertical association and equality as common imperial subjects. This represented not only 
a contribution to conservative imperialism in India, but also to a larger conservative movement 
to strengthen empire as a nationally prescribed institution in Britain and the Dominions.  
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Section Conclusion 
Lethbridge’s and Bhownaggree’s contributions to a conservative imperial tradition reflected their 
efforts to conciliate British and Indian national sentiment within a mutually inclusive and 
beneficial conception of empire. Primarily, this meant encouraging British politicians and 
commentators, especially in conservative circles, to incorporate India’s national characteristics 
within an inclusive and non-racial framework of empire. In legitimating the Empire’s 
compatibility with local and national difference, both figures challenged the universal and 
centralizing precepts of liberal imperialism and Indian nationalism in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. In criticizing the prejudiced effects of a metropolitan liberal political 
economy of free trade and laissez-faire, they argued that the Imperial state had an obligation to 
protect and enhance the skills and industries needed for India’s social and economic 
development. Moreover, they argued for an inclusive empire which allowed Indian states, 
minority communities, and social elites to locally contribute to an imperial institution which 
reciprocally protected their political and economic autonomy. Therefore, they argued for an 
inclusive and non-racial definition of imperial subjecthood which entitled all populations 
reasonable equality under the Crown.  Although ultimately failing to convince British and Indian 
nationalists to conciliate their interests within an inclusive imperial framework, they utilized 
personal experience and an existent conservative tradition, defined by Ellenborough, Disraeli, 
Mayo, Lytton, and the Kathiawar States, to promote discussion of India’s national status and 
condition in the British Empire.  
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Thesis Conclusion: Conservative Imperialism Defined  
This thesis has argued that a conservative imperial tradition in India was predicated upon the 
primary concepts of locality, prescription, and imagination. Through a study of British and 
Indian conservatives from the Indian Revolt to the First World War, it has been argued that these 
concepts informed coherent intellectual challenges and political alternatives to the universal, 
centralizing, and rational precepts of liberal imperialism and nationalism. This study reveals that 
Britons and Indians employed local and pre-modern forms to define an oppositional and 
constructive conservative imperial framework. Conservatives responded to the Indian Revolt, 
Imperial Assemblage, and Indian Nationalism by communicating their apprehensions and 
solutions through partisan discourses within the imperial intersection of British and Indian 
politics. All conservatives contended that the British Empire in India must be a collaborative 
institution which conciliated local and national institutions, customs, and prejudices.  
This thesis has demonstrated that British and Indian conservatives had intellectual 
capacity and coherency to broaden locally conceived ideologies and institutions to address the 
philosophical and governing dynamics of a global empire. In a sense, this represented their 
ability to comprehend and structure a diverse polity through a political and social philosophy 
predicated upon the assumption of an irrational and differentiated human nature. More 
specifically, they had to adapt a political and social creed, which is instinctively nationalist and 
hierarchical, to imagine and define imperial objectives and common identity. Rather than 
viewing conservatives as too parochial or nationalist to approach empire, this dissertation’s 
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central premise is that nineteenth century conservative understanding(s) of human nature 
facilitated an essential imperial recognition, acceptance, and collaboration with difference.  
The significance of locality, prescription, and imagination to shaping conservative 
inclination and action on Indian empire is shown in the preceding chapters. An attachment to 
locality and prescription is resonant in Mayo’s and Bhownaggree’s experience and engagement 
with empire. Their espousal of a conservative imperial discourse of loyalism and obligation 
reflected their minority and privileged position within the empire. Mayo’s experience mitigating 
political, social, and sectarian strife as Irish Chief Secretary shaped his Indian viceroyalty. This 
informed a principled acknowledgement that the state had a reciprocal paternal obligation to 
decentralize authority and empower a well-instructed princely and propertied interest. Moreover, 
his Irish experience in trying to accommodate a national education system for disparate Anglican 
and Catholic communities informed a recognition that the state must provide scholastic 
opportunities for India’s marginalized ryot and Muslim communities. Bhownaggree’s association 
with the Conservative Party, and proclaimed representation of “conservative India” and an “anti-
congress party,” reflected a belief that only the British Empire could defend, enable, and 
collaborate with Bhavnagar’s and the Parsis’ local autonomy and authority. This position 
informed a conception of an “Indian nation” as a politically divided, socially hierarchical, and 
culturally divided space and population held in aggregate by separate vertical loyalties and 
obligations to Britain. Therefore, he rejected a liberal conception of a horizontal Indian national 
identity and political centralization as proposed by the Indian National Congress and the 
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vernacular press. In implementing constitutional reform in Bhavnagar and associating with a 
charitable Bombay Parsi community elite, he argued that constructive initiatives, such as female 
and industrial education to raise India’s mass material condition, required benevolent British 
collaboration with local states, groups, and individuals. 
The expressions of imperial loyalty and obligation from an Irish Protestant and Indian 
Parsi reflected the significance of imagination for conservatives to conceptualize, construct, and 
communicate a functional imperial polity. This thesis has proposed that conservative imagination 
was defined by an intellectual association and political deference to pre-modern ideas and 
institutions based upon local, historical, and transcendent qualities. Specifically, it used place, 
precedent, and the extraordinary to challenge liberalism’s reasoned and progressive justifications 
for empire. This informed a significant departure from a liberal civilizational, European 
conception of race and identity. This thesis argued that conservatives imagined an imperial polity 
in which individuals and groups were identified, differentiated, and incorporated through their 
supposed belonging to a particular place, tradition, and custom.  
For Disraeli, it was Young England’s feudal and historical imagination that conceived 
Tory political opposition to Whig’s liberal destruction of India’s beneficial and harmonious 
ancient institutions which bonded prince, property, and religious custom. Through his novels, he 
critiqued liberal “progress” for causing moral and social decay in England, and questioned how 
this qualified western civilizational knowledge and spiritual superiority over the East. The latter 
informed Disraeli’s derision of liberal imperialism’s destruction of national institutions and 
 287 
 
social harmony in Ireland and India. Amidst the Indian Revolt, this derision informed his 
argument that it was British culpability over the Whig Party’s state sanction of political 
annexation, property confiscation, and religious interference which led to “national” uprisings 
across India. 
 Ellenborough and Lytton employed imagination in appropriating India’s historical 
political, social, and cultural representations to entice traditional ruling and mass support for the 
British Empire. Their unpopularity among British, and especially Liberal, commentators 
represented their disregard for metropolitan race and social prejudice in order to conciliate 
India’s national interests. Ellenborough’s contended that he acted upon the historical and 
political traditions of his “adopted country” in regards to the Somnauth Proclamation, the 
sacking of Saugar’s European administration for social disrespect, and intervening militarily in 
Sind and Gwailor. His contention that the British paramount power should act like an “Asiatic 
country,” informed his partisan condemnation of Canning’s Oudh “confiscation” Proclamation 
which lacked sympathy and justice for a population disturbed by British annexation and religious 
interference. Lytton’s Imperial Assemblage and Indian Privy Council employed traditional titles, 
symbols, and practices to inspire aristocratic loyalty and collaboration to empire. These were 
imaginative endeavors to use pre-modern devices for strengthening aristocratic leadership and 
authority against the individually degenerative qualities of modern society and political 
liberalism. Moreover, Lytton and Ellenborough shared a vision of reincarnating the spirit of 
Mughal power by elevating Queen Victoria to Empress over a feudatory India in the old imperial 
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capital of Delhi. This represented a conservative endeavor to equate British imperialism with the 
Subcontinent’s history and political tradition.  
It was an expansive conservative imagination tied to locality and prescription that 
embodied the 1858 Queen’s Proclamation and Lethbridge’s scheme for imperial federation. Both 
were conservative imperial responses to Indian national discontent caused by liberal imperialist 
and nationalist ambitions. For Disraeli, Ellenborough, and Stanley, the Queen’s Proclamation 
replaced avaricious corporate administration with the nobler foundations of Crown rule, and 
redressed a legacy of liberal state annexation, property confiscation, and cultural interference. It 
established an Indian Queen and administration which was obligated to protect and collaborate 
with India’s princes, secure property title, and not interfere with local religion. It constituted a 
“vertical” imperial polity and identity defined by a reciprocal loyalty and obligation between the 
Crown and different Indian States, property interests, and ethnic and religious groups. Moreover, 
the Proclamation informed a conception of a hierarchical and culturally divided India held in 
aggregate by an external British power. This prioritized a definition of belonging whereas states, 
groups, and individuals could link their local status to a greater imperial identity and 
subjecthood. This conditioned a British Conservative acceptance of Bhownaggree’s twin 
Bhavnagar and Parsi identities with empire, but discriminated against Naoroji and the Indian 
nationalists who were seen as alien to India for fashioning a horizontal national identity around 
western education and political philosophy.  As with the Parsi and the Muslim communities’ 
opposition to Indian nationalism through empire loyalism and obligation, this created an 
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opportunity for the Kathiawar States to enhance local autonomy and authority through imperial 
collaboration. Just as they established the Karbharis States’ Meeting to protect their 
independence from political agent centralization, they contributed and participated with a British 
initiated Rajkumar College to strengthened individual leadership and form imperial associations. 
In utilizing the space provided by Mayo’s and Lytton’s recognition of British financial and 
political weakness in India, they funded and managed social and economic local development to 
strengthen state autonomy and authority in the British Empire. 
Lethbridge’s conservative endeavors to conciliate Indian national interests to empire was 
an imagined response to the growing antagonism between liberal imperialism and nationalism in 
the late nineteenth century. He recognized that educated Indians’ legitimate national expressions 
to protect domestic political and economic interests while maintaining a loyal imperial 
contribution were being thwarted by liberal free trade and laissez faire orthodoxy. He argued that 
it was only through a conservative imperial tradition of Disraeli and Lytton that the Empire could 
be strengthened through the necessary establishment of a constituted union with India’s princes 
and an imperial preference system to enhance British and Indian industry. Moreover, his 
arguments for imperial preference reflected Ellenborough’s mid-nineteenth century contention 
that India’s exclusive trade with empire, and not the United States, would mutually strengthen 
British and Indian material development. The failure of Lethbridge and British conservatives to 
fit the national “square” into the imperial “hole” represented their inability to convince Indian 
commentators that metropolitan decision and prejudice would facilitate a fair and equal imperial 
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economic system for India’s industrial development. Moreover, a conservative imperial tradition 
which viewed India as a divided country only held together by British power made it hard to 
acknowledge that a democratic and centralizing liberal nationalist movement could represent the 
Subcontinent’s interests.   
 Just like British conservatives, Indian conservatives, who expanded their political and 
social identity with a higher loyalty and obligation to the Empire, became increasingly 
unrepresentative in twentieth century India. While accepting Hardiman’s argument that an Indian 
political conservatism was non-existent after Indian Independence in 1947, this thesis 
demonstrates that there existed an ideologically and discursively coherent conservative “anti-
congress party” in the late nineteenth century. Politically determined to protect local and 
prescriptive institutions through loyalty and obligation to empire, they challenged the Indian 
National Congress’ abstract and centralize representation of India. As was the case across the 
empire, a conservative imperialism in India weakened following the national sacrifices of the 
First World War. Many conservatives like Coswanji Jehandier became moderate liberals to 
defend measured constitutional progress under British guidance against more “extreme” 
nationalists. Increasing British capitulation to a Hindu dominated Indian Nation Congress, 
influenced Muslim loyalists, like Raffiudin, to engage in a Muslim nationalist cause for an 
independent Pakistan. Bhownaggree maintained his loyalty to British imperialism, but was 
increasingly politically isolated while living in Britain. The princes, including those of the First 
Class Kathiawar States, organized themselves to defend their autonomous interests within the 
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Chamber of Princes. The princes, however, tied to vertical allegiances with the Crown became 
unable to engage in collaborative horizontal action. Their autonomous positions became 
increasingly indefensible with imperial dissolution and Indian federal governance.    
  The failure of conservative imperialism represented the success of liberal nationalism. It 
represented Lethbridge’s and Bhownaggree’s inability to refashion a conservative imperial 
tradition, based on local or national vertical loyalties and obligations to empire, to conciliate the 
increasingly self-interested and democratic British and Indian nationalist interests. Despite this 
failure, the thesis shows that from the Indian Revolt to 1914, conservatives actively shaped 
British imperial perspective and practice in India. They employed local, prescriptive, and 
imaginative inclinations and institutions to challenge a liberal civilizing mission, and construct 
an imperial framework which centered on collaborative relationships. The longevity of 
conservative thought and collaborative participation in empire warrants further study on how 
imperial perspective and policy were politically contested in local and global areas. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 292 
 
Bibliography  
 
 
Private Papers and Government Records 
 
Bonar Law Papers, BL, United Kingdom Parliamentary Archives. 
Disraeli Papers, Dep. Hughenden 1-382, Bodleian Library, University of Oxford 
Edward Law, 1st Earl of Ellenborough: Papers, Pro 30/12, The National Archives 
IOR/R/1 India Office Records and Private Papers, Crown Representative’s Records: Political    
            Department Records 
IOR/R/2 India Office Records and Private Papers, Crown Representative’s Records-Indian States  
            Residences 
IOR/L/E India Office Records and Privates Papers, Economic Department Records  
IOR/L/R India Office Records and Privates Papers, Record Department Papers 
IOR/P/3344 India Office Records and Privates Papers, Bombay Proceedings 
IOR/L/R/5 India Office Records and Privates Papers, Indian Newspapers Reports 
Papers of Lord Mayo, MS 7490, Cambridge University Library 
Papers of Sir George Birdwood, Mss Eur. F216, Asian and African Studies, British Library 
Papers of 4th Baron Harris as Governor of Bombay, Mss Eur. E256, Asian and African Studies, 
British Library 
Papers of the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Mss. Eur. F111, Asian and African Studies, British 
Library 
Papers of 1st Viscount Cross as Secretary of State for India, Mss. Eur. E243, Asian and African 
Studies, British Library 
Sir Roper Lethbridge Papers, Mss Eur. B182, Asian and African Studies, British Library 
 
 
Published Primary Collections 
 
Balfour, Lady Betty ed., The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 1876-1880: 
compiled from Letters and Official Papers. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1899. 
———.Personal & Literary Letters of Robert Earl of Lytton, Vol. 2. London: Longmans, Green, 
and CO, 1906.  
Bhownaggree, M.M.  “The Present Condition and Future Prospects and Female Education in 
India.” Journal of the Society of Arts, v. 33 (Nov 1884-Nov 1885): 453-456. 
———.“Technical education in India – Part II., present condition and prospects, ‘tech. ed. 
Cong.,” Journal of the Society of Arts, v. 45 (Nov 1896-Nov 1897), 1000. 
Bourke, Richard Southwell. St. Petersburg and Moscow. New York: Arno Press & the New 
York Times, 1970. 
 293 
 
Derby, Edward Henry Stanley. Disraeli, Derby, and the Conservative Party : Journals and 
Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 1849-1869. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978. 
Disraeli, Benjamin, Whigs and Whiggism : Political Writings. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat 
Press, 1971 
———.Benjamin Disraeli Letters. 7 vols. Toronto Ont: University of Toronto Press, 1982. 
———.Coningsby or the New Generation. Teddington, Middlesex: The Echo Library, 2007. 
———. Tancred: Or the New Crusade. Teddington, Middlesex: The Echo Library, 2007. 
Disraeli, Benjamin, and Sheila Mary Smith. Sybil, or, The Two Nations. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Ellenborough, Edward Law, and Reginald Charles Edward Abbot Colchester. A Political Diary, 
1828-1830. London : R. Bentley, 1881. http://archive.org/details/politicaldiary02elleuoft. 
Ellenborough, Edward Law Earl of, and Arthur Wellesley Duke of Wellington. History of the 
Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough: In His Correspondence with the Duke of 
Wellington. To Which Is Prefixed, by Permission of Her Majesty, Lord Ellenbourough’s 
Letters to the Queen During That Period. R. Bentley and Son, 1874. 
Framjee, Dosabhai. The British Raj: Contrasted with Its Predecessors. London: Smith, Elder and 
Co., 1858. 
———. History of the Parsis (New Delhi: Indigo Books, 2002 
Harlan, Aurelia Brooks, and J. Lee Harlan, JR ed. Letters from Owen Meredith (Robert, First 
Earl of Lytton) to Robert and Elizabeth Browning. Baylor University, 1936. 
Lethbridge, Roper. A Short History of India. London: Macmillan and Co, 1881. 
———. The golden book of India: A genealogical and biographical dictionary of the ruling 
princes, chiefs, nobles, and other. London: Macmillan and Co., 1893. 
———. India and Imperial Preference: with statistical tables. London: Longmans, Green, and 
Co., 1907. 
———. The Indian Offer of Imperial Preference. London: P.S. King & Son, 1913. 
Lytton, Edward Robert Bulwer, Earl of, 1831-1891. The Poetical Works of Owen Meredith. New 
York: The American News Co, 
———. King Poppy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1892. 
———. The Life Letters Literary Remains of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton: by his son. Vol. II. 
London: Kegan Paul, & Co, 1883. 
Maharaja of Bhavanagar. Life Sketch of H.H. Sir. Bhavsinhji II, K.C.S.I.,. Bhavnagar,  1911. 
Palwardhan, R.P. ed. Dadabhai Naoroji Correspondence. 2 Vols. Bombay: Allied Publishers 
 Private Limited, 1977. 
 
 
 
Government Publications. 
 
Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Volume VIII: Kathiawar. Bombay: Government Central 
 294 
 
 Press, 1884. 
Aitchison, C.U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and Sunnuds relating to the India and 
 Neighbouring Countries. Vol. IV. Calcutta: Foreign Office Press, 1876. 
A Manual of Karbharis’ Meeting of Kathiawar States [1870 to 1940]. Rajkot: G.K. Shingala, 
 Shingala Printing Press, 1944. 
Agenda Papers for the Karbharis’ Meeting: to be held on the 10th March. Morvi: Maharaja of 
 Morvi, 1933. 
India Department of Finance and Commerce. East India (Tariffs). Views of the Government of 
 India on the Question of Preferential Tariffs. 1904 Cd. 1931 
Minutes of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1907. London: 1907. 
Report of the Comm.ittee on the Subject of Imperial Preference. Calcutta: Superintendent 
 Government Printing, 1920. 
Report of the Indian Fiscal Commission 1921-22. Simla: Superintendent, Government Central 
 Press, 1922. 
Correspondence relating to the Position of British Indians in the Transvaal, Cd. 1684, Aug 1904. 
 
Newspapers and Periodicals  
 
Amrita Bazar Patrika 
Birmingham Daily Post 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine 
Contemporary Review 
Empire Review 
Fortnightly Review 
Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review 
Indian Review 
Indu Praskesh 
Journal of the National Indian Association 
Journal of the Society of Arts 
Kasier-I-Hind 
Leader 
Leeds Mercury 
Lincolnshire Chronicle  
Liverpool Mercury 
Mahratta 
Manchester Times  
Morning Chronicle 
Morning Post  
National Observer 
National Review 
 295 
 
Native Opinion 
Newcastle Journal 
Nineteenth Century and After 
Pioneer 
Quarterly Review 
Saturday Review of Politics, literature, science and art 
Scots Observer 
Standard 
Times 
Times of India  
The Press 
Western Times 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Adelman, Paul. Peel and the Conservative Party, 1830-1850. London: Longman, 1989. 
Bakshi, S.R. Viceroyality of Lord Mayo: administration in India, 1869-1872. New Delhi: H.K. 
Publishers & Distributors, 1990. 
Banerjea, Pramathanath. Fiscal Policy in India. Caluctta: Macmillan and Co., 1922. 
Basu, Aparna. The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1974 
Bayly, C. A. (Christopher Alan). Imperial Meridian : the British Empire and the World, 1780-
1830. London: Longman, 1989. 
———. Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
———. The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914 : Global Connections and Comparisons. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub, 2005. 
———.Recovering Liberties : Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire. Cambridge, 
UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Bell, Duncan. The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future World Order, 1860-1900. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011. 
Bhavnagar, Maharaja of. Forty Years of Rajkumar College: An Account of the Origin and 
Process of Rajkumar College. 2 Vols. London: Hazell, Watson and Viney, 1911. 
Blake, Robert. Disraeli. New York: StMartins Press, 1967. 
Burne, Sir Owen Tudor. Memories. London: Edward Arnold, 1907. 
Cashman, Richard I. The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 
Cannadine, David. Ornamentalism : How the British Saw Their Empire. Oxford ; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 296 
 
———. The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy. New Haven, Conn: Yale University 
Press, 1990. 
———. The Rise and Fall of Class in Britain. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 
Chakravarty, Gautam. The Indian Mutiny and the British Imagination. Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. Imperial Power and Popular Politics : Class, Resistance and the 
State in India, c. 1850-1950. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Charmley, John. A History of Conservative Politics Since 1830. 2nd ed. Houndmills England ; 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
Chaube, S.P. A History of Education in India (Allahabad: Ram Narin Lal Beni Madho, 1965) 
Chatterjee, Partha. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse? 
London: Zed Books for the United Nations University, 1986. 
Chopra, Preeti.  A Joint Enterprise: Indian Elites and the Making of British Bombay. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011. 
Colley, Linda. In Defiance of Oligarchy : the Tory Party, 1714-60. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
Collini, Stefan. “Arnold, Matthew (1822-1888).” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2008.  
Comerford, R.V. “Ireland 1850-70: Post Famine and Mid-Victorian.” In A New History of 
Ireland, 1801-70, Vol. V. Edited by W.E. Vaughan. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 
———. “Conspiring brotherhoods and contending elites, 1857-63.” In A New History of Ireland, 
1801-70, Vol. V. Edited by W.E. Vaughan. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 
Cooper, Frederick. Colonialism in Question : Theory, Knowledge, History. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005. 
Copland, Ian. The British Raj and the Indian Princes: paramountcy in western India, 1857-1930. 
Bombay: Orient Longman, 1982. 
Curzon, George Nathaniel. Lord Curzon in India: being a selection from his speeches as Viceroy 
& Governor General of India, 1895-1905. London: Macmillan and Co, 1906. 
Custine, Marquis de Astolphe. Empire of the Czar: A Journey Through Eternal Russia (1839). 
New York: Double Day, 1989. 
Dave, Harikrishna Lalshankar. A Short History of Gondal. Bombay: Education Society’s Press, 
1889. 
Dickens, Charles. The Life and Adventures of Marin Chuzzlewit. London: Chapman & Hall, 
1843. 
———.New Christmas Story: Dr. Marigold’s Prescriptions. New York: Harper & Brothers, 
Publishers, 1866. 
Dobbin, Christine. Urban Leadership in Western India: Politics and Communities in Bombay 
City 1840-1885.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972. 
Eatwell, Roger and Noël O’Sullivan ed. The Nature of the Right: European and American 
Politics and Political Thought since 1789. London: Pinter Publishers, 1989. 
 297 
 
Erdman, Howard L. The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism, by Howard L. Erdman. 
London Cambridge UP, n.d. 
Ernst, Waltraud, and Biswamoy Pati. India’s Princely States: People, Princes and Colonialism. 
London: Routledge, 2007. 
Feiling, Keith. The Second Tory Party, 1714-1832. London: Macmillan, 1938. 
Fisher, Michael. Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System: 1764-1858. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Flavin, Michael. Benjamin Disraeli : the Novel as Political Discourse. Brighton ; Portland, Or: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 
Gambles, Anna. Protection and Politics : Conservative Economic Discourse, 1815-1852. 
Suffolk, England: Royal Historical Society ; Rochester, NY, 1999. 
Ghose, Sankar. Modern Indian Political Thought.  New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1984. 
Gorman, Daniel. Imperial Citizenship: Empire and the Question of Belonging. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2010. 
Guha, Ranajit. Dominance Without Hegemony : History and Power in Colonial India. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
———. History at the Limit of World-history. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. 
Hachey, Thomas E, and Lawrence J. McCaffrey. The Irish Experience Since 1800: A Concide 
History 3rd ed. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2010. 
Hall, Catherine. Civilising Subjects : Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-
1867. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
Hambly, G.R.G. “Richard Temple and the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868.” English Historical 
Review 79, no. 310 (Jan.1864): 47 
Harlan, Aurelia Brooks. Owen Meredith: a critical biography of Robert, first earl of Lytton. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1947. 
Herbert, Christopher. War of No Pity : the Indian Mutiny and Victorian Trauma. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008. 
Hinnells, John and Alan Williams eds. Parsis in India and the Diapora. London: Routledge, 
2008. 
Hobsbawm, E.J. and T.O. Ranger ed. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 1983. 
Hobson, J. A. (John Atkinson). Richard Cobden, the International Man. London: TFUnwin, 
1918. 
Honderich, Ted. Conservatism. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990. 
Hunter, William Wilson, ed. Comprehensive History of Indian Empire: The Earl of Mayo. Vol. 
25. Delhi: Armol Publications, 1986.  
———.Bombay 1885-1890: Study in Indian Administration. London: Henry Frowde, 1892. 
Ikegame, Aya. Princely India Re-Imagines: A Historical Anthropology of Mysore from 1799 to 
the Present. New York : Routledge, 2013. 
Imlah, Albert Henry. Lord Ellenborough : a Biography of Edward Law, Earl of Ellenborough, 
 298 
 
Governor-General of India. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. 
India and Lord Ellenborough. 3rd ed. London: WHDalton, 1844. 
Jehanghier, J Cowasjee. Life of Sir Cowasjee Jehangier Readymoney. London: 1890. 
Jehu, L. ed. Shaikh Saheb Jehangeermia Saheb of Mangrol, Kathiawar. Rajkot: Mohanlal 
Damodar Mehta, 1937. 
Johnson, Gordon. Provincial Politics and Indian Nationalism: Bombay and the Indian National 
Congress 1880 to 1915. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 
Kale, V.G.  Indian Industrial and Economic Problems. Madras: G.A. Natesan & Co., 1921. 
Kauskik, Harish P. Indian National Movement: The Role of British Liberals. New Delhi: 
Criterion Publications, 1986. 
Kazimi,Ali. Undersirables: White Canada and the Komagata Maru: An Illustrated History. 
Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2012. 
Kelley, Ninette and Michael Trebilcock, The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian 
Immigration Policy, 2nd ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010. 
Kasturi, Malavika. Embattled Identities: Rajput Lineages and the Colonial State in Nineteenth-
Century North India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah. The Ruling Chiefs of Western India and the Rajkumar College. 
Bombay: Thacker, 1898. 
Knight, L.A. “The Royal Titles Act and India,” Historical Journal, vol. 11, 3 (1968): pp. 487-
 507. 
Kidambi, Prashant. The Making of an Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public 
Culture in Bombay, 1890-1920. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2007. 
Latthe, A.B. Memoirs of His Highness Shri Shahu Chhatrapati, Maharaja of Kolhapur, 2 Vols. 
Bombay: The Times Press, 1924. 
Lee-Warner, William. The Protected Princes of India. London: Macmillan and Co. 1894. 
Llewellyn-Jones, Rosie, Rosie Llewellyn- Jones, and Rosie Llewelyn-Jones. The Great Uprising 
in India, 1857-58 : Untold Stories, Indian and British. Woodbridge, UK ; Rochester, NY: 
Boydell Press, 2007. 
Lutyens, Mary. The Lyttons in India: an account of Lord Lytton’s Viceroyalty, 1876-1880. 
London: J. Murray, 1979.  
Lytton, Earl of. Bulwer Lytton. London: Home & Van, 1948. 
Macdonage, Oliver. “The economy and society, 1830-45.” In A New History of Ireland, 1801-70, 
Vol. V. Edited by W.E. Vaughan. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. 
Mangan, J.A. The Games Ethic and Imperialism: Aspects of the Diffusion of an Ideal. New 
York: Viking, 1986. 
Malik, Salahuddin. 1857 War of Independence or Clash of Civilizations?: British Public 
Reactions. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
Masani, R.P. N.M. Wadia and His Foundation. Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961. 
Muhammad, Shan. The Growth of Muslim Politics in India (1900-1919). New Delhi, Ashisi 
Publishing House, 1991. 
 299 
 
McCord, Norman. British History 1815-1906. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
McLane, John. Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University 
Press, 1977. 
McLaren, Martha. British India & British Scotland, 1780-1830 : Career Building, Empire 
Building, and a Scottish School of Thought on Indian Governance. 1st ed. Akron, Ohio: 
University of Akron Press, 2001. 
Mcleod, John. Sovereignty, power, control: politics in the states of western India, 1916-1947. 
Boston: Brill, 1999. 
———. “Mourning, Philanthropy, and M.M. Bhownaggree's Road to Parliament” in Parsis in 
India and the Diapora, edited by John R. Hinnells and Alan Williams (London: 
Routledge, 2008. 
M. de Lepervanche, Marie. Indians in a White Australia: An account of race, class and Indian 
immigration to eastern Australia. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. 
Mehrotra, S.R. The Emergence of the Indian National Congress. Delhi: Vikas Publications, 
1971. 
Mehta, Uday Singh. Liberalism and Empire: a Study in Nineteenth-century British Liberal 
Thought. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
Methta, V.R. Foundations of Indian Political Thought-An Inerprettion-(From Manu to the 
Present Day). New Delhi: Manohar, 1992. 
Metcalf, Barbara Daly. A Concise History of India. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002. 
Metcalf, Thomas R. Ideologies of the Raj. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
———. The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
n.d. 
Mill, James, and William Thomas. The History of British India. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1975. 
Moin, Mumtaz. The Aligarth Movement (Origin and early history). Karachi, Salman Academy, 
1976. 
Morrow, John. Young England: The New Generation : a Selection of Primary Texts. London; 
New York: Leicester University Press, 1999. 
Muhammad, Shan. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan: A Political Biography. Lahore: Universal Books, 
1976. 
Muthu, Sankar. Empire and Modern Political Thought. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
O’Kell, Robert. Disraeli : the Romance of Politics. Toronto ; Buffallo: University of Toronto 
Press, 2013. 
Oza, Uchhrangai Kesharai. The Serfs of Kathiawar: Studies in the land revenue administration of 
smaller states in Kathiawar. Rajkot: Kathiawar Sadhana Services, 1945. 
Özcan, Azmi. Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain, 1877-1924. New York: 
Brill, 1997. 
 300 
 
Özsel, Doğancan ed. Reflections on Conservatism. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2011.  
Palsetia, Jesse. “Honourable Machinations’: The Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy Baronetcy and the Indian 
Response to the Honours System in India,” South Asia Research v. 23, no. 1 (May 2003): 
55-76. 
———.“Merchant Charity and Public Identity Formation in Colonial India: The Case of 
 Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy,” Journal of Asian and African Studies v. 40, no. 3. (June  2005): 
197-217.  
Pandey, Smita. Vision of the Rebels During 1857: Aspects of Mobilisation, Organisation, and 
Resistance. New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2008. 
Pantham, Thomas and Kenneth L. Deutsch ed. Political Thought in Modern India. New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1986. 
Patell, Bomanjee Byramjee. The Parsee Patells of Bombay: Their Services to the British 
Government.Bombay: English and Gujarati Job Printing Press, 1876. 
Pati, Biswamoy. The Great Rebellion of 1857 in India : Exploring Transgressions, Contests and 
Diversities. London ; New York: Routledge, 2010. 
Pati, Biswamoy, and Biswamoy Pati. The 1857 Rebellion. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2008. 
Peers, Douglas. India Under Colonial Rule: 1700-1885. New York: Pearson Education, 2006) 
Percival, E.H. Life of Sir David Wedderburn: Complied From His Journals and Writings. 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co, 1884. 
Pillay, Bala British Indians in the Transvaal: Trade, Politics and Imperial Relations, 1885-1906. 
London: Longman, 1976. 
Pitts, Jennifer. A Turn to Empire : the Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. 
Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 2005. 
Pottinger, George. Mayo: Disraeli’s Viceroy. Salisbury, Wiltshire: Michael Russell, 1990.  
Ralph, Omar. Naoroji The First Asian MP, A Biography of Dadabhai Naoroji: India’s Patriot 
and Britain. St. John, Antigua, Hansib Caribbean, 1997. 
Rahman, Matiur. From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League in British 
Indian Politics, 1906-1912. London: Luzac & Company, 1970. 
Ramusack, Barbara N. The Indian Princes and Their States. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004. 
Rankin, George Claus. Background to Indian Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1946. 
Ransome, Cyril. A Short History of England from the earliest times to the present day. London: 
Rivington, 1890. 
Raymond, E. Neill. Victorian Viceroy: The Life of Robert, the First Earl of Lytton. London: 
Regency Press, 1980.  
Richmond, Charles, and Paul Smith. The Self-fashioning of Disraeli, 1818-1851. Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 301 
 
Robinson, Ronald. Africa and the Victorians; the Official Mind of Imperialism, by Ronald 
Robinson and John Gallagher with Alice Denny. London, Macmillan, n.d. 
Rawal, Munni. Dadabhai Naoroji: A Prophet of Indian Nationalism (1855-1900). New Delhi: 
Anmol Publications, 1989. 
Sack, James J. From Jacobite to Conservative : Reaction and Orthodoxy in Britain, c. 1760-
1832. Cambridge England ; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Savailal, Harilal. Samaldas Parmananddas. Bombay: Tatva-Vivechaha Press, 1912. 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. 
Scruton, Roger, R. V. (Roger) Scruton, רוג׳ר מירן סקרוט dna ,ןו،ن توركس ا رجار. The Meaning of 
Conservatism. 2nd ed. -. London: Macmillan, 1984. 
Sharpe, Elizabeth. Thakore Sahib Shri Sir Daulat Singh of Limbdi, Kathiawar: A Biography. 
London: John Murray, 1931. 
Sinha, Mrinalini. Colonial Masculinity: The ‘Manly Englishman’ and the ‘effeminate Bengali’ in 
 the late nineteenth century. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995. 
Singh, Hira. Colonial Hegemony and Popular Resistance: Princes, Peasants and Parliament 
Power. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 1998. 
Singh, Iqbal. The Indian National Congress: A Reconstruction Volume One: 1885-1918. New 
Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987. 
Singh, St. Nihal. Shree Bhagvat Sinhjee: The Maker of Modern Gondal. Gondal: Golden Jubliee 
Committee, 1934. 
Smith, Vincent A. History of India: From the sixth century B.C. to the Mohammedan conquest, 
including the invasion of Alexander the Great. London: The Grolier Society Publishers, 
1906. 
Spodek, Howard. Urban-rural intergration in regional development: a case study of Saurashtra, 
India, 1800-1960. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. 
Stern, Philip J. The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations 
 of the British Empire in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.  
Stokes, Eric. The English Utilitarians and India. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963. 
Sykes, Alan. Tariff Reform in British Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979. 
Tambs-Lyche, Harald. Power, profit, poetry: traditional society in Kathiawar, western India. 
New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1997. 
Thompson, Andrew. Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics C. 1880-1932. Harrow: 
Pearson, 2000. 
Tupper, C.L.  Our Indian Protectorates. London, 1893. 
Wadia, Ruttonjee Ardeshir. The Bombay dockyard and the Wadia master builders. Bombay: 
1957. 
Wagner, Kim A. The Great Fear of 1857 : Rumours, Conspiracies and the Making of the Indian 
Uprising. Witney, UK: Peter Lang, 2010. 
Anthony Webster, The Twilight of the East India Company: The Evolution of Anglo-Asian 
Commerce and Politics, 1790-1860. Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2009. 
 302 
 
Washbrook, David. “After the Mutiny From Queen to Queen-Empress,” History Today, (Sep. 
1997), pp. 10-15. 
Wedderburn, David. “Protected Princes in India.” The Nineteenth Century: A Review 4, no. 17 
(July 1878) 151. 
Wilberfroce-Bell, Capt. H. The History of Kathiawad from the Earliest Times. London: William 
Heinemann, 1916. 
Wheeler, J. Talboys. The History of the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi. Delhi: R.N. Anjuja, 1982. 
Yajnik, Javerial Umiashankar. Gaorishankar Udayashankar, C.S.I Ex-Minister of Bhavnagar. 
Bhavnagar: Haribhai Vijayashanrkar, 1937. 
Zakarla, Rafiq. Rise of Muslims in Indian Politics: An analysis of developments from 1885 to 
 1906.Bombay: Somaiya Publications, 1970. 
 
